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Abstract 
 
 Discussing, defining and engaging with ‘terrorism’ has long been limited to 
the narrowly framed situations in which parties to an asymmetric conflict resort to the 
use of force and to the legitimacy they have in doing so. The problem with the limited 
understanding of ‘terrorism’ and ‘counterterrorism’ as ‘facts of objective reality’ is the 
lack of attention to the role of the extreme asymmetry of power in conflicts involving 
‘terrorism’ that does not lend itself to analysis readily. This thesis introduces a new 
theoretical concept, the Terrorism Complex that signifies the complexity of 
power/knowledge relations and the complexity of power/knowledge practices that 
operate on a discursive and non-discursive level through time and are affected by the 
mechanisms of power that stem from the asymmetry of power between the actors 
involved in a conflict. The research into the Terrorism Complex involves an 
ontological and epistemological widening of the research focus to account for these 
effects of the interplay between power and knowledge on the production, construction 
and perception of ‘terrorism’.  
I draw on postmodern scholarship and the Critical Terrorism Studies to 
present a theoretical and methodological framework that is used to examine the 
production of knowledge in relation to the asymmetries of power. The Israeli–
Palestinian conflict is used as a case study for the study of power asymmetry in the 
political field that determines who will be labelled a ‘terrorist’ and who will be able to 
claim the moral high ground. The research also reveals the surprising extent to which 
the power over discourse obscures the role of the systemic terrorising exercise of state 
power in inducing ‘terrorism’. The final chapter concentrates on the media’s role in 
the Terrorism Complex. It applies the findings from other chapters to observe the 
Terrorism Complex in action. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
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It is important that we start imagining better futures, and for that we need better 
imaginations. 
Paul Cilliers (2005, p. 264) 
 
Discourse on ‘terrorism’1 seems straightforward and readily understandable. 
All too realistic images of violence on the TV screen and spread across the front pages 
are structured in a way that does not leave much to the imagination and the violence 
is either made to speak for itself or is accompanied by generalizing sound-bites and 
grave faces of the politicians professing to rise against the senseless ‘terrorist’ danger 
with all the mighty right that self-defence is entitled to in international relations. This 
thesis’ objective is to examine the relations of power and knowledge that bring about 
and benefit from a narrow and superficial understanding of ‘terrorism’.  
This thesis aims to contribute to the widening of the ontological scope of 
Terrorism Studies. The starting point for research is the observation that treating 
‘terrorism’ in its purely manifest form, which can be explained in an objective manner 
as a tangible fact of reality, is a reductionist approach, since the complicity of symbolic 
struggles in the construction of ‘terrorism’ is left unaddressed. The principal 
hypothesis that this thesis will argue is that the application of the term ‘terrorism’ is a 
result of a complex network of power relations and a feature of a self-perpetuating 
asymmetric distribution of power, which signals an operation of a power/knowledge 
complex in the political, media, and academic settings. The research question 
emanating from observing the socio-political practices underpinning the discourse 
hierarchy, the subsequent establishment of the monopoly over ‘truth’, and its effects 
on the non-discursive reality, is concerned with determining the self-perpetuating 
workings of the power/knowledge nexus behind the social construction of ‘terrorism’. 
The main research focus will be these complex interactions between power and 
knowledge in relation to ‘terrorism’, that will be denoted by a tentative theoretical 
concept – Terrorism Complex. The term Terrorism Complex, for the purposes of this 
thesis, thus signifies the complexity of power/knowledge relations and a complexity of 
power/knowledge practices that operate on a discursive and non-discursive level 
through time.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The use of single inverted commas is meant to signal that this thesis does not consider the meaning of 
this term as fixed but as deeply contested and in need of reconceptualization.  
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There have been at least 109 different definitions of ‘terrorism’ since the quest for 
a general consensus began in 1930s (Duffy, 2005, p. 18). All the attempts to clearly 
define the concept of ‘terrorism’, to specify its unique characteristics and to distinguish 
it from other forms of political violence are ultimately disputed (Crenshaw, 1995a, p. 
4) and the extent of failed attempts to define ‘terrorism’ suggests that its inherent lack 
of neutrality precludes the possibility of a scientific definition (p. 10) especially since it 
relates to armed struggle which is a struggle over perceptions in itself (Bell, 1998, p. 
18).  
The vagueness of the term ‘terrorism’ in combination with its extensive use in 
ordinary language (Hoffman, 2006, p. 1) makes it even less appropriate as a definitive 
term since the commonplace value-laden observations have gotten so pervasive that 
they cannot be ignored (Crenshaw, 1995a, pp. 10-11). The issue with the perceptions 
attached to ‘terrorism’ is that they are subject to change over time (Hoffman, 2006, p. 
3). While a degree of political relevancy and even a hint of legitimacy was not long 
ago part of the perception of ‘terrorism’ as a strategy of last resort in the revolutionary 
fights of national liberation movements after the closing off of all other political 
options (Crenshaw Hutchinson, 2006, p. 80; Wilkinson, 1974, p. 24; Hoffman, 2006, 
pp. 16-17) the post 9/11 discussions of ‘terrorism’ in dominant discourse have given 
rise to another prevalent set of perceptions. Irrational notions such as “evil” and “dark 
forces” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 19) entered centre stage and the dominant discourse 
featured “many policy makers, journalists, consultants, and scholars” that marked the 
advent of ‘new terrorism’, said to be entirely different from the old ‘terrorism’ 
(Crenshaw, 2011, p. 51).  
Perceptions of terrorism as something irrational, unrestrained, fanatical, devoid of 
any values and unprecedented in its scope, capabilities and evil objectives accompany 
the new era of the ‘war on terror’ (Crenshaw, 2011, pp. 51-57) thus making the use of 
the term ‘terrorism’ even more counter-productive for any kind of constructive 
engagement with the signified phenomenon. The term has acquired a new level of 
usefulness as instant delegitimization of one’s opponents, lacking in substance but with 
the power to evoke strong emotions among the audiences and to justify the use of 
extreme ‘counter’ measures.  
The most minimalist explanation of what is signified by the term ‘terrorism’ is 
adopted for the purposes of this thesis: ‘terrorism’ is the use of force for political ends 
that may intend to have a terrorising effect on audiences. This definition includes only 
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the characteristics most commonly found in the definitions of ‘terrorism’ (Schmid & 
Jongman, 1988, pp. 5-6) in order to eschew the elements of moral condemnation and 
the distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate use of force. The argument 
developed in this thesis is that the moral condemnation and the questions of 
legitimacy have less to do with the nature of actions in a conflict and more with the 
power asymmetries between the actors involved. The conditionality of the terrorising 
intent in the above definition of ‘terrorism’ accounts for the situations when force is 
used as a reaction and not as a premeditated act. The term ‘force’ in the scope of this 
thesis signifies not only armed force but also any kind of exercise of power intended to 
coerce, control, discipline or punish.  
 
Scholarship 
 
The pertinent scholarship will be examined in a separate chapter but some 
introductory remarks here will serve to situate this thesis within the field of terrorism 
studies.  
Even though the amount of academic work on the broad theme of ‘terrorism’ is 
vast, the significant lacuna in the focused questioning and re-examination of the term 
itself has only recently begun to be systematically filled with notable contributions of 
the research conducted by scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). An example 
of this is the discursive critique of the phrase ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in political and 
academic discourse by Richard Jackson (2007a). The opening of the field of terrorism 
studies to unorthodox research approaches has opened new epistemological routes, 
one of which will be explored in this thesis.  
Even though CTS scholars continue to make considerable advances in the critical 
re-evaluation of the concept of ‘terrorism’ the notion that ‘terrorism’ has become a 
common-sense observation, a social product, which should be approached critically is 
not new and a comprehensive array of critical insights can be found in “orthodox” 
works as well as illustrated in the introductory presentation of the term where 
references were made exclusively to orthodox authors (see also: Wieviorka, 1995, p. 
598).  
According to English (2009, pp. 378-381) scholars of the so called Orthodox 
Terrorism Studies (OTS) have on many occasions expressed serious doubts about the 
various facets pertaining to the concept of ‘terrorism’, which is why the significant 
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divide between critical and orthodox research often seems even wider. The sentiment 
is shared by Horgan and Boyle (2008, pp. 51-52) who readily acknowledge the 
contributions CTS has made in terms of offering methodology alternatives, providing 
specific insights into the currents underlying the disputed nature of ‘terrorism’, and 
drawing attention to the need for a more reflective and self-aware scholarship. Yet 
they (Horgan & Boyle, 2008, pp. 53-55) maintain that the central methodological, 
definitional and objectivity-related concerns are shared by a multi-disciplinary array 
of scholars belonging to what CTS refer to as the Orthodox Terrorism Studies. 
Horgan and Boyle (pp. 57-61) are thus sceptical of this division of the field of 
Terrorism Studies and question whether it is just another “unhelpful dualism” 
hampering the potential for dialogue (p. 61). 
Orthodox scholarship poses a lot of relevant questions about the popular 
perceptions of ‘terrorism’ but remains firmly committed to the possibility of 
approaching the problem ‘objectively’ (Jackson, 2011b, p. 109). Orthodox approaches 
thus focus on expanding the knowledge about the objective tangibles of ‘terrorism’, 
about the types, actors and capabilities related to the physical use of force (e.g., 
Hoffman, 2006) and about the practical ways in which to respond to the ‘terrorist’ 
threat (e.g., Wilkinson & Jenkins, 1999). At the borders of the OTS ontological 
spectrum appear the examinations of ‘terrorists’’ motivations, objectives and the 
reasoning related to the immediate social and political realities of the environments in 
which the use of force is manifest (e.g., Crenshaw, 2011).  
Critical terrorism scholarship broadens the ontological scope of ‘terrorism’ studies, 
allows for epistemological variety and is open to the inclusion of the role of subjectivity 
in research (Jackson, et al., 2009a, pp. 216-232). These differences are important 
enough to regard the consolidation of critical approaches under CTS as a positive 
development, especially regarding the potential of CTS to engage with the status quo 
of the general understanding and response to ‘terrorism’ within the theory and 
practice of international relations.  
The work of the CTS scholars (e.g., Jackson, 2007c, 2009a, 2005a; Jackson, et al., 
2009b, 2009a; Breen Smyth, 2009; Breen Smyth, et al., 2008; Ranstorp, 2009; 
Gunning, 2007a) has provided insight into the processes of power involved in the 
construction of knowledge on ‘terrorism’, and has been instrumental in the 
development of the line of reasoning applied to the study of the intangible phenomena 
such as power and knowledge in this thesis.  
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In spite of the potential of CTS to further the understanding of ‘terrorism’ as a 
complex social phenomenon, its position in the field of Terrorism Studies remains 
marginal in relation to the OTS. The mechanisms of power that aim to preserve the 
status quo in which OTS occupy the dominant position are a part of the Terrorism 
Complex. The subjugation of knowledge through the exercise of power from a 
dominant position will thus be discussed in the chapter on the role of the academic 
field in the Terrorism Complex. 
 
Objectives 
 
This thesis will challenge the seemingly factual representations of ‘terrorism’ 
by arguing that the manner in which the portrayal of violence is framed is causally 
linked to the power asymmetry characterizing conflicts with elements of ‘terrorist’ 
violence. This power asymmetry affects political decisions, media coverage, and 
academic research but remains insufficiently addressed by the producers of policies, 
news and research. The thesis will explore the process of assigning meaning to the 
term ‘terrorism’ in order to examine its function as a mechanism of power that 
perpetuates and deepens the power asymmetry. In comparison to the narrowly 
understood term ‘terrorism’ the proposed term ‘Terrorism Complex’ signals a need 
for a more comprehensive understanding, attentive to the fluid dynamics of the 
relations of power that affect and are affected by the discursive particularities, which 
accompany, influence, and construct knowledge about ‘terrorism’ in the international 
realm. 
It thus follows that the main objective of this thesis is to analyse how is 
‘terrorism’ constructed and affected by discursive and non-discursive actions and 
processes in the political, academic, and media fields. The term Terrorism Complex is 
introduced to represent these complex interactions of knowledge and power in and 
across the analysed fields. The Terrorism Complex approach will involve highlighting 
the underplayed and obscured role of the broader historical, social and political 
contexts, which factor into the use of force commonly labelled as ‘terrorism’. The 
focal point of the Terrorism Complex approach will be the connection between the 
subjugated knowledge and the asymmetrical distribution of power among the 
participants involved in an asymmetric conflict. Identification of the systemic 
mechanisms of power that help sustain the power asymmetry is expected to lend 
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insight into the root causes of ‘terrorism’. A critical approach to the security discourse 
that accompanies ‘terrorism’ will address the constructs of knowledge about 
‘terrorism’ and raise questions regarding the complicity of politics, media and 
academe in the active production of the terrorising effect of ‘terrorism’.  
Ultimately the term Terrorism Complex is meant to encapsulate the interplay 
of the power relations that precede and follow an act of ‘terrorism’. It is intended to 
signal the connection between the exercise of power and the dominant discourse that  
perpetuates the widespread preconceptions contained in the ‘–ism’ label of the term 
‘terrorism’, while obscuring the socio-political conditions that underpin ‘terrorism’.   
Since ‘terrorism’ can only be understood in its historical, political, social, and 
institutional context, the ontological basis for its research needs to be adapted to these 
wider contexts. This thesis will develop an argument that ‘Terrorism’, as an extreme 
reaction to the status quo, presents as a symptom of an underlying social malaise 
emanating from a malignant power asymmetry. To avoid addressing the symptom 
instead of the disease is to acknowledge the constitutive role of the status quo practices 
and the accompanying dominant discourses in what is commonly perceived as 
‘terrorism’. The violent act itself needs to be properly contextualized in terms of the 
political, institutional, social and historical issues surrounding it in order to determine 
whether the ’terrorist’ actors’ concerns can be granted a degree of legitimacy. The 
Terrorism Complex approach thus avoids the categorical denial of legitimacy to 
actors engaging in ‘terrorism’ and opens the discursive space to alternative ways of 
political engagement with ‘terrorism’.  
The relations of power that allow for almost anything to be constructed to fit the 
‘terrorist profile’ or be filed under the ‘terrorist threat’ label will be addressed 
primarily. Such construction seems rarely, if ever publicly challenged since dissenting 
voices quickly drown in the dominant discourse and the emerging dominant 
constructs of reality cater to the interests of the dominant elites. It would be naive and 
misguided to approach this research question by mere general criticism of the power 
play behind the discursive relations that ultimately translate into a comprehensive 
image of ‘reality’ since the process to some extent underlies all social interaction 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 121; 1992, pp. 163-170; Lyotard, 1984, p. 15; Foucault, 1972, pp. 
59-60; 2002d, p. 120). Criticism does become imperative when the dominant actor in 
an initially asymmetric conflict uses the advantage of dominant discourse to stifle 
opposing voices and presents a ‘reality’ in which otherwise questionable, even illegal 
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actions become justified. For instance, the application of the term ‘terrorism’ to one’s 
opponents functions as instant legitimization for counterterrorism measures enshrined 
in enabling legislation that demands no other explanations, negotiations or rules 
regarding the conduct of such operations (Jackson, 2011b, p. 223). The process of 
labelling is facilitated by a lack of an agreed upon definition of ‘terrorism’ (Duffy, 
2005, pp. 44-46; Crenshaw, 1995a, p. 10).  
 
 
Method 
 
The selection of methods, their combinations and the justification of their use for 
the purposes of this thesis will be covered in a separate chapter as these choices are 
already a part of the power/knowledge relations included in the complexity of the 
Terrorism Complex. The following brief general outline of methodological choices 
will facilitate further reading.  
The structure of the thesis will follow the workings of power and knowledge within 
and across the heterogeneous fields of politics, media and academe as they intersect at 
the point popularly known as ‘terrorism’. The aim of this thesis is to establish a 
Terrorism Complex framework of the interactions between power and knowledge. 
This aim will be achieved by relating the dominant and the marginalized discourses 
on ‘terrorism’ to the non-discursive reality they emanate from and to the non-
discursive reality they refer to. The alternative, dissenting and supressed voices within 
the fields will serve as sources of subjugated knowledge, which will be used to 
contextualize ‘terrorism’.  
A multileveled analysis is needed to engage with the various levels at which the 
Terrorism Complex operates. The interplay between power and knowledge, and its 
effects will be observed on the levels of individuals, social structures, institutions, 
policies, theories and ideas. In order to address this diversity, the methodology will 
combine elements of critical discourse analysis, Derridean double reading and 
deconstruction, and Foucauldian archaeology and genealogy.  
The mapping of the complex networked phenomena referred to as the Terrorism 
Complex demands broad theorizing that makes the scope of this thesis excessively 
wide. The merits of a comprehensive approach are, however, expected to outweigh 
this risk. When complex problems of the social world are observed and studied in 
	   17	  
minute detail it is easier to loose sight of the ethical considerations that have in the 
pursuit of academic objectivity been relegated to the realm of unquantifiable non-
science (Smith, 2004, p. 513; 2000, pp. 384-385; Hollis, 1994, p. 42). Even though 
issues of international politics are “some of the most fundamental normative issues 
that human beings ever encounter in their lives” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 297), 
the discipline relegates normative approaches to the borderline of acceptable science 
(Smith, 2004, p. 500). The privileging of objectivity over reflexivity and of facts over 
values will be approached as a part of the Terrorism Complex and its effects on the 
non-discursive reality will be problematized as they manifest in the desensitization to 
humanity.  
 
 
1.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
The Theoretical and Methodological Foundation 
 
Chapter 2 will be devoted to establishing a strong theoretical and methodological 
foundation. In view of the stark criticism2 often launched against the non-empiricist 
postmodernist methodologies it is important to devote special attention to detail when 
arguing for a more introspective and abstract type of research. “[A]n interpretive 
epistemology that stresses the dynamic, constructed and evolving nature of social 
reality” is connected to the view that there is “no objective science that can establish 
universal truths or can exist independently of the beliefs, values and concepts created 
to understand the world” (Devine, 2002, p. 201). In the broadest sense the analysis 
will thus be approached from an interpretist position, which problematizes the 
existence of the objective truth and instead focuses on the social and discursive 
construction of the social world (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, pp. 26-27). Theories and 
concepts developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1993, 1988, 1992), Michael Foucault (2002a, 
1972, 1995, 2002b) and Jacques Derrida (2003; 1997, 2001) will serve as a 
philosophical foundation for a theoretically and methodologically well grounded 
research into the workings of the power/knowledge nexus that constitute the 
Terrorism Complex.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Østerud (1996, 1997), Smith (1997), Patomäki (1997) debate is illustrative of the academic 
exchange of opinions on the matter. 
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In order to retain the distance needed to look past the dominant representations 
with the status of ‘truth’ and acknowledge the existence of counter-subjectivities that 
fail to achieve such a status, critical discourse analysis seems to be the most 
appropriate method since it views texts as a selection and interpretation of events and 
“places a lot of emphasis on the implied messages that underlie communication” 
(Riggins, 1997, pp. 2, 10). Politics makes use of discursive practices in constructing 
meanings, values, and views. It is the “dominant, surviving textual practices that give 
rise to the systems of meaning and value from which actions and policies are directly 
legitimated” (Shapiro, 1989, p. 13).  
The analysis of the power currents and knowledge construction in and among the 
academic, political, and media fields will not only map the patterns of interactions that 
maintain the status quo but also those that work to disturb it. The Terrorism Complex 
encompasses both sets of interactions. In order to find constructive relations, and 
untapped potentials that could be applied to intransigent conflicts, the margins of the 
fields need to be consulted. The analysis of the select fields will consist of locating 
representative examples of the dominant and critical approaches to ‘terrorism’. It will 
make use of the subjugated knowledge in order to present a wider context of 
‘terrorism’, containing information on the “political, socio-economic and cultural 
conditions that nurture and sustain terror” (Wilkinson, 1974, p. 22). The juxtaposition 
of the dominant and the subjugated knowledge on ‘terrorism’ is expected to reveal 
contesting clusters of information: the goal oriented pragmatic cluster directly 
connected to the calculated pursuit of power that is endorsed by the centres of power 
in each field in order to preserve the status quo, ,and the cluster of information drawn 
from the margins of the fields that includes the positions of marginal groups and 
reveals wider contexts.  
The research will be applied to the particularities of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 
which features Israel, a sovereign state actor with international backing and Palestine, 
a non-state actor, internally divided, in part due to the active international pressures 
disputing the 2006 election victory of Hamas on the grounds of it being a ‘terrorist 
organization’. The work of Foucault will serve as a theoretical basis on which the 
genealogical examination of this particular conflict will be based. The contours of 
extreme power asymmetry shaping the Israel-Palestinians conflict will be explored and 
the findings will be used to chart the workings of the power asymmetries at the very 
core of the Terrorism Complex. Juxtaposing dominant and marginalized discourses 
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featuring contesting ‘realities’ with corresponding contesting ‘truths’ pertaining to this 
focus example should call the narrow application of the term ‘terrorism’ into question. 
By pointing out the power imbalance in the ability to authoritatively construct an 
image of reality, the pejorative meaning of the term ‘terrorism’ will be examined in its 
role as a delegitimizing label used for political and moral exclusion of opponents 
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 23).  
 
The Academic Field 
 
Chapter 3 will tap into the role of the academic field in relation to ‘terrorism’. 
It is necessary to stress the subjectivity entailed in this task, since I, as the author of this 
thesis and a pretender to a certain position in the academic field, with formed 
personal views on the issues pertaining to the political field, and exposed daily to the 
products of the media field, cannot at any point of this research claim an external 
observer status. A position unaffected by one’s existence in the society is illusory even 
when researchers rely on the most rigorous empiricist methodologies. Subjectivity is 
entailed already in their choice of research focus, in their selection of methods, and in 
the manner they interpret results – in the decisions about what is to be made salient 
and what is to be left out. Social science is “an inside story told by insiders” (Hollis, 
1994, p. 204). One of the more important aims of this thesis is to question the 
partiality and subjectivity in political science, by, as Booth (1995a, p. 330) puts it, “re-
examining basic concepts”’ and “opening up to what has been closed out”. Attention 
will thus be paid to the international relations theory constructing knowledge about 
world politics and presenting it as neutral and objective even though scholarship and 
even truth can be nothing but partial (Smith, 2004, pp. 499-515).  
Smith (1995, p. 3) also draws attention to the lack of ethics in the international realm 
where dominant theoretical discourse accepts and perpetuates dubious international 
practices that “threaten, discipline and do violence to others”. The issue of academic 
‘objectivity’ will be observed in order to test the hypothesis that maintaining the 
construct of ‘objectivity’ ultimately plays a major role in the power relations revolving 
around ‘terrorism’, working to maintain the status quo. The dominant position of the 
orthodox approaches to ‘terrorism’ will be critically evaluated in relation to the power 
asymmetries existing outside of the academic field in an effort to gain insights into the 
relations of power that affect the academic construction of knowledge on ‘terrorism’. 
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The role of the OTS in providing academic justifications for particular 
counterterrorism policies will be traced to the relations between the academic field 
and the field of politics. These relations are expected to explain some facets of the 
power asymmetry between OTS and CTS. The attempts to subjugate critical 
knowledge on ‘terrorism’ will be analysed in the context the field-specific operation of 
the Terrorism Complex.  
 
 
The Political Field – A Genealogy of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict 
 
The political field will be approached as the epicentre of the Terrorism Complex 
since it directs the practices relating to ‘terrorism’ that the other fields necessarily 
respond to and interact with. The analysis in Chapter 4 will focus on the nature of 
power politics in an asymmetric conflict where the dominant actor makes use of the 
delegitimizing power of the term ‘terrorism’ to gain moral high ground and to justify a 
certain type of response. The discourse of securitization (Buzan, et al., 1998b) and  the 
simplistic modern narrative of binary oppositions will serve as signposts for locating 
the arbitrariness, the socially constructed character and the power in imposing 
“subjectivity, objectivity, and conduct” (Ashley & Walker, 1990b, p. 264) in the uses of 
the term ‘terrorism’.  
The decision to use force and the manner in which it is exercised need to conform 
to the international laws on the use of force (e. g., International Committee of the Red 
Cross - Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War [Fourth Geneva Convention], 1949) and the just war theory with its jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello stipulations (e.g., Johnson, 1984, 1991; Lammers, 1990; Coates, 1997; 
Holmes, 1992; Ramsey, 2002) in order to be considered legitimate. This chapter will 
examine the workings of power in the political field prior to the use of force in order 
to test the hypothesis that the interpretation of legal provisions can become an 
exercise of power. The consistent use of rhetorical tools from a position of power can 
make partisan constructs of reality appear as objective representations of reality and 
utilized in support of the more powerful side of the conflict. This is especially 
problematic in cases of extreme power asymmetry, which usually accompany 
instances of ‘terrorism’. When it comes to conflicts the power on the side of the 
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dominant participant is reflected in the dominant discourse operating with signifiers 
such as the term ‘terrorism’. in order to gain certain advantages in the conflict.  
The dangers of interpreting the legal and ethical principles in a way that 
accommodates the preferred version of ‘truth’ become especially acute in asymmetric 
conflicts where the dominant actor has the de facto power and the discursive primacy 
to challenge the legitimacy of the opponent’s political claims and obfuscate their 
relevance. The usefulness of the ‘terrorism’ label in such an exercise of power is at 
least twofold and the two facets are mutually reinforcing: the justification and the 
legitimization of the more powerful actor’s unilateral decisions aimed at satisfying 
particular interests; while at the same time obscuring their own role in creating an 
incendiary social situation. Contributing to the ‘terror’ effect of the opponent’s use of 
force to promote the agenda of the dominant actor is at the core of the political fields’ 
complicity in the Terrorism Complex. To test these claims the spiralling, volatile 
relationship between the reciprocal Israeli and Palestinian actions will be analysed. 
The distribution of power among the participants in the conflict will be determined in 
order to establish the hierarchy of the related discourses as they enter the international 
realm in an effort to define reality. Attention will be drawn to the differences between 
the narratives using the term ‘terrorism’ to legitimize questionable actions and the 
narratives contesting these legitimizations.  
The challenging of ‘the truth’ imposed by a sovereign3 centre provides an opening 
for a reintroduction of ethics hitherto bound by the territorial delimitations imposed 
by the primacy of the sovereign state. In line with Foucault, Ashley and Walker 
(1990a, p. 395) speak of ethics of freedom:  
Where this ethics is rigorously practiced, no voice can effectively 
claim to stand heroically upon some exclusionary ground as a source 
of a necessary truth that human beings must violently project in the 
name of citizenry, people, nation, class, gender, race, golden age, or 
historical cause of any sort (p. 395). 
Discursive construction of the term ‘terrorism’ needs to be brought to the forefront 
before any attempt can be made to deconstruct it. The geostrategic, macroeconomic 
and other interests considered of vital national importance are usually confined to the 
circles of top officials in sovereign states. The classified nature of this information 
precludes reliable identification of specific interests that merit entanglement into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Extensive examination of the concept of sovereignty can be found in the works of Richard K. Ashley 
(1987, 1989, 1988). 
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protracted conflict situations. But these interests can be inferred from the wealth of 
other available narratives on a particular topic, as the chosen example of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict will illustrate.  
The research will focus on the “variety of dissident voices” that can challenge 
“the given, axiomatic and taken-for-granted ‘realities’ of prevailing disciplinary 
discourses” (George & Campbell, 1990, p. 269). “Dissident works of thought” can 
“prompt critical readings” because they draw critical attention to the “seemingly self-
evident narratives” and hint at the “political and theoretical possibilities hitherto 
forgotten or deferred” (Ashley & Walker, 1990a, pp. 375-376). Full advantage of the 
open nature and availability of the Internet will be taken to seek out the information 
not featured, only briefly mentioned, denied, or entirely left out of the dominant 
discourses. This subjugated knowledge is expected to relate to the wider context of an 
asymmetric conflict. It can provide insights into the mechanisms of power and 
methods of oppression that trigger the use of force. The differences between the 
dominant, the oppositional and the marginal political discourses will be stressed in 
order to extend the awareness of the wider political context. The information 
provided by various civil initiatives and non-governmental organizations will be given 
a special role in establishing a wider scope. For the purposes of this research the 
hierarchy of discourses will be overturned by awarding more attention to the 
alternative knowledge constructs than to those featured in dominant narratives.  
The limited and the widened scope of the political field in connection to 
‘terrorism’ will be examined by mapping the dispersion of discursive relations between 
the political assertions of the dominant group and the claims of the marginal group. 
The political field’s interconnections with the fields of media and academe will be 
touched upon but examined in more detail in the media chapter featuring the case 
study that will tie the workings of power across all the examined fields and 
demonstrate how they operate as a Terrorism Complex. 
 
The Terrorism Complex – A Case Study Through the Media Lens  
 
How is the ‘terrorist’ threat framed in the public discourse, how are the 
counterterrorist measures justified, how do these discursive constructs fit into the 
wider context uncovered in the previous chapters and what are the consequences of 
ignoring that context? These questions will be addressed in Chapter 5 by focusing on 
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a time-limited case study of the Terrorism Complex. This covers the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict from the failure of the Kerry-sponsored Middle East peace talks in 
late April 2014, spans over the Israeli ‘counterterrorism’ operation ‘Brother’s Keeper’ 
that followed, and culminates in the Operation Protective Edge. 
Since the media serve as the exclusive mechanism that constructs narratives and 
mediates between the available information on developing events and the audiences, 
an analysis of the media field is inextricably linked with examining the workings of the 
Terrorism Complex as a case study. A very broad definition of the media4 will be 
adopted since the Internet continues to facilitate mass communication on a global 
scale in constantly evolving ways. Narratives from dominant and marginal global 
media outlets and partisan media outlets will be examined. The focus will be on the 
unprecedented potential of the new media as a unique space within the Terrorism 
Complex which is individual-based, less burdened by the direct influences of the 
centres of power, and has shown the potential to bring some balance to the otherwise 
asymmetric discursive situation.  
Chapter 5 will thus study the immediacy of the media field’s reactions to 
‘terrorism’. This chapter will cover a variety of explanations and their dissemination 
by the mass media. It will try to determine how the centres of power in the media field 
relate to the centres of power in the other fields by analysing to what extent the media 
reports on ‘terrorism’ and ‘counterterrorism’ reflect the image of reality constructed 
by the centres of power in the other fields. The narrow examinations of the media 
field in relation to ‘terrorism’ that focus on questions regarding the terrorists’ need for 
publicity or how media reporting on ‘terrorism’ affects media ratings will be left aside 
in favour of examining the less tangible workings of power that place the media within 
the interconnected relations of power of the Terrorism Complex. This line of inquiry 
will study whether the media fulfil their watch-dog function or are swayed by the pull 
of power from the political field, whether they cooperate with academic experts who 
provide in-depth information and context or whether they employ the academic field 
to corroborate certain selections of facts and give these selections a gloss of objectivity. 
The answers to these questions are not intended to serve as a basis for generalizations 
but as a basis for determining the media field’s relations with the other fields in 
connection to ‘terrorism’.. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Methodological choices involved in the selection of the research-relevant media are explained in the 
methodological section of the thesis. 
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In the search for the relations of power that can account for the manner in 
which ‘terrorism’ is presented in the media, the discursive analysis will focus on 
discontinuities and differences. It is only in spaces of dissent and on the margins of 
public discourse that imposed totalities can be disturbed. These are also the testing 
grounds for the theory that it is very difficult for journalists to maintain their 
independence and integrity since the centres of power impose severe constraints on 
the freedom of traditional journalism. ‘Terrorism’ as a media theme is expected to be 
fraught with the similar workings of power as the ones located in the other fields since 
the centres of power connect and  interact in their pursuit of power. When the media 
present shocking narratives of violence without proper context and background they 
produce constructs that feed into the image of reality maintained through the 
dominant discourse. The focus of public attention is oriented towards terrorist 
violence “rather than the politics of political violence” (Karim, 2002, p. 104). This is a 
move consciously or subconsciously consolidated among the centres of power in the 
individual fields striving to maintain the status quo and making use of the power of 
discourse. Dominant discourses in journalism correspond to rationalistic mainstream 
political and socio-economic theories (pp. 102, 113).  
Mostly, the audiences do not critically engage with the news which endows the 
media discourses with a considerable amount of power (Harris, 2004, p. 187). When 
media disseminate the official discourse and indiscriminately apply the label ‘terrorist’ 
to a certain group, they identify it as such, “remove it from the unknown, and then 
assign to it a set of characteristics, motives, values and behaviours” (Bhatia, 2005, pp. 
8-9). At this point the research task will be to question these categories that form 
public knowledge about ‘terrorism’ by consistently relating them to the mechanisms of 
power operating across the different fields.  
 A range of media accounts from the select time frame (April 2014 – July 2014) 
will be examined in order to determine the ways in which mechanisms of power 
operate across the different fields in order to maintain the status quo and strengthen 
the centres of power in the individual fields. The significance of the accounts that look 
into the causes and objectives of the acts of terrorism will be explored for their 
potential to highlight constructive ways to address the root causes of ‘terrorism’. Such 
accounts provide information that does not feed the irrational fears of the audiences 
and thus remove some of the ‘terror’ from ‘terrorism’. Special attention will be paid to 
the accounts that contextualize Palestinian actions by including the relevant historical 
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and socio-political factors.  These accounts will be used throughout the chapter to 
construct an alternative narrative of events. 
This chapter will demonstrate how ‘terrorism’ is presented in the dominant 
discourse that combines the dominant narratives from all fields under analysis as it 
emerges from the media reports. This information will be used to demonstrate that 
the mainstream narrow construct of ‘terrorism’ is yet another mechanism of power. It 
operates within the Terrorism Complex alongside other mechanisms, which ensure 
the marginalization of dissenting voices and consolidate the dominant narratives 
within the narrow limits imposed on the discussions of ‘terrorism’.  
The final chapter will join the other chapters in illustrating the misdirected 
nature of the term ‘terrorism’ and the relevance of a broader understanding of 
‘terrorism’ as a Terrorism Complex. What is widely perceived as ‘terrorism’ will be 
presented as a combined effect of the use of force, and of the accompanying political, 
media, and academic discourses, all marked by significant contextual omissions. 
‘Terrorism’ would not have the terror-inducing effect without the securitizing political 
discourse pursuing various power-related interests, without the academic narratives 
providing legitimization, and without the media narratives uncritically disseminating 
dominant constructs among larger audiences.  
This chapter will ultimately connect the findings of the previous chapters and 
present the completed framework of the Terrorism Complex in action. Dominant 
power currents responsible for the limited scope of the term ‘terrorism’ and 
committed to the status quo across the fields of politics, media, and academe will be 
contrasted with the counter-currents striving to contextualize ‘terrorism’ and induce 
change. Power asymmetries will be recapitulated, and held accountable for the 
persistence of the narrow understanding of the term ‘terrorism’ in political discourse, 
in everyday news, and in academic research. 
The disruption of the dominant discourses and the uncovering of the 
knowledge supressed by the workings of power will challenge the domination of one 
single objective truth. Approaching ‘terrorism’ as the Terrorism Complex opens a 
wider space for research, thought and argumentation. After juxtaposing dominant 
and alternative discourses to substantiate theoretical arguments throughout the thesis, 
a more complex image of reality will form. This image will call into question the 
simplifications and generalizations associated with the term ‘terrorism’, and elicit 
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criticism of the counterterrorism policies, the legitimacy of which depends on selective 
information and the lack of context. 
The final aim is to evaluate the potential of substituting the term ‘terrorism’ for 
the term Terrorism Complex. The change in terminology would not have an 
immediate impact on the ethically compromised counterterrorism methods. The 
potential, however, lays in expanding the narrow treatment of the social and political 
phenomena by consulting the alternative sources of information and locating the 
subjugated knowledge.  
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 2. THE THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION 
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Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open 
towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their 
childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and 
can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their 
heads. 
 
Plato, 360 BC (2007, p. 236) 
 
 
Critical approach to the prevalent epistemological foundations of the social 
sciences is necessary to challenge the established way in which ‘objective’ knowledge 
about the social world is supposedly arrived at. This chapter will address the 
positivism and empiricism in the social sciences and their claims to have the ability to 
express objective truths about the social world through observation and experience. 
The dogma about the possibility of objective knowledge about the social world must 
be theoretically challenged and reasonable doubt has to be established about the 
possibility of objective research prior to engaging in any subsequent analysis, which 
would otherwise risk being immediately disputed on the grounds of its supposed lack 
of scientific value.  
It will be argued that, as far as international policies are concerned, realities of 
the social world come second to the momentary discursive interpretations, which 
compete for the status of legitimate explanations of reality. This proposition will be 
substantiated through the discourse analysis of application and instrumental use of the 
term ‘terrorism’ in various observed discourses, which will be undertaken in the 
subsequent chapters. The uses of the term ‘terrorism’ will reveal what the term has 
come to signify (1974, p. 61; Wittgenstein, 1968, p. 6). The traces of the power struggle 
that determines which discursive interpretation prevails are expected to signal the 
need to uncover the asymmetries of power that determine the meaning of the term 
‘terrorism’ in a given social setting. Appearance of the term ‘terrorism’ in discourse 
will thus signal the need to examine the relations of power that factor into the 
construction of the discourse under analysis. 
Foucault (1972, pp. 47-48) identifies the layer of discourse between the pre-
textual existence of ‘things’ and purely linguistic understanding of language. Discourse 
is not to be “neutralized” or made to be “the sign of something else” that exists prior 
to discourse. What Foucault invites us to do is  
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[t]o substitute for the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to discourse, 
the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse. To 
define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, 
but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as 
objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their 
historical appearance. (1972, pp. 47-48) 
To examine this layer Foucault (1972, p. 179) suggests examining the groups of 
relations that characterize particular discursive practices which operate not only in 
scientific disciplines but can also be found “in operation in legal texts, in literature, in 
philosophy, in political decisions, and in the statements made and the opinions 
expressed in daily life”. Taking up Foucault’s reasoning it is possible to argue that it is 
inadequate and often misleading to study ‘terrorism’ solely as an objective 
phenomenon of the real world. The formation of discursive references related to 
‘terrorism’ and the discursive practices that surround it must be analysed in the spaces 
of their operation in order to determine the use of the term ‘terrorism’ in support of 
the asymmetry of power characterizing a particular asymmetric conflict but also to see 
how it factors into the currents of change challenging the status quo. 
The prevailing knowledge about the social world, influencing and guiding the 
subsequent actions of agents acting in the social world, is the result of the dominant 
discursive practices which are at the same time the product and the producer of the 
complex workings of power between various groups of social agents. In the course of 
this chapter these claims will be inspected as the general cornerstones of the Terrorism 
Complex approach that will guide the proposed understanding of ‘terrorism’ as the 
Terrorism Complex. This wider understanding will also guide the practical research 
into the dynamic complexity of the power/knowledge relations the term Terrorism 
Complex signifies. This complexity is constantly in motion and at any given time 
exposed to the possibility of transformation and change. It is never fixed in its 
existence. It is in a constant state of producing and of being produced. The scope of 
general social knowledge about ‘terrorism’ is moulded through the operation of the 
network of relations, which are influenced by the distribution of power within the 
specific fields where more power means more authority to explain and manage 
‘terrorism’. For the analysis to be able to follow this cyclical process throughout the 
chapters its general ontological and epistemological orientation must be delineated 
and substantiated. 
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Concepts central to the task of understanding the dynamics of the proposed 
new concept of Terrorism Complex are power, knowledge and discourse. There is a wealth 
of philosophical treatments of these concepts, some of which will be explored for their 
potential in informing the proposed course of this research. 
 
 
2.1 POWER 
 
Power is a much-used central term in the study of politics, however its scope 
must be defined in relation to the particularities of the tasks envisioned for this thesis. 
Since the research at hand is not concerned with the points of view characteristic of 
the realist accounts of politics the definition of power will adapt to the discourse-
oriented nature of analysis and focus mainly on the dimension of symbolic power5. 
Some of the more persuasive and comprehensive views on symbolic power are offered 
by Bourdieu (1992, pp. 163-170, 209; 1989, p. 23):  
symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with 
the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to 
it or even that they themselves exercise it (1992, p. 164).; Symbolic 
power is a power of constructing reality, and one which tends to 
establish a gnoseological order: the immediate meaning of the world (and 
in particular of the social world) depends on what Durkheim calls logical 
conformism, that is, ‘a homogeneous conception of time, space, number 
and cause, one which makes it possible for different intellects to reach 
agreement’ (1992, p. 166).; Symbolic power – as a power of constituting 
the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of 
confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action 
on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which 
enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force 
(whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of 
mobilization – is a power that can be exercised only if it is recognized, 
that is, misrecognized as arbitrary. /.../ Symbolic power, a subordinate 
power, is transformed, i.e. misrecognizable, transfigured and legitimated 
form of the other forms of power. (1992, p. 170); A symbolic power is a 
power which presupposes recognition, that is, misrecognition of the 
violence that is exercised through it (1992, p. 209).; Symbolic power is 
the power to make things with words (1989, p. 23). 
What Bourdieu calls “an almost magical power” with the potential equalled to that of 
physical or economic force is in fact the power that resides in discourse.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The political field as the one most closely related, even synonymous with the field of power will also be 
analysed according to the dynamics of symbolic power. 
	   31	  
In Discipline and Punish Foucault (1995, p. 194) raises another set of 
important points that fit at the very core of approaching ‘terrorism’ as a Terrorism 
Complex, such as acknowledging the generative character of power. Power and its 
effects should not be characterized in terms such as: “it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it 
‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces 
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (1995, p. 194). And it 
primarily does so through discourse.  
Another central concept presented by Foucault (1995, p. 305) involves the 
interconnectedness of relations between power and knowledge which is embedded 
into the society and affects our ability to observe and research it, especially to do so 
objectively. Foucault (1972, 1995, 2002b, 2002d) investigates discourses all the way 
from the analysis of texts to the analysis of complex networks between social 
institutions. Foucault’s concepts of genealogy and archaeology will be explored for 
their potential to be combined and applied as useful methodological tools for 
detecting the effects of power in discourse. This methodological choice enables 
research to focus on the ways in which the power exercised through discourse reflects 
into the exercise of power in practice and vice versa. This interaction led to the idea of 
the Terrorism Complex, a dynamic system of relations constantly in motion, which 
functions on the principles of reciprocity between the relations within and among 
discourses pertaining to ‘terrorism’ (effects of power in discourse) and the relations of 
power that operate within the corresponding fields and among the fields (effects of 
power through discourse). 
 According to Bourdieu (1993, pp. 64-65) agents’ choices from the “space of 
possibles” (field) are the result of conscious calculations about the attainability of 
positions of power, and subconscious decisions imposed by their personal dispositions 
(habitus) which guide perceptions and evaluations of the possibles. The relevance of 
the concept of habitus for this thesis lies in Bourdieu’s explanation (1973, pp. 63-67) of 
habitus as a part of a complex social dynamic where particular social structures 
produce habitus as a set of particular and durable dispositions. These dispositions in 
combination with the decisions based on the circumstances of particular social 
situations act as generating principles of general social practices. These social practices 
contribute to the formation of the conditions involved in the production of habitus at 
which point the dynamic is at once completed and starts anew.  
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 According to Bourdieu’s own explanation in an interview (Honneth, et al., 
1986, p. 41) habitus as a concept does not presuppose conscious calculation in 
approaching and performing social actions, even when these actions are goal-oriented. 
Actions are guided rather by agents’ habitus, naturalized and seemingly self-evident 
strategies stemming from the similarities in the social existence of a particular group 
or class whose members are “products of identical objective conditions, which exercise 
a universalizing and particularizing effect insofar as they only homogenize the 
members of a group by distinguishing them from all the others” (Bourdieu, 1973, pp. 
68, 64-69). This theory informs the analysis of some of the central themes of this thesis 
such as the controversy of constructing legitimacy by claiming an objective, external 
observer status, and the inclination towards the exclusion of the ‘other’. It also 
explains the choice of methodology. The potential of discourse analysis originating 
from Foucault’s (1972, p. 55) definition of discourse as “a totality, in which the 
dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined” and as 
“a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed” should be 
realized at this point. Derrida (1997, p. 158) too suggests “critical reading” that 
produces a “signifying structure” by observing “a certain relationship, unperceived by 
the writer, between what he commands and what he does not command of the 
patterns of language that he uses”.  
Bourdieu (1989, p. 21) maintains that the construction of a naturally perceived 
and thus legitimate social world is not an intentional design of social agents but a 
result of a  
fact that agents apply to the objective structures of the social world 
structures of perception and appreciation which are issued out of these 
very structures and which tend to picture the world as evident. 
Objective relations of power tend to reproduce themselves in relations 
of symbolic power. In the symbolic struggle for the production of 
common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly over legitimate 
naming, agents put into action the symbolic capital they have acquired 
in previous struggles and which may be juridically guaranteed./.../ The 
legal consecration of symbolic capital confers upon a perspective an 
absolute, universal value, thus snatching it from a relativity that is by 
definition inherent in every point of view taken from a particular point 
in social space. (pp. 21, 22) 
The stability of the social status quo and its power relations is supported by the 
dynamic of symbolic power which stems from the unequal positions of agents in the 
social order and produces legitimate explanations of the social world that perpetuate 
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the existent social structures (Bourdieu, 1989, pp. 21-22). The research into the use of 
the term ‘terrorism’ is primarily the research into the (re)production of power relations 
that run across the fields of politics, media and academe and of the way in which they 
converge and condense around certain instances where the use of force is combined 
with the political struggle for legitimacy. Understanding ‘terrorism’ as a Terrorism 
Complex will assist in exploring the use of the term ‘terrorism’ as a weapon of choice 
in this struggle.  
 The concept of the field adopted in this thesis was developed in Bourdieu’s 
work. Following Bourdieu’s theory (1993, pp. 38-44) the fields of politics, journalism, 
and academia can be located within the broader field of power which makes their 
agents subject not only to symbolic power stemming from the autonomous principles 
of the respective fields, such as satisfying the expectations of the electorate (2005, p. 
34), ensuring objectivity, autonomy, and ethical reporting in journalism (Deuze, 2007, 
p. 163) or maintaining objectivity and universality in academia (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 
xii), but also to the dominant principles of hierarchization represented by economic 
and political gains in the field of power (1993, p. 39). The choice of the fields of 
politics, media, and academe as the main research areas of the complexity-oriented 
approach to ‘terrorism’ was not an arbitrary selection but one that surfaced after 
observing the most prevalent processes of power surrounding the social construction 
of ‘terrorism’, their origins, and common interactions. Bourdieu’s text (2005, pp. 29-
47) entitled The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and the Journalistic Field looks into the 
same selection and singles out the question of the fields’ autonomy as the most 
important one (pp. 33, 46).  
 The more autonomous the field the less it is guided by the principles of the 
field of power although it can never completely elude them (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 39). 
Least autonomy is expected to be found in the political field since it is the field, which 
together with the economic field bears the strongest resemblance and the closest 
proximity to the field of power itself, which is governed by the laws of “economic and 
political profit” (p. 39). This thesis will present a case for the understanding of 
‘terrorism’ as a much wider phenomenon – the Terrorism Complex by drawing on 
the knowledge provided by the individuals or groups of individuals operating in the 
examined fields whose autonomy and professionalism are less compromised by 
conscious or subconscious adherence to the heteronomous principles of 
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hierarchization “favourable to those who dominate the field economically and 
politically” (p. 40). 
Heteronomous principles of hierarchization in the political field are in part 
synchronous with the autonomous principles since they share political power as the 
most important capital. The political field has a slightly different position from the 
other fields in respect to the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ since its inner asymmetries 
involve the political power domination over the marginalized social group involved in 
an asymmetric conflict together with its political representation. A relationship worth 
exploring is the bearing of this domination on the struggle countering the power 
asymmetry that culminates in the use of force labelled ‘terrorism’.  
The power invested in the use of the term ‘terrorism’ is the starting point for the 
analysis of the Terrorism Complex and can be located in the “struggle over the 
specifically symbolic power of making people see and believe, of predicting and 
prescribing, of making known and recognized, which is at the same time a struggle for 
power over the ‘public powers’ (state administrations)” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 181). It is 
also the power struggle that takes place in and through discourse: 
I am speaking here of the discourse that comes to be, in a pervasive and 
overwhelming, hegemonic fashion, accredited in the world’s public space. 
What is legitimated by the prevailing system (a combination of public 
opinion, the media, the rhetoric of politicians and the presumed 
authority of all those who, through various mechanisms, speak or are 
allowed to speak in the public space) are thus the norms inscribed in 
every apparently meaningful phrase that can be constructed with the 
lexicon of violence, aggression, crime, war, terrorism, with the supposed 
differences between war and terrorism, national and international 
terrorism, state and nonstate terrorism, with the respect for sovereignty, 
national territory, and so on. (Derrida & Borradori, 2003, p. 93) 
Derrida speaks of the authority that enables discursive manipulation of reality, which 
ends up functioning according to the norms set by this hegemonic discourse. In the 
context of the Terrorism Complex this means that the asymmetry of power and the 
resulting relationship of dominating/dominated actors when it comes to international 
conflicts translate into ‘terrorism’ status quo. As the chapter on the political field will 
show, the use of structural violence by a dominating group incites the use of force by a 
dominated social group. By describing the use of force employed by the dominated 
social group as ‘terrorism’ the dominant social group is simultaneously obscuring its 
own role in the conflict and constructing a distinction in the morality of often similar 
actions by the actors involved in the exchange of force. It is the asymmetry of power 
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that determines which actions will be described as ‘terrorist’ actions and which will be 
presented as a legitimate use of force. 
 As powerful and focus directing as the narrowly viewed ‘terrorism’ momentum 
becomes through the joined discursive labour of the contributing fields the 
reconceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as the Terrorism Complex expands the scope of 
research beyond the dominant power currents working within the status quo. 
Locating the narratives of the counter-currents, which have the potential to bring 
about change in what seems to be an otherwise impenetrable gyrating system of 
power domination is an important part of this thesis. Directing the focus to the 
alternatives explores the potential such narratives have in expanding the discursive 
space instead of closing it off and maintaining the status quo. The way to achieve this 
goal is to widen the limited scopes imposed by the dominant discourses on the public 
discussion on ‘terrorism’. Broader scopes thus include the narratives that challenge the 
narrow explanations of ‘terrorism’ but also the narratives that reach beyond the 
conflict and discuss the options for dialogue, cooperation and coexistence.  
 Bourdieu (1988, pp. 119-120) identifies processes weakening the autonomy of 
specific fields by increased permeability of the fields’ borders allowing for the 
appearance of “mixed institutions and agents” (p. 119) such as the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between journalists and academics which allows academics to 
reach wider audiences and popularise their work, while helping journalists promote 
the image of objectivity and factual substantiation. This fluidity is eroding the 
structural integrity of the fields by introducing external ways of “consecration” (p. 120) 
thus undermining the rules of internal hierarchization and the very autonomy of the 
fields. As a result the value of the products of these mixed enterprises is assessed by 
economic and political criteria established in the field of power and not by the criteria 
governing the hierarchy of the products in the specific field. These instances of mixed 
enterprises will be explored in order to determine their role in sustaining the status 
quo by forming mutually strengthening relations between the dominant centres of 
power in the fields of the Terrorism Complex.  
 Bourdieu (1988, pp. 159-160) points out critical social events as particularly 
challenging for maintaining the standards of quality since crises demand instant 
responses from “all those whose profession is to read the meaning of the world” and 
construct suitable interpretations. This notion is critical for a better understanding of 
the processes of power involved in the uncritical application of the ‘terrorist label’ in 
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asymmetric conflicts as the pursuit of power is what motivates certain academics or 
journalists, for example, to participate in the legitimization of the dominant political 
order. Bourdieu (1993, p. 41) speaks of artists and writers in the broader field of 
cultural production but the same rationale concerning the struggle for power can be 
applied to the fields examined in this thesis:  
In this struggle, the artists and writers who are richest in specific capital 
and most concerned for their autonomy are considerably weakened by 
the fact that some of their competitors identify their interests with the 
dominant principles of hierarchization and seek to impose them even 
within the field, with the support of the temporal powers. The most 
heteronomous cultural producers (i.e. those with least symbolic capital) 
can offer the least resistance to external demands, of whatever sort. To 
defend their own position, they have to produce weapons, which the 
dominant agents (within the field of power) can immediately turn 
against the cultural producers most attached to their autonomy. In 
endeavouring to discredit every attempt to impose an autonomous 
principle of hierarchization, and thus serving their own interests, they 
serve the interests of the dominant fractions of the dominant class, who 
obviously have an interest in there being only one hierarchy. (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 41) 
Academic experts pursuing their own interests such as obtaining funding for their 
research (2005, p. 41) find it most pragmatic to support the dominant political 
discourse by providing it with legitimacy through scientific discourse thus preventing 
the detection of the ever present arbitrariness of interpretation. The same can be said 
for journalists who are equally invested “to enlist the appearance of objectivity in the 
service of interests linked with a position in the game” (1988, p. 4). This process is 
reproducing the structure of the field of power within the individual fields even 
without the agents’ conscious or wilful decision to do so (pp. 40-41).  
 It is thus crucial to establish the impact of the degree of autonomy of the fields 
of politics, journalism, and academia in relation to each other and within the wider 
field of power. This mapping of power relations impinging on knowledge about 
‘terrorism’ is one of the overarching aims of this thesis and one that can benefit from 
the insights to be achieved through the discourse analysis of the Foucauldian type.   
 
2.2 DISCOURSE 
 
In order to comprehend the abstract nuances of the discourse analysis and be 
able to apply it as a methodological tool to the discourses of the Terrorism Complex it 
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is necessary to define discourse in line with the proposed task. Foucault (1972, pp. 21-
117) arrives at the definition of discourse after a lengthy and detailed exploration of its 
constitutive parts and defines it as “a group of statements in so far as they belong to 
the same discursive formation” (pp. 107, 117). A definition, which involves further 
defining. A statement as an event “is linked not only to the situations that provoke it 
and to the consequences that it gives rise to, but at the same time, and in accordance 
with a quite different modality, to the statements that precede and follow it” (p. 28), 
“it is not in itself a unit, but a function that cuts across a domain of structures and 
possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space” 
(p. 87). “Statements different in form, and dispersed in time, form a group if they refer 
to one and the same object” (p. 32). Discursive relations give discourse the ability to 
speak of a particular object and thus “characterize /.../ discourse itself as a practice” 
(p. 46). “Complex group of relations that function as a rule” represent a “system of 
formation” (p. 74). “The discursive formation is the general enunciative system that 
governs a group of verbal performances” together with “logical, linguistic, and 
psychological systems”, and is analysed in four directions: “formation of objects, 
formation of the subjective positions, formation of concepts, formation of strategic 
choices” (p. 116). Discursive practice can finally be defined as “a body of anonymous, 
historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given 
period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the 
conditions of operation of the enunciative function” (p. 117).   
An analytic approach to what lends itself to observation as the “facts of 
discourse” finds its purpose in “freeing them of all the groupings that purport to be 
natural, immediate, universal unities” which can lead to the constitution of “discursive 
groups that are not arbitrary, and yet remain invisible" (Foucault, 1972, p. 29). This 
thesis will define “conditions clearly” and apply “controlled decisions” (p. 29) 
throughout the analysis of the ‘terrorism’ related narratives with the final aim to locate 
the discursive clusters within the political, media, and academic discourses which are 
complicit in the production of terror as one of the defining elements of ‘terrorism’ and 
make visible the constitutive role of these discourses in ‘terrorism’ itself.  
Bourdieu (1989, p. 23) observes symbolic power as the power which can 
preserve or transform social classifications through the use of words applied to actors 
in the social world. In the case of naming ‘terrorists’ it is necessary to locate discourses 
oriented towards transformation in order to challenge the use of the label for 
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justifications of certain practices. Foucault (1972, pp. 48, 49) contests the two-
dimensional perception of discourse as a straightforward operation “between a reality 
and a language (langue)”, between “words and things”, He outlines the depths of the 
discursive layer where “a group of rules proper to discursive practice” operates and 
leads us to  
a task that consists of not – of no longer – treating discourses as groups 
of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but 
as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of 
course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than 
use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them 
irreducible to language (langue) and to speech. It is this ‘more’ that we 
must reveal and describe. (p. 49) 
Foucault’s ‘more’ in this thesis is discussed as the network of relations and practices 
constitutive of the Terrorism Complex. The analysis of how discourses are formed 
(analysis of the effects of power in discourse) complements the analysis of the impact of 
discourses on the non-discursive realities (analysis of the effects of power through 
discourse). This multileveled approach is necessary in order to substantiate the 
hypothesis that ‘terrorism’ is political violence accompanied with the terror effect that 
is produced when securitizing political discourse is joined by the academic discourse 
legitimizing the narrowly determined scope and the media joining in the construction 
and perpetuation of the dominant discourse by uncritically disseminating these 
authoritative narratives. 
 In spite of the potential of the discourse-oriented methodologies the field of 
international relations remains sceptical of non-positivist approaches. Martin Hollis 
(1994, p. 42) comes to observe that positivism, “especially in international relations”, 
usually means “a behaviourism so fierce that it rejects all psychological data and 
qualitative methods.” Poststructuralism, as an enfant terrible of even the critical 
approaches to international relations, is now more than thirty years old and quite 
prolific (Edkins, 2007, p. 88), and yet still on the side-lines of the discipline, fiercely 
criticized, often with the use of emotionally-charged discursive constructs (see 
Østerud, 1997, 1996; Wendt, 2000, pp. 171-173; Keohane, 2000, p. 129). Kratochwil 
(2007, pp. 26-27) even suggests that the ‘great debates’ in international relations 
theory are to be re-examined as “ex post facto constructions provided by the historical 
narrative rather than by the events themselves”.  
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 Kratochwil’s scepticism possibly stems from what Derrida (1997, p. 130) states 
as that which “has long been known”: 
that the power of writing in the hands of a small number, caste or class, 
is always contemporaneous with hierarchization, let us say with political 
differance. It is at the same time distinction into groups, classes, and 
levels of economic-politico-technical power, and delegation of authority, 
power deferred and abandoned to an organ of capitalization. (p. 130) 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1997) is essentially a narrative on the systematic 
downplaying of the role of writing - writing which Derrida understands not as the step 
that follows speech but as the elusive essence that precedes it and can only be glimpsed 
at in the trace it leaves behind. Writing designates “not only the physical gestures of 
literal pictographic or ideographic inscription, but also the totality of what makes it 
possible” (Derrida, 1997, p. 9).   
 Ashley and Walker (1990b, p. 264), applying some of Derrida’s ideas (1997, 
pp. 79, 120-121; 2001, pp. 246-249) to international relations theory, speak of the 
logocentric discourse of the realist theories which describes the world in terms of 
simplistic sets of binary oppositions such as “identity/difference”, “inside/outside”, 
“sovereignty/anarchy”. Logocentric discourse, carried out by a ‘sovereign source of 
truth and meaning’ gives identity to a term by positioning it against its opposite thus 
creating hierarchy, where one is privileged and above all questioning, while the other 
is inferior and seen as something negative, a “complication”, a “disruption” (Ashley, 
1989, p. 261). These sets can be used to re-establish the sovereignty of states (Ashley & 
Walker, 1990b, p. 264), which is a significant disadvantage for the non-state actors 
involved in a conflict.  
 Ashley (1989, p. 268) presents the concepts of state and reasoning man as 
inextricably bound and mutually reinforcing in traditional perspectives. Together they 
can be perceived as “domestic society” within certain boundaries and positioned 
opposite to the anarchy beyond those boundaries, which “refuses to submit to the 
sovereign truth of reason and that calls forth the means of the state to exclude or 
subdue it in the name of reasoning man” (p. 268). Theory calling on the principle of 
sovereignty can actually supply the appropriate legitimatization for state violence in 
defence of the boundaries of domestic society and the freedom of man (p. 270). In 
order to establish cohesiveness within the borders of the sovereign space this discourse 
ignores the existence of minorities which have to be delegitimized in order not to 
disturb the concept of a homogenous society (Ashley & Walker, 1990b, p. 262).  
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Ashley (1995, pp. 100-104) draws on the knowledge/power relationship to 
explain how knowledgeable practices are the “productive relations of power”(p. 101) 
when connected to the arbitrary construction of domestic society by privileging a 
single interpretation. By subordinating historical practices, change, and diversity to an 
ahistorical common identity, the logocentric discourse fixes one interpretation as a 
“self evident and identical voice of truth in itself” (1989, p. 262). The voice of truth 
Ashley is referring to can be seen as the product of the struggles for the “imposition of 
the definition of the world” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 39) in the political field where the 
“legitimate principle of vision and division” (p. 39) depends on the mobilizing 
potential of the symbolic power actors possess (p. 39). Bourdieu’s wording seems most 
fitting to express the centrality of discourse study when approaching questions of 
power: 
One should never forget that language, by virtue of the infinite 
generative but also originative capacity – in the Kantian sense – which it 
derives from its power to produce existence by producing the 
collectively recognized, and thus realized, representation of existence, is 
no doubt the principal support of the dream of absolute power (p. 42). 
Foucault (1981, pp. 52-53) establishes a similar connection between discourse 
and power: “discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of 
domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the 
power which is to be seized” (pp. 52-53). Power, political means, and consequently 
monopoly over dominant discourse tend to concentrate around a relative minority of 
actors prevailing in the power struggles of the political field (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 34-
35; 1992, p. 172). The electorate is ultimately reduced to the level of consumers of the 
dominant political discursive products emerging from within the field in the form of a 
limited number of acceptable political discourses which represent the “instruments for 
perceiving and expressing the social world” and delimit the space of the possible 
reality in certain pre-set boundaries (1992, p. 172).  
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998a, pp. 23-26) apply a similar idea in their 
treatment of speech acts in relation to security: “[i]n security discourse, an issue is 
dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by labelling it as 
security, an agent claims a need for a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (p. 26). 
The full implications of evoking security in this context will be explored in practical 
terms in the following chapters and the securitizing moves will be inspected as one of 
the key components of the Terrorism Complex.  
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2.3 KNOWLEDGE 
 
 Bourdieu (1992, p. 127) maintains that political action rests on the fact that 
agents are all a part of the social world and have certain degrees of knowledge of this 
social world which guides their actions when they endeavour to construct 
representations that match their interests. Knowledge produced through this process 
emerges as the singular true explanation of the social world and feeds into the 
beginning of a new cycle of social action, which assures the stability of the social order 
since the unequal amounts of power actors possess shape the construction of 
knowledge in a way that serves the dominant social actors. Or as Cox puts it (1981, p. 
128): “The world is seen from a standpoint defineable [sic] in terms of nation or social 
class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of 
immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for 
the future.” In the case of ‘terrorism’ the most ruthless battles of power are expected 
to take place in the arena of discourse over the naming of the instances of social 
violence. The aim of the power struggle is to make arbitrary representations of the 
conflict situation seem objective in their favouring of the dominant actor. The full 
extent of the seriousness of this discursive battle becomes evident when the emergent 
knowledge about ‘terrorism’ starts exerting effects on the non-discursive practices, 
such as the diplomatic and counterterrorism efforts. Due to the importance of 
knowledge as one of the central themes of this thesis a more detailed definition of the 
concept is needed.  
 When talking about knowledge Foucault (1972, p. 15, Tr. note; Scheurich & 
McKenzie, 2005, p. 846; Foucault, 2000, pp. 324-235) makes an important distinction 
between ‘savoir’ and ‘connaissance’ according to which ‘savoir’ designates the general field 
of knowledge gained through our common social existence at a particular time and 
space, while ‘connaissance’ is used to describe the field of formal knowledge connected 
to sciences, disciplines and institutionalized learning practices. The two types of 
knowledge are in close relation which Foucault (1972, p. 179) demonstrates by 
describing the emergence of the new discipline of psychiatry (connaissance) the 
appearance of which was conditioned by a range of social relations, practices, rules, 
norms and procedures, “in short a whole group of relations that characterized for this 
discursive practice the formation of its statements” (p. 179) (savoir). Maintaining this 
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distinction between ‘connaissance’ and ‘savoir’ is essential in order to recognize the power 
currents and the relationship between what is formal knowledge of ‘terrorism’ and 
what is perpetually being created, perceived and treated as ‘terrorism’.  
 Foucault (1972, p. 183) concentrates on the “discursive practice/knowledge 
(savoir)/ science axis” which can be approached through archaeological analysis unlike 
“the consciousness/knowledge (connaissance)/science axis” which “cannot escape 
subjectivity”. This does not mean that archaeological analysis excludes scientific texts, 
in fact “archaeological territories” cover a wide variety of texts, from fiction to 
political decisions (pp. 183-184), which is particularly relevant for an informed choice 
of methodologies that promise to offer the best tools for the exploration of the 
Terrorism Complex. Knowledge in the sense of ‘savoir’ thus encompasses the space in 
which a subject assumes a discursive position, the substance of a discursive formation, 
the management of statements, the awareness of their positioning and the totality of 
discourses and non-discursive practices (pp. 182-183) and is defined even more 
precisely as “the laws of the formation of a whole set of objects, types of formulation, 
concepts, and theoretical options which are invested in institutions, techniques, 
collective and individual behaviour, political operations, scientific activities, literary 
fictions and theoretical speculations” (2000, p. 324).  
 The relationship that needs to be most thoroughly investigated for the 
purposes of this thesis is the one between power and knowledge. To examine the 
relevancy of understanding ‘terrorism’ as the Terrorism Complex, the link between 
the power to produce reality though dominant discourse and its influence on the 
construction of the predominantly shared knowledge of the social world needs first to 
be established as existent and then challenged by a dialectic approach.  
Cox (1981, p. 134) suggests that the concepts representing reality need to be 
juxtaposed to that reality especially in their adaptations to changes in reality while 
maintaining awareness “that each assertion concerning reality contains implicitly its 
opposite and that both assertion and opposite are not mutually exclusive but share 
some measure of the truth sought, a truth moreover, that is always in motion, never to 
be encapsulated in some definitive form.” If some truth is present in assertion and its 
opposite alike, which makes them both entitled to be presented, if truth is indeed to be 
approached, there must be an explanation why one is expressed while the other is 
obscured in its marginality or even complete absence. Foucault (1995, pp. 27-28, 187; 
2002d, pp. 111, 127-133) provides the power-knowledge nexus as an answer and 
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proposes we do away with the tradition which insists that knowledge cannot develop 
in the presence of power (1995, p. 27) – quite the contrary:  
power produces knowledge /.../ power and knowledge directly imply 
one another; /.../ there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (p. 27). 
Consequently truth is subject to power, “truth is a thing of this world: it is produced 
only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power” 
(2002d, p. 131) while “knowledge is understood as knowledge production, that is, 
socially situated discursive practice with its own regulative mechanisms and with social 
consequences” (Jørgensen, 2003, p. 63). According to theory presented thus far it can 
be expected that this thesis will be able to effectively argue that a knowledge about 
‘terrorism’ is produced, reproduced and consequently widely perceived as the 
knowledge about ‘terrorism’ by actively silencing and overriding opposing or even 
simply different ‘knowledges’. Which of the available ‘knowledges’ prevails is expected 
to hinge on the constellation of the power relations and their investment in a certain 
issue, in this particular case in the power play surrounding ‘terrorism’ which will be 
analysed in the subsequent chapters.  
In the quest for knowledge, truth should be perceived as an ideal that cannot 
be asserted or claimed but only aspired to. The way to approach truth, even though it 
is never quite in our reach, is to acknowledge the multiplicity of the representations of 
reality and openly connect them into a patchwork of knowledge which is what the 
Terrorism Complex approach aims to achieve. A guideline taken from Bourdieu 
(1992, pp. 241-242) suggests that  
one cannot establish a science of classifications without establishing a 
science of the struggle over classifications and without taking into 
account the position occupied, in this struggle for the power of 
knowledge, for power through knowledge, for the monopoly of 
legitimate symbolic violence, by each of the agents or groups of agents 
involved in it /.../. 
Each of the coming chapters will follow this guideline to arrive at the most relevant 
conclusions. These findings will inform the mapping of the positions of agents across 
the fields involved in the power struggle surrounding the term ‘terrorism’ which will 
be applied to a non-discursive situation in the final chapter as an illustration of the 
workings of power and knowledge in the Terrorism Complex.  
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 The repercussions of mutually reinforcing positions of agents inclined to 
maintain the social status quo seem especially grave when it comes to conflicts that 
escalate to the use of force. The use of force in relation to ‘terrorism’ bears the explicit 
feature of power asymmetry and the inherent imbalance immediately negates the very 
possibility of objectivity. To explore the validity of this claim the space of the 
production of authoritative opinions on ‘terrorism’-related conflicts needs to be 
observed more closely.  
 Parts of the academic field concerned with conflicts involving ‘terrorist’ 
violence are diverse and include disciplines such as psychology, sociology, law, 
criminology and philosophy but the main focus of this thesis will be on the academic 
work in politics and international relations, security studies and especially terrorism 
studies, where the mainstream political theory, closely connected to political practice, 
is realism. It relies on empiricism that justifies the external-observer status (Hollis, 
1994, pp. 41-43) and is thus most suitable to make claims of objectivity and connect 
efficiently with the dominant class interested in the explanations of the temporary 
order. Dominant discourse exercises its “ideological function” by naturalizing the 
established order and reproduces the dominant structures of power across the fields 
(Bourdieu, 1992, p. 169). Foucault (1972, p. 185) draws attention specifically to the 
“ideology of the sciences” which resides in science as a discursive practice marked by a 
discursive regularity in the formation and dissemination of knowledge. Dominant 
discourse of the discipline is presented as a set of objective facts about the political 
world that cannot be questioned because they are impartially describing the true state 
of the social world.  
Bourdieu (1992, pp. 105, 127-129, 134; 1988, pp. xiv, 6, 24) draws attention to 
the cyclical paradox of the social sciences where the actors in the field describe the 
space of struggles that is the social world while themselves participating in those 
struggles. No matter how obstinately the subject is pushed out of the research scope it 
always remains present in what Foucault (1977, p. 162) calls the “will to knowledge: 
instinct, passion, the inquisitor’s devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice.” Academics try 
to establish an artificial position of distance by invoking objective scientific measures 
which in turn have tangible effects on the ‘reality’ that academics are supposed to be 
impartially observing, studying, analysing and describing. A discourse-oriented 
approach will be applied throughout the thesis due to its previously explained 
potential to shed light on the power play underlying the constitution of the hegemonic 
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discourse which is marked by the domination of the more powerful side involved in 
the conflict.  
Another prominent feature of the chapters to come will be the concept of 
legitimacy of the violent struggle and how it can convincingly be claimed through 
discourse by any actor providing they are endowed with enough power to establish 
their discourse as the dominant one and are hence able to chart the correspondingly 
favourable reality. The limited array of hegemonic discourses, if uncritically adopted 
in the political theories, thus simultaneously produces and reproduces constructed 
political reality, which can then be transmitted through the mass media to the mass 
audiences by consecrated academics, government representatives and other experts. 
Agents of the dominant discourse of the discipline join experts from the government 
and the military and make themselves available to the mass media (Karim, 2002, p. 
104) to offer explanations for the onset and development of violence.  
Building on Said’s (1981, pp. 141-149) explanation of scholarly involvement in 
the crisis-reporting it seems that times of crises favour explanations that do not 
challenge orthodoxy and are responsive to overlying political and economic interests. 
These instant constructs of politicians, journalists and academic experts compete for 
legitimacy in what Bourdieu (1988, pp. 191-192) calls “institutionalized places of 
speech” where skilful manipulation of discourse through most blatant rhetoric devices 
and simplifications imposes the legitimate explanation of events. “Because facts rarely 
speak for themselves, strategic actors must deploy such assets as charisma, a delicate 
balance of intimidation and flattery, and rhetorical proficiency to promote favored 
framing” (Entman, 2007, p. 167). 
 Said (1981) offers a persuasive account of the construction and detrimental 
effects of the simplified, generalized and stereotypical media representation of Islam in 
the Western media that is the result of ignorance (p. xi), political will pursuing specific 
strategic interests (pp. 33-40), the media’s own agenda which is to satisfy the audiences 
and advertisers (pp. 45-49), and finally the scholarly complicity in the process (pp. 
141-143). Misleadingly one-sided and unfavourably simplistic representation of a 
diverse religious group observed by Said (1981) is consistently persistent in the media 
content (Harris, 2004, pp. 76-78, 210), forming general and generalized knowledge 
inclined to motivate actors to set an agenda supportive of particular Western policies 
in the Middle East by framing conflicts involving Arabs in a certain manner. 
Considering that the public has little direct personal contact and experience with most 
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issues appearing in the news, the audience gets most knowledge about the social world 
through the media (p. 2) which endows journalists, much in the same way as artists, 
with the “power to create semblances of reality which are more real than reality” 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 156). It is this power to construct reality while obscuring the 
authorial trace that endows certain discourses with a constitutive role in the formation 
of ‘terrorism’ not only as a discursive phenomenon but also as a non-discursive 
practice, as the Terrorism Complex.  
 
2.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
 Methodological pluralism is necessary to address the complex and often 
abstract facets of the Terrorism Complex. The following subchapter will elaborate on 
the methodological choices and practices that underpin the research presented in the 
following chapters.  
Critical case sampling (Palys, 2008, p. 698) has preceded the choice of the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict as the relevant case study for this thesis. The pronounced 
asymmetry of power between the actors involved in this conflict suggests that the 
related discourses and relations contain information needed to argue the validity of 
the Terrorism Complex hypothesis. The analysis will also cover an array of texts, 
relations, and events from the fields of politics, media and academe. The texts and 
cases for analysis will be chosen according to the principles of theoretical sampling, 
which allows for a researcher to focus on a multitude of diverse sources that are 
relevant to the exploration of theoretical propositions (Hoonaard, 2008, p. 874). The 
aim is to examine the dominant discourse on ‘terrorism’ for the information on the 
knowledge/power relations that pertain to the Terrorism Complex. All subsequent 
analysis will be aimed at uncovering the discernible manifestations of the interplay of 
power and knowledge. 
 Parallel to the analysis of the dominant discourse, theoretical sampling will also 
be applied to the marginal discourses from each field. Statements from the 
representatives of the marginal social groups, information provided by the non-
governmental organizations and grassroots movements, alternative news items from 
less internationally present regional news sources and new media outlets, and finally 
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research resulting from non-mainstream academic approaches6 will be monitored and 
examined for evidence of the challenges to the status quo. Samples for analysis will be 
chosen according to their potential to offer alternative points of view and different 
approaches to making sense of the social world in order to provide counterbalance to 
the dominant discourse.   
 The Internet combined with mobile technology presents a yet-unfinished 
revolution in terms of the potential for wide dissemination of alternative sources of 
information. Alternatives to the dominant discourse have become widely available to 
the interested publics, often in real time through the internet-exclusive information 
sharing venues such as the blogosphere, web pages of various organizations, social 
networking sites and content sharing platforms. It must be noted that the differences 
in the availability of the new media and the subsequent unequal participation in the 
new media landscape at the same time represent yet another venue in the asymmetry 
of certain conflicts, and certainly in the asymmetry of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 
(Naveh, 2007, pp. 171-189; Najjar, 2007, pp. 191-212; Conway, 2009, pp. 239-244). 
However, the number of the news consumers who get their information online or 
browse the news on their phones has grown significantly in the last decade and shows 
signs of continued steady growth of the number of news consumers who receive 
information online where they can also actively participate in sharing and 
commenting on the news items7.  
   The focus in the analysis of texts featuring the term ‘terrorism’ is not solely on 
the subjects, either of social action or on the authors of discourse, research is not 
exclusively trying to uncover the underlying social structures which silently but 
decisively guide subjects through every social action, and the goal of the thesis is 
certainly not to determine which discourse should be recognized as the one single 
truth. The method, while working with all these concepts, operates in the interstices 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Various strands of critical theory, and especially approaches with poststructuralist tendencies.   
7 The Pew Internet & American Life Project provides comprehensive research on the new media trends 
which show considerable rise in the orientation towards the news available online: How Media 
Consumption Has Changed Since 2000 (Rainie, 2010); News Consumption 2010: Portable, 
Participatory and Personal (Purcell, 2010); The State of the News Media 2010 (Project For Excellence 
In Journalism, 2010); Understanding the Participatory News Consumer (Purcell, et al., 2010). Similar 
trends of the consumers’ increased use of online information are observed in Europe as well due to the 
rising numbers of internet users with fast broadband connections (Lööf & Seybert, 2009) which can be 
connected to the changes in the media consumption and to the increasing use of the online news outlets 
according to the results presented in the Mediascope Europe 2008 (European Interactive Advertising 
Association, 2008). The availability of fast internet connections and thus access to online news is higher 
in the West although internet penetration has shown staggering growth in most countries in the last 
decade (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2010).  
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between them, in the discursive layer of reality where the dynamics of relations 
between individual subjects, between individual structures, between subjects and 
structures represent the struggle to explain, divide, create, in short – to construct the 
origins of the social world and to construct the ‘truth’ about the non-discursive reality. 
The effects of such construction are expected to be felt as consequences and reflected 
in the events of the non-discursive reality where a simple act of naming a group 
‘terrorists’ can result in an array of not always proportionate or discriminate counter-
terrorist actions which in turn again proceed to influence the dynamics of relations. 
Considering the multifaceted and multi-layered nature of the analysis of this complex 
interplay between power and knowledge and between discourse and reality, a custom 
made methodology becomes imperative. The methodology of this thesis is somewhat 
peculiar due to the insistence on using a combination of approaches that surface from 
the theoretical exploration of the key concepts, featured in the beginning part of this 
chapter.  
Parts of Foucault’s method-systems of archaeology and genealogy are 
combined with the spirit of Derridean deconstruction within the scopes drawn 
according to Bourdieu’s distinction between habitus and field. This methodological 
bricolage forms a version of discourse analysis and is based on the theoretically 
established centrality of discourse in the identification and understanding of the 
Terrorism Complex. The initial introduction to these methodological choices and 
their potential for the study of knowledge and power were outlined already in the 
theoretical segment above while a more detailed presentation and practical 
application options are to follow presently.    
   
Archaeology and Double Reading 
  
 Before the general layers of discursive reality can be examined, compared and 
finally juxtaposed, the individual texts comprising these discourses need to be 
examined according to the principles that satisfy scientific requirements. Elements of 
Foucault’s archaeology combined with Derrida’s double reading are used as an initial 
approach to analysis and applied to the texts. By looking at the composition and the 
interplay of statements and groups of statements, especially in different fields, across 
different registers and in relation to the events in the non-discursive reality the idea 
about the connections and relationships begins to form (Foucault, 1972, p. 29) that is 
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indicative of the power currents shaping complex social phenomena such as 
‘terrorism”. But first a definition of archaeology according to Foucault is in order. 
 
 
Archaeology 
 
Foucault (1972, pp. 135-195) provides us with detailed guidelines for 
approaching discourse by presenting the term archaeology which “designates the 
general theme of a description that questions the already-said at the level of its 
existence /.../.” (p. 131) and is well suited for the task envisioned by this thesis since it 
“reveals relations between discursive formations and non-discursive domains 
(institutions, political events, economic practices and processes)” (p. 162). Only after 
exploring the interior relationships, analysis inverted “towards the exterior” can look 
for “the legitimate use of these notions: what can be discovered through them, how 
they can take their place among other methods of description, to what extent they can 
modify and redistribute the domain of the history of ideas” (p. 117). In order to justify 
the proposed necessity of understanding ‘terrorism’ as the Terrorism Complex the 
analysis of the internal structuring of the relevant political, media, and academic 
discourses to be examined in connection to the Terrorism Complex should be 
complemented with the analysis of their relations to the non-discursive practices 
commonly connected to the treatment of ‘terrorism’, especially to the military and law 
enforcement practices.  
Unlike the history of ideas, oriented towards unity, cohesiveness and 
coherence, archaeology acknowledges contradictions, differences and change, works 
with individualization and diversification (Foucault, 1972, pp. 149-170), and is willing 
“to speak of discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, entirely new forms of positivity, and of 
sudden redistributions” (p. 169). Most important shift of focus occurs in relation to 
differences which for the history of ideas indicate error and need to be reduced while 
archaeology aims “not to overcome differences, but to analyse them, to say what 
exactly they consist of, to differentiate them” (pp. 170-171).  
The significance of examining differences does not escape Derrida (2001, p. 
22) and is perhaps best described in his (1997) treatment of the plane between “image 
and reality”, “outside and inside”, “representation and presence” (p. 33), in his 
treatment of writing: 
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The instituted trace cannot be thought without thinking the retention of 
difference within a structure of reference where difference appears as 
such and thus permits a certain liberty of variations among the full 
terms. The absence of another here-and-now, of another transcendental 
present, of another origin of the world appearing as such, presenting itself 
as irreducible absence within the presence of the trace, is not a 
metaphysical formula substituted for a scientific concept of writing. This 
formula, beside the fact that it is the questioning of metaphysics itself, 
describes the structure implied by the “arbitrariness of the sign”, from 
the moment that one thinks of its possibility short of the derived 
opposition between nature and convention, symbol and sign, etc. (pp. 
46-47) 
This attention to difference is paramount for the scope of this thesis since it informs 
not only the internal analysis of the texts, their construction, and the emerging 
structure, but also allows for the existence of the marginalized voices and for their 
discourses to contradict the dominant discourses thus creating space for the non-
violent challenges of the status quo.  
 Foucault (1972, p. 131) explicitly states that the term archaeology “does not 
imply the search for a beginning” but rather “designates the general theme of a 
description that questions the already-said at the level of its existence”. Archaeology 
operates according to the following principles: it treats discourses themselves as objects 
of analysis and systematically describes them as specific practices by defining the 
continuities running through the specific sets of rules according to which these 
practices operate (pp. 138-140). In following these principles it does not avoid 
contradictions but welcomes them as they appear – as formative parts of the 
historicity of discourse (p. 151). The most important potential of archaeology for this 
particular thesis is in its ability to reveal “relations between discursive formations and 
non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and 
processes)” (p. 162) which can be accessed when regimes of practices are analysed “as 
places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the 
planned and the taken-for-granted meet and interconnect” (2002c, p. 225).  
 In line with the principles of archaeology it is important to identify 
contradictions, ruptures, and discontinuities (Foucault, 1972, pp. 166-177) that point 
to the cracks in the construction of the texts through which the process of construction 
becomes visible. In this sense archaeology seems to resemble Derrida’s deconstruction, 
which “is used to implode theories and discourses from within” (Carspecken, 2008, p. 
171). “When Derrida deconstructs a text, or as he would prefer to put it, when he 
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shows how a text deconstructs itself, he attempts to show how underlying its surface 
unity and coherence, there are also sorts of crevices, abysses, and undecidable 
aporias” (Bernstein, 2002, p. 277). In the spirit of deconstruction the analysis in the 
subsequent chapters will aim to locate textual indicators of omissions, voids and 
expulsions, the traces of writing in that elusive Derridean sense where “[t]he trace is 
nothing, it is not an entity, it exceeds the question What is? and contingently makes it 
possible” (Derrida, 1997, p. 75).  
The concept of trace is central to the deconstruction of presence that is emerging 
out of the realm of differences as the foundation of origin and truth (Derrida, 1997, 
pp. 65-71).  
If words and concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, 
one can justify one’s language, and one’s choice of terms, only within a 
topic [an orientation in space] and a historical strategy. The justification 
can therefore never be absolute and definitive. It corresponds to a 
condition of forces and translates an historical calculation. (p. 70) 
The dominance of presence in ontology was established, privileging logos at the expense 
of the trace throughout the history of metaphysics (p. 71; 2001, pp. 247-248). 
Logocentrism in the form of realism and empiricism provides an ‘objective’, ‘true’ 
narrative (1973, pp. 34-35) but this absoluteness of logocentric discourse needs to be 
repositioned in its historical context and unveiled as merely one among multiple 
choices. In other words, the multiplicity of initial diverse choices is erased after a 
particular choice had been made according to the specificities of time and space. 
Although the calculations and choices made are concealed by the operations of logos 
the differences, contradictions, and oppositions are retained in the trace. The initial 
reading of the text has to be coupled with the deconstructive reading in order to locate 
the trace and challenge the singularity inscribed in the text by logos. Double reading is 
aimed at the weak points in the text which are then used to deconstruct the text from 
within (Critchley, 2005, pp. 555-556). The difficulty of such deconstruction lies in 
proving the relativity of discourses without “being fixed in suspension, or even in a 
pure and simple suppression of meaning and reference” (Derrida & Houdebine, 1973, 
p. 35) which will also be one of the main methodological preoccupations of this thesis.  
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Genealogy and Deconstruction 
 
While archaeology in a deconstructive sense will be applied to particular texts 
as a micro-method, a set of more overarching methods will be needed for an 
encompassing view of the knowledge/power nexus in connection to ‘terrorism’. To 
test the hypothesis that dominant political, media, and academic discourses shift the 
balance of power even further away from the marginalized social groups by 
designating them as ‘terrorists’, thus deepening the divide caused by the initial 
asymmetry of power, a combination of Bourdieu’s system of habitus and field, and 
Foucault’s genealogy will be deployed in a manner corresponding to Derrida’s 
deconstruction, this time applied not only to entire discourses but also to the social 
practices and relations that relate to speaking about, reacting to, or engaging in 
‘terrorism’ . The concepts of habitus and field, which provide the structural frame for 
the analysis, have been explained already in the theoretical part of this chapter and 
their application will be further addressed in the following chapters.  
 Even though the application of deconstruction on the broader scale is 
sometimes conflated with genealogy (Burr, 1995, p. 166), the distinction between the 
two concepts will be maintained. Derrida (1988, pp. 1-5) is candid about the 
difficulties of defining deconstruction and quite explicit in stating what the term does 
not signify. According to Derrida (p. 3) “deconstruction is not a method and cannot 
be transformed into one” which is why the methodology of this thesis does not involve 
deconstruction as a tangible approach but is rather marked by the spirit of 
deconstruction in its treatment of discursive and non-discursive structures. 
Deconstruction will at this level draw on the insights gained from the archaeological 
analysis of individual texts and will be aimed at locating general areas of absences, 
contradictions, and repressions across the discourses of the Terrorism Complex. This 
deconstructive approach will retain Derrida’s (1997, pp. 37, 43) rearrangement of the 
sequence languageàwriting into writingàlanguage, the rearrangement which 
challenges the suspension of the reflection on language maintained through the 
logocentric metaphysics (pp. 37-46).  
 Deconstruction will be used in this thesis as a valuable means for shifting the 
focus of research towards the disruption of the seemingly natural order, which 
systematically underestimates the power running through the ‘writing’ of discourses – 
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the power of constructing reality. Derrida (1997, pp. 92-93) establishes a clear 
connection between writing and power, and speaks of the indestructible “solidarity 
among ideological, religious, scientific-technical systems, and the systems of writing 
which were therefore more and other than ‘means of communication’ or vehicles of 
the signified” (p. 93). In this respect deconstruction truly has the potential to be “an 
engaged and deeply ethical praxis of reading of great social and political relevance” 
(Critchley, 2005, p. 562).  
In a way deconstruction is more a philosophical, even ethical attitude than a 
method in the traditional sense but it nevertheless invaluably complements the 
genealogical inquiry into the Terrorism Complex. It should be noted that no negative 
connotations should be attached to the term deconstruction since none were 
envisioned by Derrida (1988, p. 3): 
[T]he undoing, decomposing, and desedimenting of structures, in a 
certain sense more historical than the structuralist movement it called 
into question, was not a negative operation. Rather than destroying, it 
was also necessary to understand how an "ensemble" was constituted 
and to reconstruct it to this end. However, the negative appearance was 
and remains much more difficult to efface than is suggested by the 
grammar of the word (de-), even though it can designate a genealogical 
restoration [remonter] rather than a demolition.  
The deconstruction of ‘terrorism’ that this thesis sets out to achieve is simultaneously 
mapping the contours of the Terrorism Complex as an ‘ensemble’ of systems and 
structures contributing to the signification of the term ‘terrorism’.  
Genealogy is said to be part of Foucault’s later phase of work (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2002, p. 12) and appears as a natural evolution of archaeology as it progresses 
from “the analysis of utterances and statements” and “concern with the structures and 
rules of discourse” (Mills, 1997, p. 49) to the study of how the non-discursive reality is 
historically established through discourses according to the endless interplay of power 
and knowledge. “Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of 
details and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material” (Foucault, 1977, p. 
140) which I take to be one of the foremost methodological guidelines for my analysis. 
Even though discussing genealogy in reference to Nietzsche’s work, Foucault 
(1977) provides insights into his own understanding and use of the concept. Similar to 
his claim about archaeology (1972, p. 131) Foucault (1977, p. 144) states that 
genealogy is not the search for origins but rather pays attention to “the details and 
accidents that accompany every beginning” and awaits “their emergence, once 
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unmasked, as the face of the other”; it “seeks to re-establish the various systems of 
subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of 
dominations” (p. 148).  
 What needs to be achieved in this thesis is a genealogy of ‘terrorism’ within the 
scope of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict akin to the genealogies of the penal system in 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1995) or of the institutionalization of madness in 
Madness and Civilization (2001). Genealogy entails the mapping of “objects” and “a 
system of truth”, uncovering the formation of “knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ 
discourses” and their connections with the workings of power resulting in a 
“scientifico-legal complex” as the source of “justifications and rules” for the monopoly 
over power to appear quite natural (1995, pp. 22-23). Genealogical analysis should, 
according to Foucault (1995, pp. 23-24), follow four general rules: it should be fully 
aware of the complexity of the social phenomenon under study, of its positive and 
negative aspects, it should assume a wide scope to locate the power exercising 
techniques attached to the studied phenomenon, it should discern the technology of 
power which lies at the heart of both – the studied phenomenon and the knowledge of 
man, and finally, it should follow the transformations of the phenomenon in 
connection to the power relations. “[D]iscourse is not simply that which translates 
struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is 
struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized (1981, pp. 52-53).    
 Another methodological lesson taken from Foucault to be applied in this thesis 
is that the most appropriate way to approach the study of human-related phenomena 
is through discourse, which is a conclusion Foucault (2002b) arrives at after a lengthy 
study of the origins of human sciences. Human sciences are after all the 
representations of man by man himself, “the body of discourse that takes as its object 
man as an empirical entity” (pp. 384, 375). This proposition reaffirms the use of 
genealogical methods for the suggested study of ‘terrorism’ since genealogy “can 
account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, and so on, 
without having to make reference to a subject that is either transcendental in relation 
to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history” 
(2002d, p. 118). Actors in international relations, such as political elites, military 
circles and alleged ‘terrorist’ organizations, are subjects which operate at particular 
points in time, or across time, and act as closed circles with high confidentiality 
thresholds which makes them difficult to study. A discourse-oriented genealogical 
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approach to ‘terrorism’ has the advantage of not being side-tracked by the inevitable 
lack of inside information or by the diverse time frames while endeavouring to tease 
out the networked interrelated facets of the Terrorism Complex. The attention is 
focused rather on the various social practices and how they have been constituted, 
enacted, and justified through time. 
 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
 
The methodological choices presented above fit into the critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) framework since CDA is a type of analysis concerned with the “radical 
critique of social relations” (Billig, 2003, p. 38), with “the development of a new kind 
of knowledge” which depends on combining “scientific knowledge and common 
sense” (Gouveia, 2003, p. 60), and with making “explicit the relations between 
discourse and knowledge” (van Dijk, 2003, p. 85). The term CDA8 appeared just over 
two decades ago (Billig, 2003, p. 35; Gouveia, 2003, p. 53) and since then there has 
been an upsurge in CDA theorizing and methodology systematizing (Milliken, 1999; 
Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Gouveia, 2003). “Studies in CDA are multifarious, 
derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds and oriented towards very 
different data and methodologies” which can be seen “as a specific strength of CDA” 
(Weiss & Wodak, 2003, pp. 6, 11), especially if researches devote additional attention 
to the questions of specific criteria and methods’ application which are generally 
diverse and vague (Milliken, 1999, pp. 225-226). The process of developing the 
methodology for this thesis entailed the exercise of freedom to devise a customized 
version of CDA but also recognized the duty to equip this methodology with a solid 
theoretical foundation and an explanation of the individual conceptual tools9 and 
analytical concepts used10.  
The selection of facts and the scope of context are among the elements that 
need attention in order to get insight into the relations operating within the Terrorism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  According to The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods (Weninger, 2008, p. 145) 
CDA is defined as “a theoretical approach to studying the role of language in society that originated 
within linguistics but has found widespread application across the social sciences”. 
9 “[E]lements that may be adopted from different theoretical approaches, schools and traditions” and 
which “mediate between text and institution, between communication and structure, and between 
discourse and society” (Weiss & Wodak, 2003, pp. 8, 9). 
10 These are the components necessary for developing an “integrated theoretical framework” (Weiss & 
Wodak, 2003, pp. 8-11). 
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Complex. The custom-made critical discourse analysis must be devised in a manner 
that complements the evaluation of the social structures bearing on the entire scope of 
agents actively participating in the construction of knowledge about conflicts involving 
‘terrorism’, ranging from belligerents to academics. The distinguishing of the power 
struggles behind the scenes of ‘terrorism’ discourses can be facilitated by the insights 
gained from the analysis of the relevant discourses. The breadth of the research into 
the application and use of the term ‘terrorism’ is determined by the analysis of 
discourse in the fields expectedly implicated in the Terrorism Complex. The power 
dynamics within and among these fields need to be examined and if possible verified 
from multiple angles in order to evaluate the role of politics, media and academia in 
asymmetric conflicts and their influence on the domestic and international public 
opinion. This multifaceted understanding of the Terrorism Complex depends on the 
accentuated interdisciplinary11 nature of the proposed version of critical discourse 
analysis which will be fashioned around a proposition that “all the human sciences 
interlock and can always be used to interpret one another” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 390). 
The fences raised between the individual disciplines of the social sciences are yet 
another testament to the “historical power struggles among vested interests, the 
political economic forces in which such interests are embedded, and the intellectual 
proponents and opponents thereof” (Graham, 2003, p. 111), which is why I opted not 
to replicate them in this research project.  
Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p. 64) see the aim of the critical discourse 
analysis in contributing “to social change along the lines of more equal power 
relations in communication processes and society in general”. In order to fulfil this 
aim, critical discourse analysis must not stop at the analysis of discursive formations 
and corresponding discursive events. The definition of discourse has to be broader 
and has to incorporate the three key focal points – discourse (in the above mentioned 
narrow sense), power, and knowledge. Foucault, albeit using slightly different 
terminology, refers to this amalgamation as the “complex pattern” which  
must be analyzed both as a formation of statements (when considering 
the population of discursive events that are part of it); as a positivity 
(when considering the system that governs the dispersion of the objects, 
the types of formulation, the concepts and the opinions that come into 
play in these statements); as a knowledge (when considering these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The chosen array of methods dictates the need to overstep the disciplinary divisions between 
philosophy, linguistics, history, sociology, political science, journalism and media studies, international 
law, and security studies.  
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objects, types of formulation, concepts and opinions as they are invested 
in a science, a technical recipe, an institution, a fictional narrative, a 
legal or political practice, and so on) (Foucault, 2000, pp. 324-325).  
To elucidate the practical application of this approach to the Terrorism Complex 
research a visual representations of what Foucault (2002c, p. 226) would call 
“eventalization” is presented in Figure 1.  
Defined as “a breach of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on which our 
knowledges, acquiescences, and practices rest”, eventalization “means rediscovering 
the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, 
that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, 
universal, and necessary” (pp. 226-227). Figure 1 represents the most general ‘facts’ 
about the observed fields – politics, media, and academe – as they intersect in the 
object of research – the term ‘terrorism. The objectivity of media reports on 
‘terrorism’, the legitimacy of counterterrorism operations and the possibility of 
impartial scientific distance will be treated as the generally accepted ‘self-evidence’, 
rarely questioned because of the role of the field-associated discourses in making sense of 
the world. The methodology used in this thesis aims to target the more or less conscious 
use of the effects of power in these discourses and help determine how they narrow the 
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potentially wide scope of possible approaches to ‘terrorism’ to a single-track approach 
with limited options of action.  
 The knowledge producing centres of power within the fields (Figure 2) are 
mutually sustained and strengthened by exercising the effects of power through 
discourse which are, again more or less deliberately, oriented towards maintaining the 
existing relations of power. The political field in Figure 2 is further divided into the 
representatives of the dominant social group, and the representatives of the marginal 
social group, which are often labelled as ‘terrorists’. This division within the political 
field is indicative of the oppositional friction forming the conflict. The analysis will 
cover a range of available texts and discursive practices to be analysed in relation to 
the focus events of the non-discursive reality. Extensions of the political field such as 
the military, security forces, the police, and especially unrecognized armed resistance 
(‘terrorists’) will be included for their specific and significant role in producing 
discourses and thus knowledge about ‘terrorism’.  
 
 
The same combination of archaeology, double reading and genealogy will be 
applied to the discourses of the media and the academe. The centrally constructed 
limited scopes of approaching ‘terrorism’ will be widened through the deconstructive 
analysis oriented towards seeking out the differences, incoherencies, deviations, the 
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marginalized voices and the traces of the ‘other’ (Figure 3). The aim of this approach 
is not merely the criticism of the established practices and approaches to ‘terrorism’. 
The main goal of this research project is locating and acknowledging the existence of 
the wider scopes existing within the fields where individuals, communities, non-
governmental organizations, grass-roots movements, artists and many others offer 
different discourses. These discourses operate outside of the box constructed by the 
dominant explanations and represent spaces where conflict resolution could begin in a 
more constructive manner even for peoples as divided as the Palestinians and the 
Israelis.  
 The contours of relations between the fields of the Terrorism Complex are 
briefly sketched in Figure 4. The connections between the centres of power (Figure 
4.1) are seen as reproductive of the asymmetry of power (Figure 4.2), which will be 
established as one of the key components of the conflicts with elements of ‘terrorist’ 
violence. These relations are also constitutive of the terror effect – one of the defining 
features of ‘terrorism’ as the name of the term itself suggests. The use of force depends 
on the attributed speech acts12 to become ‘terrorism’.  
Since the positions of authority are distributed according to the amount of 
symbolic power13, it is the dominant sectors of society that have the advantage in 
explaining the world in a way that sustains the favourable distribution of authority. “If 
the people who make the claims can get others to accept the claims, then they have 
created a kind of deontology that goes beyond the deontology of the speech act” 
(Searle, 2008, p. 450) thus creating rigid narrow scopes which set the limits for action. 
Without the misdirected and often terrorising political practices, policies, actions, and 
responses, the uncritically narrow and compliant media reports, and the academic 
legitimization constructing a limited scope around particular acts of violence and 
placing constraints on the ability to expand the scope of research there would be no 
‘terrorism’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Speech acts are discursive utterances produced by the recognized social authorities (Bourdieu, 1992, 
p. 74; Buzan, et al., 1998a, pp. 32-33). Infused with the “legitimacy of the dominant mode of 
expression” they are used to represent the world in a way that sustains the power relations supportive of 
the afore mentioned authority (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 70).   
13Apart from the definitions of symbolic power already mentioned, the following is the most illustrative 
in this particular context: “Symbolic power is a power which the person submitting to grants to the 
person who exercises it, a credit with which he credits him, afides, an auctoritas, with which he entrusts 
him by placing his trust in him. It is a power which exists because the person who submits to it believes 
that it exists” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 192). 
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By observing the effects of power in discourse and the effects of power through 
discourse the components of the terror effect will become identifiable. ‘Terrorism’ is 
not a fact of the objective reality and cannot effectively be approached as such. What 
is commonly labelled as ‘terrorism’ is rather a Terrorism Complex – a networked 
social phenomenon, discursive in nature, and reproductive of the conflict inducing 
power asymmetry. To find effective possibilities of alleviating and eventually resolving 
conflicts is to look beyond this dominant power core of the Complex and examine the 
array of alternative, additional or simply different discourses.  
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This loose multitude needs to be sifted through to find discourses offering additional 
viewpoints on ‘terrorism’ that could lead to new and constructive solutions for lasting 
peace based on ethical practices (Figure 4.3).   
 Returning to Foucault’s ‘eventalization’, similarities can be found with the way 
the concept of Terrorism Complex is devised “around the singular event analyzed 
[sic] as process” around which “a ‘polygon’ or, rather, ‘polyhedron’ of intelligibility” is 
constructed (Foucault, 2002c, p. 227). By looking at ‘terrorism’ through the limited 
scopes of individual prisms can only lend a limited understanding of the observed 
social phenomenon. In order to get a more accurate image the individual 
understandings, together with the scopes that form them, need to be recognized as 
parts of a wider network – the Terrorism Complex.  
The complexities involved in the discourses constitutive of the power/knowledge 
relations within and between the fields involved in the Terrorism Complex can be 
adequately addressed only when observed through a variety of discourses with 
attached practices, relations, and viewpoints. In attempting to provide a plausible 
answer to the question what could act as a safeguard against the abuse of language in 
the pursuit of power, the notion of ethics kept surfacing as a possible solution. Though 
many attempts to elaborate on the application of ethics to the international relations 
issues and to the Terrorism Complex in particular fell short. Wittgenstein’s (1965) 
lecture on ethics lends clues as to why it is so difficult to discuss questions of the 
absolute good, the absolute value, the absolute importance, the right way (p. 5). Each 
of these expressions entails “two very different senses. I [Wittgenstein] will call them 
the trivial or relative sense on the one hand and the ethical or absolute sense on the 
other” (p. 5). Ethical propositions can only be expressed as similes of something that is 
supernatural and is not attached to facts (pp. 7-10). This intangible nature of ethics 
combined with the often intentionally blurred distinction between the trivial and the 
absolute sense of what is good or right results in difficulties when trying to approach 
ethical considerations ‘scientifically’. But instead of abandoning the project 
Wittgenstein’s advice can be heeded : 
[e]thics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the 
ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can 
be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. 
But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I 
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personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life 
ridicule it. (p. 12) 
The previously established connection between knowledge and power explains the 
under-developed role of ethics in international relations. As ethics does not add to 
knowledge it is irrelevant in the endeavours towards maximizing power, and as it can 
be no science it is avoided in the dominant discourse of the international relations 
theory as well. The critique of posing the relative sense of ethical propositions as the 
absolute sense will, however, be one of the points of the subsequent investigation into 
the use of the term ‘terrorism’ within the scope of this thesis. 
Both critical and ethical reflections are especially important when working on 
conflicts with elements of ‘terrorist’ violence. These social events usually draw 
immediate attention from the political elites poised to deal with the particular 
situation, from the media due to the newsworthy characteristics14 of social violence 
and from the particular group of academic experts prepared to provide swift 
explanations and policy guidelines. Even though objectivity is both a journalistic and 
academic ideal it rarely survives the editorial and self-censoring practices guided by 
the power currents underlying any conflict. Only homogenous interpretations capable 
of bringing together heterogeneous societies get through the editorial sieves filtering 
masses of information according to the rules and conventions of the trade (Said, 1981, 
pp. 45-49). Only explanations and policy suggestions in line with power interests get 
awarded political attention and implementation. In conflicts characterized by power 
imbalance the emergent legitimized reality can be expected to correspond with the 
interests dominant in the field of power. In order to lend support to this claim the 
critical analysis of discourses explaining ‘terrorism’-related conflicts is crucial for the 
understanding how a uniform representation of reality is further constructed and 
legitimized.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 According to Harcup and O’Neill (2009, p. 43) events with the biggest potential of making the news 
are connected to one or more of the following: power elites, celebrities, entertainment (including also 
human interest and unfolding drama), surprise, bad news (especially conflicts and tragedies), good 
news, magnitude (in terms of people involved or people potentially affected), events relevant to the 
audience, follow up stories previously introduced as news, and those corresponding to the media 
organization’s agenda.   
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 3. THE ACADEMIC FIELD 
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We are suffocating in the captivity of narrow and homogenous interpretations. 
(Bakhtin, 1986a, p. 140) 
 
 
“The social sciences stand at the nexus of power and knowledge in the modern 
world” (Bell, 2009, p. 3) and the following theoretical elucidations touch upon the 
dynamics in the production of knowledge and its relationship with power. This 
chapter will begin by examining the networked effects of the personal and systemic 
struggles for power in the relevant areas of the academic field. The focus will initially 
be on International Relations (IR)15 but in the course of the chapter it will gradually 
be narrowed to Terrorism Studies, which is the subfield of IR that relates most 
directly to the study of ‘terrorism’.  
The representative narratives of the academic field, as the first faces of the 
‘terrorism’ polyhedron to be analysed for their role in the Terrorism Complex, will be 
approached as they intersect and form points of departure and convergence in the 
dynamic intertextual16 setting. In the specific environment of the academic field, 
where knowledge is produced and reproduced through textual amalgamations, 
attention will be oriented towards intertextuality and dialogism as a complex layering 
of relations, voices, and meanings (Bakhtin, 1986b, pp. 121-124), which should not be 
overlooked in the pursuit of a mirage of consolidated knowledge. The reading will be 
focused on the subtle biases in the interstices of academic texts, on the borders 
between the discourses where the opposing opinions clash, and on the manner in 
which some claims are awarded the status of objective truth while others are 
marginalized and kept away from the homogenized narratives of the discipline, mostly 
due to their supposed lack of scientificity and methodological rigour.  
The identification of the exclusionary mechanisms that are operating in the 
academic field and implicating its discourses and relations in the Terrorism Complex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 To distinguish between the academic discipline of International Relations (IR) and international 
relations as the object of study, the discipline will be either spelled with initial letters capitalized or 
abbreviated to IR.   
16 Intertextual is used here in a broad sense corresponding to Julia Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality. 
Intertextuality, born out of Bakhtin’s dialogism and Barthes’ text theory (Kristeva, 2002, p. 8), refers to 
the multiplicity of different, often oppositional fragments involved in the dynamic formation of meaning 
(p. 11) through the signifying process where voices and texts intersect in the “trans-verbal reality of the 
psyche from which all meanings emerge” (p. 9).	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will then inform the parts of the chapter dedicated to the search for the academic 
voices that could turn the monologue of the discipline into a dialogue. This part will 
lean on the Bakhtinian view of language, which predates and complements Bourdieu, 
Foucault, and Derrida in their understandings of the knowledge/power/discourse 
triad. Bakhtin views language as a dialogized heteroglossia – as the dynamic contact 
between texts 17  on the discursive borders marking the “co-existence of socio-
ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between different epochs 
of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between 
tendencies, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form” (Bakhtin, 2000, pp. 276, 278).  
The asymmetries of power within the academic field itself betray the operation 
of the Terrorism Complex. The privileging of certain academic accounts over others 
effectively constricts the realm of legitimate knowledge and consequently the access to 
alternative approaches to enduring problems such as ‘terrorism’. It is only by 
acknowledging the plurality of thought in all the diversity of its methods and 
strategies, that scientific reason is realized (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 21). “If we transform 
dialogue into one continuous text, that is, erase the divisions between voices /…/ then 
the deep-seated (infinite) contextual meaning disappears (we hit the bottom, reach a 
standstill)” (Bakhtin, 1986c, p. 162). The instrumental role of the academic field in the 
Terrorism Complex will be related to the discrediting, marginalizing, and silencing of 
the academic discourses endowed with less symbolic power.  
This chapter will feature an argument that the academic field cannot 
effectively approach ‘terrorism’ until it acknowledges its own role in the Terrorism 
Complex and its network of relations and mechanisms constructing the dominant 
view and understanding of ‘terrorism’. It will further be argued that when scholars 
adopt the value-laden terminology associated with ‘terrorism’ and use the term itself 
as a pre-given they are actively participating in the Terrorism Complex by 
perpetuating the power asymmetry, the physical manifestation of which is the use of 
force labelled as ‘terrorism’. This chapter will demonstrate that when this physical 
‘fact of objective reality’ lends itself to unreflective academic analysis the spiral of 
power asymmetry starts anew. Part of the academic field’s complicity in the Terrorism 
Complex is also the complicity in the desensitization to humanity. This aspect will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “’Text’ is understood in the broad sense – as any coherent complex of signs” (Bakhtin, 1986b, p. 
103). 
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examined by looking at how the insistence on hard scientific facts corresponds to a 
particular idea of academic objectivity.  
 
 
3.1 POWER AND THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
The understanding of the Terrorism Complex depends on the acute awareness 
of the existence of implicit, even unconscious biases regulating researchers’ choices 
and slanting their research projects according to particular interests. Reflective 
thought directed towards the structural mechanisms, agential choices, and the 
complexity of the interrelations stemming from the mutually constitutive relationship 
between agents and structures is the basis for the understanding of the Terrorism 
Complex. “If there is a truth, it is that truth is a stake in the struggle” (Bourdieu, 1993, 
p. 263). Bourdieu thus draws attention to the crack in the foundations of positive 
science – to the socially constructed character of truth about the social reality.  
Much of Foucault’s legacy attests to the relevance of such a view. His 
genealogies (Foucault, 1973, 1995, 1984, 2001) reveal the historical origins and 
developments of the social systems and practices that at any given moment seem 
ahistorical and are generally accepted as natural given facts. The intimate relationship 
between power and knowledge (1995, pp. 26-28) allows the gradual development of 
social practices to mirror the power relations and general power distribution in a 
particular society. 
In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces 
a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-
knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it 
is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of 
knowledge (p. 28). 
Questions of agency and structure culminate in a system of vertical and horizontal 
relationships between agents and structures where any preferences towards agency or 
structure become moot. Socially constructed structures over time take on an existence 
of their own, influencing other structures and agents. Agents, socialised into existing 
structures, interact within and between clusters of agents in the process of the social 
construction of reality. Or as Wight (2003, p. 714) puts it: 
Society can be seen to be both the ever present condition (that is the 
material cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of human 
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agency. All social practices have an action and a structural aspect that 
is integral to the practice.  
In spite of this perpetual motion and seemingly uncontrollable multitude of social 
exchanges some limited predictions about the social world can be made. The degree 
of predictability depends on the slow patterns of change stemming from the rigidity of 
the power-knowledge nexus, which works over long periods of time towards 
maintaining the status quo in power distribution (Foucault, 1995, pp. 27, 305; 
Bourdieu, 1989, pp. 21-22). The academic field is not exempt from this process in 
spite of striving towards objectivity and the external observer status. The structure of 
the academic field is most influenced by the agents and institutions with the majority 
of the field-specific capital and its configuration dictates “as the universal norm” 
practices used by the most powerful agents and institutions, thus perpetuating the 
cycle by endowing them with even more capital (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 13). 
Wight (2003, p. 714) and Bourdieu (1973, pp. 64-69; see also Honneth, et al., 
1986, p. 41) seem to be in agreement that even though agents might rationally be 
devoted to the scientific project and the objectivity it presupposes, they cannot 
consciously be aware of all the structural influences they have internalised in the 
process of socialization. Particular dangers are attached to ignoring the possibility that 
Wight and Bourdieu are right which would imply that international relations policies 
are justified on the basis of theories, which only appear to be objectively explaining 
social situations.  
The autonomy of the scientific field needs to be taken into consideration along 
“with the intensity of the constraints and controls exercised, directly or indirectly, by 
external powers, which themselves appear to depend on the degree to which the 
scientific discoveries are liable to affect the legitimate representations of the social 
world” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 15). The degree of influence from the outside is 
particularly steep in the field of International Relations closely linked to the field of 
power. Supposedly (Smith, 2000, p. 377)18 born out of the practical need to help 
policy-makers avoid another Great War (Burchill, 2001, pp. 4-6) the discipline has 
remained centred around Western, particularly American hegemony and 
instrumental in the decisions regarding the inter-state conduct of the international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Smith gives credence to Schmidt’s find that the study of IR predates the First World War and that 
the positioning of its roots in that particular time and the constructing of historical accounts in a 
particular way erases certain debates from “our collective memory” (Schmidt, 1998b, pp. 228-229) and 
serves to frame the discipline in a particular manner (pp. 230-231). 
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politics. A theoretical exposition of the asymmetric power distribution regarding the 
academic field is required to determine the focus of the argument to follow.  
 
 
3.1.1 The Asymmetry of Power and the Production of Knowledge 
 
The complicity of the academic field in the Terrorism Complex will perhaps 
be the most difficult to analyse. It requires a metatheoretical endeavour ridden with 
perilous pitfalls attributed to the fact that an agent, as an active participant in the field, 
cannot avoid using the methods or following the rules of the field complete with the 
internalised pre-givens. The fiercest struggles of the field can go on without 
questioning the set of presuppositions that Bourdieu (1991, p. 9) terms as doxa, which 
“bears upon the totality of what is accepted [in the field] due to the mere fact of 
membership in it” and acts as the most powerful set of limits to the field’s scope of 
vision and agents’ array of choices. The researcher cannot claim to be exempt from 
participating in the power struggles regulating the hierarchy and the structure of the 
field, whether one strives to satisfy the autonomous or the heteronomous principles of 
hierarchization (1993, p. 41).  
The position of an agent in the academic field combined with their personal 
primary and secondary socialization guide their strategic decisions when presented 
with the available choices pertaining to their research and its publicizing. The purpose 
of such strategizing, according to Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 6-10), is to gain more 
field-specific capital and to acquire a better initial position in the course of the 
continuous competitive struggle for power. This struggle stems from the opposition 
between orthodoxy preserving the state of the power distribution and heterodoxy 
working towards subverting it (pp. 6-10).  
When the opposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy becomes tainted 
with the incursion of external power, the heteronomous principles of hierarchization 
enter the field. Agents from both opposites may feel inclined to abandon autonomous 
principles of hierarchization in favour of more recognition, power or monetary gain 
by aligning themselves with an external centre of power. Figure 5 shows the resulting 
distribution of power whereby the agents who choose to support the status quo of 
orthodoxy while following the heteronomous principles of hierarchization have the 
most power, and those who choose autonomous principles and belong to heterodoxy 
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tend to have the least power. The autonomy/heteronomy divide is strong in the field 
of Terrorism Studies, which is the result of the incursion of political power relations 
and their demands into the field as will be illustrated in the analysis to follow.  
 
 
Figure 5 
Distribution of Power 
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The correlative rift in the political field magnifies the oppositional tensions 
within the academic field. The cross-field alignment of power sustains the power 
asymmetry within the academic field by supporting the production of knowledge that 
does not disturb the status quo. Power, as the main principle of hierarchization in the 
political field, depends on the amount of popular mobilization potential it can amass 
(Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 188-196). Academics oriented towards heteronomous 
hierarchization provide “ideological services” in support of certain policies in 
exchange for furthering their interests and maximizing their weight in the power 
struggles within the field (1991, p. 19). This support may not be obvious or even 
intentional; it may be attributed to details as minute as the unquestioned application 
of certain terminology such as the use of the value-laden term ‘terrorism’.  
To the detriment of alternative solutions to problems ridden with impasses and 
stalemates, the definitions and approaches to the International Relations subject 
matter are too closely linked to the practitioners’ perceptions of the international 
realities. Mixed agents, appearing both in the academic and in the political field 
(Hoffmann, 1977, p. 50), are not uncommon in the field of international relations, 
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which explains the long reign of realism, liberalism and their neo-varieties over the 
discipline. Some of the leading academic figures in the field spent parts of their careers 
working in the political field or even holding political positions. Edward Hallet Carr 
held a post in Foreign Office for twenty years (Griffiths, et al., 2009, p. 9), Robert 
Gilpin was a congressional fellow (p. 16), John Herz “worked for the Office of 
Strategic Services and the State Department” before taking on a professorial position 
(p. 24), Samuel Huntington was a “co-ordinator of security planning of the National 
Security Council in the White House” during which time he “co-founded the journal 
Foreign Policy” (p. 31), George Kennan held various positions in the US Foreign 
Service (pp. 36-37), Stephen D. Krasner was a member of the Policy Planning Staff 
and the International Security Advisory Board in the US Department of State 
(Stanford University, 2011, p. 1), Hans Morgenthau was also a member of the Policy 
Planning Staff in the State Department as well as an adviser to the Pentagon 
(Griffiths, et al., 2009, p. 51).  
Mixed agents appear among the great names of liberalism as well. Francis 
Fukuyama “has held a variety of positions with RAND and with the US State 
Department (p. 82), Richard Rosecrance began his career working for the Policy 
Planning Council in the State Department (p. 115), Joseph Nye “served as Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National 
Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, 
Science and Technology” (Harvard Kennedy School, n.d.). The close “confidential 
relationships between academic disciplines and national security organs” (Engerman, 
2007, p. 603) also suggest closer and mutually formative relationships between the 
theories and the world they explain (pp. 604-611).  
Miller and Mills’ (2009, pp. 419, 424) research into the invisible college of 
‘terrorism’ experts revealed that 42 out of 100 most prominent experts had or 
currently have career ties to the political field, including connections to the military 
and security sectors, and are supportive of the policy orientations. Current situation 
supports the Terrorism Complex hypothesis that suggests tight connections between 
the centres of power across the fields of academe, politics and media that enable the 
construction of knowledge in support of the existing power distribution. Encouraging 
a public dialogue with scholars, further removed from the policy making and thus in a 
unique position to offer a view less burdened with political practicalities and policy 
shaped pre-givens, might open new views on finding sustainable solutions to persistent 
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problems such as ‘terrorism’ and would be a step in the direction of the coveted 
impartiality and objectivity. For the time being these scholars remain relegated to the 
fringes of the academic field.  
Bourdieu (1975, p. 30) identifies the structure of the field as the factor that 
presents agents with strategies for waging the struggle for power. Some agents opt for 
a steady and respectable career by choosing risk-averse “succession strategies” (p. 30) 
that follow in the footsteps of the dominant established science, staying within the 
scope of its problems and methods for solving them.  
Conscientious people can come to see their legitimate stampingground 
[sic] as limited once and for all by the topics and methods already on 
offer. They can suppress new ideas, not just from nervousness, but on 
principle. The Citation Index, a device lately invented to ensure 
conventional thinking, helps them to do this by rewarding 
contributions to existing debates and penalizing unexpected 
suggestions, which naturally take longer to register and attract replies. 
Doctoral theses, too, unavoidably give training in sticking to existing 
lines of argument. (Midgley, 1989 p. 52) 
Other agents find themselves more inclined towards the gamble involved in the 
“subversion strategies” (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 30), which can eventually bring them 
recognition and a position at the very top of the discipline’s heterodox hierarchy that 
only a widely debated establishment of a revolutionary new paradigm can achieve.  
The lifestories of great scholars typically tell of their hard struggles to 
shift the focus of attention away from unprofitable places towards the 
problems where it was most needed. And, by a pleasing irony, 
defenders of orthodox methods are very often the heirs of these 
revolutionaries. (Midgley, 1989 p. 52) 
The magnitude of the risk is reflected in the odds stacked against the ability of agents 
to carry out “a complete redefinition of the principles legitimating domination”, 
especially “since the whole logic of the system is against them” (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 
30). The logic is the one behind the asymmetry in the distribution of scientific capital, 
which translates into the corresponding positions in the hierarchy of the field and the 
influence over the mechanisms that systematically support the dominant orthodox 
parts of the academic field and make the struggle inherently unequal (p. 29). Every 
choice that agents in the academic field make translates into a certain amount of 
scientific capital, which affects the power distribution and is as such a building block 
of the structure of the field. It is the power of this structure that makes the choices of 
agents largely predictable and constant in their reproduction of the initial structural 
pattern. 
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3.2 THE ASYMMETRIES OF IR IN GENERAL AND TERRORISM 
STUDIES IN PARTICULAR 
 
3.2.1 Cultural Bias 
 
 The asymmetrical distribution of power in the field of International Relations 
begins with its cultural bias. Judging by its most esteemed scholars (Jordan, et al., 
2009, pp. 43-48), highest ranking educational institutions (pp. 64-69), the most 
renowned journals (pp. 49-51; Russett & Arnold, 2010, p. 597; Wæver, 1998, pp. 697-
701) and book presses (Jordan, et al., 2009, pp. 52-54) the discipline has remained 
firmly situated in the Western, dominantly American cultural setting since the 
beginning of its independent path (Walt, 2011; Hoffmann, 1977; Smith, 2000; Wæver, 
1998; Smith, 2002). According to Smith (2000, pp. 394, 399) “the parochial character 
of US IR”, due to its size and significant control over the mechanisms of consecration, 
overshadows the discipline as a whole and moulds it to US interests.  
In spite of the growing theoretical diversity in the European IR, the dominant 
US theory still operates in expressly rationalist environment (Wæver, 1998, pp. 701-
702). A rather narrow and partial scope of ‘official science’ is transmitted through the 
mechanisms of secondary socialization, which present agents with a very particular 
idea of a legitimate ontological outlook, epistemological orientation and 
methodological choices. Or as Booth (1996, p. 331) explains it: “The 
institutionalisation of the subject and its development underlines simply and clearly 
the crucial relationship between the global distribution of power and the global 
production of knowledge”.  
The consequences of the discipline’s cultural bias can be detrimental when 
they align with the political bias and feed into its ideological constructs. The process is 
best summarised by Edward Said (1981, p. 142): “The scholarly honor and integrity 
of the field are upheld against critical outsiders, scholarly rhetoric is wilfully arrogant 
about denying political partisanship, and scholarly self-congratulation fortifies present 
practices indefinitely”. Said’s , 1979) work on the implications of Western negative 
bias towards the Islamic world, veiled in supposedly objective and value-free scientific 
approaches (pp. 136-139), was written more than three decades ago but has hardly 
lost its relevance. The academic ‘othering’ of Islam continued throughout the 1990s. 
From Lewis’s exploration into the Roots of Muslim Rage (1990) to Huntington’s 
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Clash of Civilizations which warns of Islam’s “bloody borders” (1993, p. 35) the divide 
between Islam and the West was commonly not explored as something to bridge but 
as a something to defend against. The view from the West-centric academe suggested 
an image of violent Islam, which was readily adopted by politics and media searching 
for the ultimate Other to take the place of the Cold War communist nemesis (Seib, 
2004, p. 76; Lazar & Lazar, 2004, pp. 225-226; Bleiker, 2003, p. 440). “[T]he West 
needed the image of an enemy after the end the Cold War, and Islam, for a variety of 
reasons, has come to fill that role” (Laqueur, 1999, p. 128).  
The negative focus on Islam has gained unprecedented momentum in the post 
9/11 world in which academic research has joined a multitude of political and media 
products largely clustered around the idea of religious ‘terrorism’. David C. 
Rapoport’s (2001, 2002, 2004, 2006) influential theory on the four waves of modern 
terrorism suggests religious terrorism as the fourth and the most recent evolutionary 
stage of terrorism and singles out Islam as being “at the heart of the wave” and 
responsible for its onset (2004, p. 61).  
Much of the problem-solving oriented research is marked by the ‘Islamic 
terrorism’ discourse featuring a set of binary oppositions that magnify the supposed 
cultural divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ “such as the West versus the Islamic world, 
extremists versus moderates, violent versus peaceful, democratic versus totalitarian, 
religious versus secular, medieval versus modern and savage versus civilized” (Jackson, 
2007a, p. 401). Jackson (pp. 403-412) provides a set of exemplary narratives which 
testify to the use of simplifications and generalizations in academic research that help 
sustain an exaggerated threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ and feed into the widespread 
climate of fear constructed around Islam through the decades. These “narratives 
imply that because ‘Islamic terrorism’ is fanatical, religiously motivated, murderous 
and irrational, there is no possibility of negotiation, compromise or appeasement; 
instead, eradication, deterrence and forceful counter-terrorism are the only reasonable 
responses” (p. 409).  
The complicity of academic research in sustaining this overstated adversarial 
situation is indicative of the role of academe in the Terrorism Complex.  
[N]arratives of fanatical, murderous, suicidal ‘Islamic terrorists’ 
functions to amplify rather than allay the social fear generated by 
terrorist actions because it reinforces the perception that the attackers 
are inhuman killing machines who cannot be deterred or reasoned 
with. /…/ More broadly, there seems little doubt that Western 
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counter-terrorism policies, based in large part on the productive 
categories of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse, are at least partly 
responsible for intensifying cycles of violence and instability. (Jackson, 
2007a, p. 424) 
Dominant academic narratives on ‘Islamic terrorism’ tie with the dominant narratives 
of political elites and help maintain the mutually favourable distribution of power that 
often results in what Jackson (p. 424) terms “self-defeating policies” which “persist 
because the discourse restricts and constructs the legitimate ‘knowledge’ that is 
allowed to inform policy debate whilst simultaneously establishing the parameters of 
legitimate action.” The confrontational narratives limit the range of possible actions to 
a “set of coercive and punitive counter-terrorism strategies, whilst simultaneously 
making non-violent alternatives such as dialogue, compromise and reform appear 
inconceivable and nonsensical” (p. 421). Particular political interests of powerful elites 
are legitimised as necessary components of counter-terrorism supposedly addressing 
national and international security concerns (p. 421). The negative consequences of 
unbridled exercise of power for the purposes of Western states’ policies keep mounting 
in the form of rampant Islamophobia and “erosion of public morality” which leads to 
a skewed perception of the acceptability of torture and other human rights abuses (p. 
423).  
Terror as the key ingredient in ‘terrorism’ as the “system of terror” (Crenshaw, 
2011, p. 21) is partly manufactured through the academic use of inflammatory 
‘terrorism’ discourse and becomes a part of the social reality structured according to 
the dominant discourse. The academic field is not immune to the subsequent 
structuring pressures of the realities constructed through the dominant ‘Islamic 
terrorism’ discourses. The extent to which this manufactured reality of an 
omnipresent Islamic threat can distort the perception of a certain situation can be best 
illustrated by an example to which I will refer to as the Nottingham affair. It is a 
cautionary manifestation of academic freedom falling prey to the anxieties 
manufactured around ‘Islamic terrorism’.  
In 2008 two young Muslim men, Rizwaan Sabir, a postgraduate student of 
International Relations at the University of Nottingham, and Hicham Yezza, a junior 
administrator at Sabir’s school, were arrested under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 
on suspicion of terrorist activity after downloading and printing the Al-Qaeda 
Training Manual from the United States Department of Justice website. The widely 
available document was intended for the purposes of Sabir’s research for his thesis and 
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for the draft PhD proposal on counter-terrorism he was working on. Sabir sent the 
document to Yezza to be printed out. A situation that could have been solved with a 
simple explanation has spun into a protracted matter of national security. After being 
held for six days and after having their homes raided and families upset the two men 
were released without charges but continued to suffer random police incursions into 
their daily lives due to records still kept on file (Sabir, 2008; Yezza, 2008).  
In 2011, after three years, Sabir won a legal battle against the 
Nottinghamshire police who had to pay damages, agree to remove inaccurate 
information from his intelligence files and apologise for the random stop and search 
actions he had to endure over the years (Sabir, 2011).  
The story continued in 2011 when academic freedom was once again put in 
question when Dr Rod Thornton, a lecturer in counterterrorism at the University of 
Nottingham, was suspended over an article titled Radicalization at Universities or 
Radicalization by Universities?: How a Student’s Use of a Library Book Became a 
‘Major Islamist Plot’ that he prepared for the British International Studies Association 
(BISA) conference after he has been dismissed and disciplined for his insistence to 
investigate and address the University’s management misconduct surrounding the 
arrests of Sabir and Yezza internally.  
In the whistle-blowing article Thornton details the extent of the exaggerated 
fears over ‘Islamic terrorism’ that led to the questionable conduct of the University of 
Nottingham’s authorities in leading up to and handling of the 2008 arrests (Thornton, 
2011). Subsequently over 200 confidential documents that support Thornton’s claims 
have been published by the Support the Whistleblower at Nottingham (SWAN) 
campaign and Unileaks (Support the Whistleblower at Nottingham, 2011; Unileaks, 2011) 
while a number of notable academics petitioned for Thornton to be reinstated and for 
the conduct of the University of Nottingham to be thoroughly examined (Chomsky, et 
al., 2011). The University however remains steadfast in the claims that Thornton’s 
article is defamatory and baseless and that the management’s conduct regarding the 
2008 arrests was beyond reproach. “The University became concerned and decided, 
after a risk assessment, that those concerns should be conveyed to the police as the 
appropriate body to investigate” (The University Press Statement: Unileaked, 2011). 
The Nottingham affair demonstrates how the self-defeating security concerns 
and the exaggerated perception of risk can be directly linked to the fear stemming 
from the West-centric construct of ‘Islamic terrorism’. The phrase ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
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has become a commonplace “negative ideograph” (Jackson, 2007a, p. 420) which has 
entered the collective Western consciousness through repeated use and dissemination 
of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse by politicians, scholars, experts, and the media. 
The discursive phrase ‘Islamic terrorism’ was gradually transformed into ‘Islamic 
terrorism’ as a ‘fact’ of social reality and approached through research as an 
independently existing social occurrence lending itself to analysis as a ‘given fact’.  
Due to the multifaceted complexity of issues studied in any field, including 
Terrorism Studies, scholars inevitably have to resort to choosing a starting point for 
their research and making selections of relevant information, which lead to contextual 
lacunas, simplifications, and generalizations. These largely inevitable research 
processes (Midgley, 1989 p. 193) become problematic when they start reproducing the 
negative effects related to their subject topics, for example magnifying the terror 
surrounding terrorism by making statements such as “[d]espite increased security and 
heightened public awareness, Islamist terrorists continue to kill hundreds of civilians in 
high-profile attacks” (Berman, 2009, p. 7).  
By accepting ‘Islamic terrorism’ as a given fact and accepting that fact as a 
starting point for research, scholars tend to skip over the asymmetries of power 
entailed in the very construction and use of the term. As a consequence the power 
asymmetries are reproduced with every indiscriminate use of the term, the root causes 
for conflicts involving ‘terrorism’ remain unaddressed, and the options for the 
resolution of such conflicts dependent on alternative viewpoints are closed off. Some 
scholars look at the context, which disposes people to become religious militants 
(Stern, 2003), others venture into the workings of terrorist networks (Berman, 2009). 
There are studies on the characteristics of terrorist organizations in order to find 
effective ways to counter them (Lesser, et al., 1999) and focused studies, for example 
on the Palestinian religious terrorism (Alexander, 2002). What all these academic 
narratives have in common is the uncritical West-centric adoption of the term 
‘terrorism’ and the perception that the connection between the signifier ‘terrorism’ 
and certain events of the non-discursive reality is observable and straightforward. 
Examples abound19 of similar academic products too concerned with observable facts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In view of the vast amount and varying quality of research conducted on ‘terrorism’, especially after 
its rise in popularity post 9/11 (Dunne, 2011) and given the fact that the approach advocated in this 
thesis is not inclined towards the presentation of the studied sources in the form of accumulated 
empirical data but towards the examination of complex relations and processes, I have chosen to stay 
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to question the intangible cultural biases, power relations, or normative considerations 
related to the construction and use of the term ‘terrorism’ in general and the term 
‘Islamic terrorism’ in particular.  
 
3.2.2 The History of Asymmetry – Myths and Debates 
 
Any expansion of “the space and resources of thought” (Ashley & Walker, 
1990b, p. 267) has to battle the limit-imposing constructs of the discipline such as the 
writing of the discipline’s history which blends into the background of the doxa and 
can be studied as another mechanism aimed at naturalizing the asymmetry of power 
in the field. The retrospectively constructed history has “present criteria and 
concerns” written into it as it emerges in the form of “a self-constituted tradition in the 
field” (Long & Schmidt, 2005, pp. 8-9). “[T]he widespread practice of treating an 
analytically constructed tradition as an actual historical tradition has inhibited our 
ability to understand the disciplinary history of IR” (p. 8) as it enabled the widespread 
acceptance of myths “of what we study and how we study it” (de Carvalho, et al., 
2011, p. 3). Booth (1996, p. 328) defines the foundational myths as “half-truths – 
which help shape attitudes and buttress ideologies” while they “tend to sustain 
primitive rather than complex understandings of human predicaments.”  
The ontological myth of 1948 indicates the emergence of the sovereign state 
and the anarchic state system at the time of the treaties of Westphalia while revisionist 
historic accounts show that to be erroneous and simplistic (de Carvalho, et al., 2011, 
pp. 4-8). The second myth is the epistemological one that places the birth of the IR 
Discipline in 1919 when it supposedly emerged out of the idealistic push that followed 
the Great War (Schmidt, 1998a, pp. 437-438). Traditional historical accounts tell the 
story of the first great debate during the course of which the supposedly more 
competent realist approach replaced the inadequate interwar idealism (de Carvalho, 
et al., 2011, pp. 11-12; Schmidt, 1998a, pp. 438-439; Booth, 1996, p. 329). This myth 
was constructed by substituting the expressly Eurocentric, and from today’s viewpoint, 
blatantly racist beginnings of the discipline with an imposed narrative recounting the 
discipline’s noble birth. This narrative was combined with the retroactive narrative of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
within the realm of metatheoretical debates, only occasionally illustrating some of the points by select 
examples from a number of analysed prescriptive and practice oriented academic texts.  
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dominant realism and superior empiricism in a rounded revisionist account (de 
Carvalho, et al., 2011, pp. 13-18) that sustains the status quo of the power asymmetry. 
Booth (1996, p. 329) makes an explicit connection between the constructed “ideas of 
realists about themselves and the world”, the appeal these ideas held for the “national 
security elites”, the way “the academic power shifted in their direction” and the 
following forty years of teaching the subject in a way that naturalized this constructed 
historical account.  
The analysis of IR textbooks, as pivotal texts in the secondary socialization of 
agents in the field, shows that, regardless of the persuasive revisionist historiographical 
accounts, the controversy surrounding these myths is either completely omitted in 
favour of the dominant narrative or mentioned, but soon overpowered and 
marginalized (de Carvalho, et al., 2011, pp. 8-11, 18-21). The myths of IR serve as “a 
matrix for further thinking in IR” which “might be one of the reasons why they have 
proved so difficult to dislodge” (p. 23). The pressures of the doxa are imposing the 
traditional accounts that have been written into the foundations on which the 
discipline now stands and reproduces the doxa through the continuous circular 
dynamic just described. This dynamic can be observed in the narrative of the ‘great 
debates’ of International Relations.  
The framing of the epistemological issues in the form of the great debates of 
IR is another set of mythical historic narratives which misleadingly present the 
discipline as open and pluralistic (Smith, 2000, p. 376) while performing their 
“legitimating functions, classifying some positions as the product of intellectual 
progress, others as consigned for ever to the proverbial dustbin of history” (Bell, 2009, 
p. 5).  
Schmidt (1998a) re-examines the narratives of the ‘first great debate’ and finds 
that the foundational myths that have been constructed around the beginnings of the 
discipline not only misrepresent the history of International Relations (pp. 437-439) 
but also orient the discipline towards particular views on state sovereignty and 
international anarchy. These views have a defining hold on the way international 
relations are approached through research (pp. 453-455).  
The centrality of state sovereignty in International Relations is crucial for the 
understanding of power asymmetry, where states are privileged in respect of the non-
state entities, which are, in line with the binary discourse of the discipline, considered 
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to be part of the dangerous realm of anarchy (Ashley & Walker, 1990a, p. 389). The 
academic field of International Relations thus mirrors, legitimizes, and co-constructs 
the privileged position of states, which endows them with the power necessary to label 
the opposing non-state entities as ‘terrorist groups’. “‘Anarchy’ and ‘terror’ are names 
– albeit not the only ones, surely – that modern discourses use to mark off the 
centerless and undecidable practices of criticism and resistance that they would fear, 
exclude, and prepare to discipline” (Ashley, 1989, p. 267). The myth of the “great 
debates” is structured in a way that minimizes the diversity of legitimate approaches. 
The framing of the ontological, epistemological and methodological differences in an 
exclusionary manner sets the borders of the sovereign field of IR science and polices 
those borders by determining who is allowed to enter and who dominates the struggle 
for the legitimate explanations of international matters.  
An exchange set in motion by Øyvind Østerud (1996) is illustrative of the 
‘third debate’ and of the imperative shared by the representatives of the dominant 
core to categorically dismiss different approaches and impose a single valid view. This 
exchange was chosen for the emotional undertones in Østerud’s article that point to 
the extent of the need to silence alternative views that could potentially upset the 
entrenched asymmetry of power. Østerud’s writing is indicative of the 
power/knowledge struggle within the field as it communicates from the position of 
power in an attempt to preserve the status quo. The origins of anti-positivism in IR 
are placed into “peripheral North American universities”, “the American outback” (p. 
385) while devaluing and misrepresenting the aims of the critical approaches as 
“[m]odish currents” which “tend to rise with the frenzied search for visibility in an 
overpopulated and strongly competitive discipline” (p. 385).  
Securitizing moves can be detected in sentences such as “the price of such an 
open mind could be quite high”, “[o]ur concern is the implications of the postmodern 
consciousness creeping into the academic sphere”, and phrases such as “an effort to 
erode the spirit of the Enlightenment”, “[t]he attack on the Enlightenment” (Østerud, 
1996, p. 386). Generalizations and vagueness can be discerned in phrases that lack 
specific examples and references such as “many postmoderns” or “[f]ast talking and 
imprecise short-cuts are rampant in postmodern texts on international relations” (p. 
387), and also “[i]n contrast to most realists and rationalists, the postmoderns do not 
present theories and hypotheses at all” (p. 388). The ideas put forth in postmodern 
approaches are described either as “extreme” or dismissed as “trivial, commonplace, 
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banging at an open door” while hiding their “lack of originality by trendy verbiage, 
name-dropping (Nietzsche should always be mentioned), allusions, and emotional 
appeals instead of lucid argumentation”(p. 387).  
The defence of foundational concepts such as the state, sovereignty, and 
anarchy is evident from the strong language such as “[s]ince they [postmoderns] are 
relieved by their own epistemology from careful argumentation, the anti-statist, anti-
sovereign, and cosmopolitan ‘world community’ bias stand out as ideology in the 
classical sense of naive pipe dream” (Østerud, 1996, p. 388). The supposedly 
unscientific nature of postmodern approaches is continually stressed throughout the 
article by evoking the image that postmodernism implies that “anything goes”, “that 
any narrative is as valid as another” (p. 386) and that “every meaning is as good as 
any other” (p. 389).  
The terminology introduced into IR by postmodern approaches is trivialized 
in a dismissive way: “they particularly fancy the word discourse”, “fancy 
terminology”, “trendy verbiage” (Østerud, 1996, p. 387). And finally the entire wealth 
of approaches that Østerud labels postmodern are casually dismissed from the realm 
of legitimate science:  
[t]he problem with the postmoderns is their retreat from basic norms 
of science and professional scholarship. /…/ The cloudy language of 
postmoderns and kin is no trivial matter. It is intrinsic to their failure 
to establish a serious approach to international relations”. (p. 389)  
While claiming that postmodernism reduces established approaches “to a mere 
caricature” (p. 388) Østerud’s text could be accused of the same offence against the 
postmodern approaches.  
In reply to Østerud’s article Smith (1997, p. 335) and Patomäki (1997, p. 326) 
agree that a more targeted and precise critique of postmodernism would have more 
merit than a generalized dismissal of approaches that have a significant potential to 
contribute to our understanding of international relations. Patomäki (p. 325) suggests 
a constructive approach to the quest for scientific insights, which allows for 
cooperation and critical exchange while avoiding confrontation and mutual dismissal. 
The main problem of the “third debate” in relation to the Terrorism Complex 
surfaces in Smith’s text (1997, p. 332) – the debate is not a dialogue but various 
monologues taking place on at least two different levels.  
Surely anyone who had to work through Derrida’s painstaking 
analyses of texts would contest the claim that this is not ‘scientific’; 
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what, of course, is the case is that the notion of ‘scientific’ is in 
question. /…/ What is at stake is what is epistemology and how that 
very discourse has come into existence. (p. 332) 
The asymmetric distribution of power is skewed in favour of the traditional 
approaches and their positivism-oriented epistemology. The longstanding dominant 
position of traditional approaches in IR endows their representatives with enough 
symbolic capital to make performative utterances20 and prevail in the “struggle for 
classification” through which they reproduce a favourable social reality with a 
favourable distribution of power (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 70-75, 106-109).  
 The segment of the ‘third debate’ analysed here concludes with Østerud’s brief 
rejoinder (1997), which exhibits discursive elements similar to those in his initial text. 
He (p. 337) contrasts “the elusiveness and ambiguities in postmodern positions” with 
“orderliness, linearity and rationality of modernist thought” and uses conflict-
associated words “defended” and “resistance” to mark the relationship between the 
two oppositions. The reply reiterates the objections about “empty jargon” and 
“obscure style” (p. 337) in connection to the  “lack of scholarly standards” (p. 338). 
The suggested contributions of post-positivist approaches are referred to as 
“commonplace”, emerging “from a wide-open door in sociology and political science” 
(p. 338). ‘Postmodernism’ and its derivatives are again used throughout the text in a 
generalizing and reductionist manner only to be associated with something 
unnecessary, useless, even harmful. 
[Y]ou certainly don’t need to cite any postmodernist to argue the case 
for studies making these topics [ethics, gender, sex, race, economics] 
and angles relevant.” /…/ As I said, this is a wide-open door, and 
postmodernism has muddied the water rather than clarified our 
analyses, as exemplified by some of the contributions recommended by 
Smith. ”(p. 338) 
Patomäki (1997, p. 326) exposes the “effects of power Østerud’s rhetorics tends to 
have”. He (p. 328) identifies them in “generalizations and overstatements” containing 
“loaded terms used to undermine the position of those against whom the criticism is 
directed”. What Patomäki sees surfacing in Østerud’s first text and what is openly 
stated in his rejoinder is an exclusionary position “that ‘postmodernism’ does not in 
fact allow for real research at all. And therefore the conclusion must be that it should 
not be funded or published” (p. 328). The manner in which this particular debate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 “The efficacy of an utterance, the power of conviction which is granted to it, /…/ depends on the 
authority of the speaker” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 70). The authority of the utterances advocating the 
dominant position in IR draws on and perpetuates the power asymmetry in this academic field. 
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ends is in line with the previously mentioned research (Schmidt, 1998a; Smith, 2000; 
Bell, 2009), which shows that the triumph of the dominant set of IR positions depends 
on the general dismissal and expulsion of significantly differing positions..  
The operative mechanism of academic complicity in the reproduction of the 
status quo is the production and perpetuation of persistent myths. Two of the most 
prominent myths in the research field of terrorism studies are the exaggerated 
magnitude and severity of the threat that ‘terrorism’ presents (Reid, 1997, p. 101; 
Jackson, 2011b, pp. 124-147; Burnett & Whyte, 2005, pp. 4-6), and the myth of ‘new 
terrorism’, especially in connection to ‘religious terrorism’ and Islam (Jackson, 2011b, 
pp. 165-170; Burnett & Whyte, 2005, pp. 2-6). The excerpt from the report Assessing 
the Terrorist Threat (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010) was chosen as an example of a dominant 
narrative where both myths intertwine21. Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, renowned 
experts on terrorism, are among the leading names in the field of Terrorism Studies 
and are as such poised to shape the dominant discourse. Their assessment of the 
terrorist threat is hence a pivotal text to analyse the construction of the threat. In their 
report Bergen and Hoffman (2010, p. 1) acknowledge Al-Qaeda’s lessened capabilities 
to carry out a massive attack but still open with an executive summary stating that 
Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United 
States. Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 
9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse 
than at any time over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue 
to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a 
single attack. 
Bergen and Hoffman (pp. 30-31) elaborate on the threat and claim that the most 
recent ‘terrorist’ danger is much closer to home, in the form of radicalized domestic 
Muslim communities, which produce growing numbers of home-grown willing 
recruits “in the wars of terrorism being waged against the U.S.” The authors (p. 31) 
go on to explain that virtually any Muslim can turn into a potential terrorist  
The diversity of these latest foot soldiers in the wars of terrorism being 
waged against the U.S. underscores how much the terrorist threat has 
changed since the September 11, 2001, attacks. In the past year alone 
the United States has seen affluent suburban Americans and the 
progeny of hard-working immigrants gravitate to terrorism. Persons of 
color and Caucasians have done so. Women along with men. Good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Other examples that feature similar narratives include The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of 
Mass Destruction (Laqueur, 1999), The New Age of Terrorism (Jenkins, 2006), Where Are We in the “War of 
Ideas”? (Rabasa, 2011), and Countering the New Terrorism (Lesser, et al., 1999) to name only a few of the 
more prominent ones. 
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students and well-educated individuals and high school dropouts and 
jailbirds. Persons born in the U.S. or variously in Afghanistan, Egypt, 
Pakistan, and Somalia. Teenage boys pumped up with testosterone and 
middle-aged divorcées. The only common denominator appears to be a 
newfound hatred for their native or adopted country, a degree of 
dangerous malleability, and a religious fervor justifying or legitimizing 
violence that impels these very impressionable and perhaps easily 
influenced individuals toward potentially lethal acts of violence.  
This text is combining the narrative of the culturally conditioned othering of 
Muslims with the narrative of the omnipresent ‘terrorist’ thereat, thus actively 
contributing to spreading fear among the general public and to the propagation of 
prejudice about a specific religious group. The construction of this adversarial 
situation within the domestic communities can contribute to the growing tensions 
(Jenkins, 2011, pp. 205-206) that further exacerbate the issue of radicalization.  
Jenkins (1999, p. viii) illustrates the problem-solving nature of the policy-
oriented approaches that tend to maintain the status quo, by explicitly advocating a 
pragmatic focus on “what terrorists did, how they did it, and how best to protect 
society against those actions that could lead to death, widespread disruption, and 
alarm” instead of focusing on “political or economic conditions that produced 
terrorism”. The power asymmetry of ‘terrorism’ marked conflicts is maintained by the 
dismissive attitude towards addressing the root causes (e.g., Bergen & Hoffman, 2010, 
p. 15) while the effectiveness of military solutions, even those as contested as targeted 
killings, is hardly questioned (e.g., Jenkins & Godges, 2011, pp. 1, 4). 
Expanding the view beyond the confines of terrorism studies and even IR in 
general offers a glimpse into such processes in other academic fields. One of the fields 
with the most significant impact on the discursive and non-discursive reality regarding 
‘terrorism’ is International Law. The reproduction of the asymmetry of power will be 
observed on the example of the project New Battlefields, Old Laws started in 2007 by the 
Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) of the Syracuse 
University in collaboration with the Israeli International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism (ICT) Herzliya (INSCT, n.d.). The project brings together academics and 
practitioners with the aim to adapt the laws to the contemporary armed conflicts, 
especially of the asymmetric kind. According to the project’s website:  
Neither the Hague Rules, the customary law of war, nor the post-1949 
law of armed conflict and accompanying international humanitarian 
law, account for non-state groups waging prolonged campaigns of 
terrorism – and, in some cases, more conventional military attacks – 
	   84	  
that leave the defending state with little choice but to respond in ways 
that inflict heavy civilian casualties (INSCT, 2011).  
The wording reflects an overwhelming preoccupation with the security of state actors, 
automatically assumed to be in the defence position, and with the legal protection of 
their actions in armed conflicts, even if these actions involve ‘heavy civilian casualties’. 
The sentiment of the above quote is reflected in the events featured in the scope of this 
project such as the 2007 conference New Battlefields, Old Laws – From the Hague 
Conventions to Asymmetric Warfare, which was at the time of writing available in video 
format online (INSCT, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c).  
International law is also an academic discipline with close ties to the 
practitioners and the governments where the lines between what is necessary for the 
protection of society, and what is necessary for the protection of a particular 
distribution of power get blurred easily. Colonel Daniel Reisner of the International 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) Herzliya, former head of the International Law 
Department of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and former senior member of Israeli 
peace delegations has advised various Israeli prime ministers and army personnel on 
matters of the Middle East peace process, Palestine, and counter-terrorism. In his 
advisory capacity Reisner endorsed the legalization of targeted killings (INSCT, 
2009c), that have recently undergone a transition from being “impermissible” under 
international law and condemned by the Human Rights Committee (Duffy, 2005, pp. 
311, 342) to a grey area subject to interpretation. Reisner also justified military actions 
in which soldiers are allowed not to wear their uniforms since wearing them makes 
them easy targets. After being reminded by the moderator Robert Siegel that 
uniforms are mandated by the laws of war which are apparently often “ignored or 
violated”, Reisner replied that “ignored or violated is a strong word” and went on to 
explain that the allowed use of such practices can be explained by writing legal 
opinions on the matter (INSCT, 2009c).  
Projects such as New Battlefields, Old Laws, which are leading the way towards 
changing the laws of armed conflict to suit military practice and not vice versa, show 
the tendency of the academic field to cater to the more powerful actors in the 
asymmetric conflicts and legalize their actions, thus further deepening the divide and 
power asymmetry between the two sides. As Israeli scholars Ben-Naftali and Michaeli 
(2003, pp. 237-238) point out, the production of laws is context-dependent and with 
the Supreme Court of Israel setting the precedents for legal treatment of ‘terrorism’, 
	   85	  
there is bound to be a degree of partiality involved. It is important to keep in mind the 
contending “rhetorical fronts” of conflicts intended to “prejudge” issues – “In the 
Israeli terminology, a Palestinian is forever a terrorist, never a combatant, even if the 
objects of his attack are Israeli soldiers advancing into his hometown” (p. 235). Ben-
Naftali and Michaeli (p. 235) acknowledge the importance of reflexivity and self-
criticism, which reflect in the construction and content of their article that is 
consequently poised to withstand the autonomous principles of hierarchization.  
Resisting the imposed divides, such as the ones sustained through the 
narratives of the Great Debates, the foundational and other myths, and various 
dominant narratives depends on the identification of the arbitrary borders within the 
academe. These borders that separate ‘true’ knowledge from the supposedly failed 
unscientific attempts are set according to the power asymmetries within the field and 
across other relevant fields. The following section is not a dismissal of the rationalist 
approaches but rather an argument for the equal legitimacy of reflective positions 
based on their ability to add a crucial dimension to our understanding of the social 
world (Cilliers, 2005, p. 256).  
 
‘Proper’ Science 
 
The indoctrination into the scientific habitus and its “systems of generative 
schemes of perception, appreciation and action” (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 30`) encompasses 
the processes of selection, education, and “control over access to the instruments of 
research and publication” (p. 34). The role of “reward systems and gatekeepers” 
(Wæver, 2010, p. 651) as a part of the academic context is, together with the scholars’ 
personal social context and the larger social political and economic context, crucial for 
the understanding of the power relations entailed in the production of an academic 
text (pp. 650-651). IR’s dominantly rationalist ontology, empiricist epistemology and 
positivist methodology firmly “define ‘proper’ social science and thereby serve as 
gatekeepers for what counts as legitimate scholarship” (Smith, 2000, p. 383). The 
institutions in charge of the evaluation and circulation of scientific products make it 
very difficult for agents deviating from what is considered legitimate science to gain 
recognition. The access of the subversive scientific products to acclaimed journals is 
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limited as these journals perform a gate-keeping service for the “official science” 
(Bourdieu, 1975, p. 30).  
Apart from the underlying constraints regarding publication, the policing 
mechanisms that are guiding agents away from marginal research areas and 
approaches include the implicit rules regarding the allocation of funds and academic 
posts (Buzan & Albert, 2010, p. 661). The censoring components of these processes 
are usually obscured by invoking certainty-oriented approaches to knowledge 
production (Hoffmann, 1977, p. 57) as the sole condition for objective science. These 
approaches, when applied without reflection and without relevant context, are 
identified among the regulating social mechanisms of the field (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 34). 
The regulating mechanisms work towards discrediting a wide range of alternative 
approaches as not amounting to “serious social science” (Smith, 2000, p. 384) or 
“reliable knowledge about the world” (p. 385).  
The search for other available choices is left to those agents who choose the 
subversive gamble of heterodoxy, which is largely still taking place in the same 
cultural setting and against the background of the same doxa (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 34). 
The constraints and prescriptions imposed by the structure of the field explain the 
stability of the doxa that is forming the general rules of the struggle between agents and 
perpetuating a particular structure of power distribution (p. 34). Doxa, as the 
“aggregate of the presuppositions which the antagonists regard as self-evident and 
outside the area of argument” is the ultimate form of censorship (p. 34) and forms the 
outmost border of the field’s scope, a border that encompasses even the most opposing 
extremes of the arguments. The previously mentioned cultural bias forms a part of 
this border.  
We live in a world in which the majority of the world’s population does 
not live in the West. Yet most of us do not feel any responsibility for 
reading and assigning texts that are not authored in the West or by non-
English-speaking scholars. (Tickner, 2011, p. 11) 
The personal and structural factors that limit agents’ pursuit of knowledge about the 
social world demand the reconsideration of claims to objective results. The awareness 
of these limitations will guide the critical examination of the academic notion of 
objectivity in the course of this chapter. 
Accepting the limitations of tackling the “core problematic of the discipline 
without placing oneself outside the discipline” (Smith, 2000, p. 378) and its structuring 
mechanisms, demands, ontological and epistemological adjustments of which some 
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academic environments are more forgiving than others (pp. 376, 399). Open 
academic settings are elementary for the occasional appearance of agents who not 
only sense the presence of the doxa but also feel the need to challenge its constructs22. 
Disturbing the doxa is a slow, laborious and initially mostly unconscious process 
hindered by the powerful counter-currents of dominant power (Ashley & Walker, 
1990b, pp. 263-267). As it grapples with the structural exclusionary and policing 
practices entwined with the agents’ dispositions and interests, its outcomes are far 
from guaranteed. But the cumulative effects of the multitude of successful and 
persuasive challenges have the potential to eventually amass enough support and 
enough momentum for the outer limits of the field to widen (Ashley & Walker, 1990a, 
pp. 407-414). 
The field of terrorism studies is illustrative of the theory outlined above. 
Certain orthodoxy has become established in the field and now has the symbolic 
power to determine the scope of research and what passes as ‘proper science'. The 
concept of orthodoxy can be made more tangible when related to an academic 
community’s phenomenon of ‘invisible colleges’. Price and Beaver (1966, p. 1011) 
defined this term as a group of key people in a certain field. The majority of power is 
concentrated among the members of an invisible college who, even though they may 
not necessarily know each other personally, interact through their contributions to the 
field. The symbolic power of this leading core of scholars grants them the authority to 
influence the distribution of research funds and regulate the process of knowledge 
production, including the flow of new ideas and their acceptability. One of the more 
concise explanations of the processes and relations behind the formation of the 
terrorism studies’ traditional research core is offered by Reid’s analysis of the ‘invisible 
colleges’ of terrorism research (Reid, 1997; Reid & Chen, 2007). 
Since the field’s beginnings in the 1960s terrorism studies have gone through 
several evolutionary stages (Reid, 1997, p. 96) during which the scholars that had 
shaped the beginning stages have maintained their leading status to the present day 
(Reid, 1997, p. 97; Reid & Chen, 2007, p. 43; Raphael, 2009, p. 52). The core 
relationships and processes formed during the establishment and evolution of the field 
of Terrorism Studies and its knowledge production can best be described as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ashley’s critique of the sovereignty paradigm (Ashley, 1989, 1995, 1988), Schmidt’s historiography of 
IR (Schmidt, 1998b, 2002), Tickner and Wæver’s edited volume (as the first in a planned set of three) 
challenge to the cultural bias of the discipline (Tickner & Wæver, 2009), to name but a few authors and 
examples of their work. 
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invisible college of terrorism research (Reid & Chen, 2007, p. 43). The analyses of 
scientific output, literature content, and links between the researchers identified “the 
intellectual structure of the field” (p. 42). The key names of the terrorism field, such as 
Brian Jenkins, Paul Wilkinson, and Bruce Hoffman, are associated with the key 
research institutions, such as RAND Corporation and the Centre for Studies in 
Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), and these core scholars have been shaping 
the agenda of the field from its very beginnings. They founded leading research 
centres and journals, organized and presented at major conferences, collaborated with 
each other and various other researchers, and taught new generations of terrorism 
researchers (Reid, 1997, pp. 97-99; Reid & Chen, 2007, p. 49).  
RAND Corporation, which started out in 1945 as a US military project, has 
become one of the largest and most influential private research centres in the world, in 
part due to its strong ties to government institutions and administrations (Burnett & 
Whyte, 2005, p. 8). The beginnings of terrorism studies were significantly marked by 
the collaboration between the US government and think tanks, among them RAND, 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Institute for Studies 
of International Terrorism (ISIT) (Reid, 1997, p. 99). Many of the core researchers 
have worked closely with the policy makers (p. 102), for example on largely 
government funded research projects like the development of the RAND Database of 
Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (p. 99) widely used as a source in ‘terrorism’ research 
even though it excludes instances of state terrorism (Blakeley, 2007, p. 230) and thus 
leads the subsequent research in a direction that sustains the asymmetry of power.  
RAND’s academic influence contributed to the establishment of CSTPV at 
the University of St. Andrews in Scotland with Bruce Hoffman temporarily leaving 
RAND in 1993 to found CSTPV. The ties between the two institutions, or “the 
RAND-St Andrews nexus” (Burnett & Whyte, 2005, p. 8), illustrate the multifaceted 
network of relations and processes that contribute to the consolidation of core 
knowledge on terrorism. Burnett and Whyte (p. 9) draw attention to the editorial 
boards of the most acclaimed journals in the field. Prominent RAND and CSTPV 
experts, together with other top names in the field, hold positions on the editorial 
boards of key journals such as Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Terrorism and Political 
Violence and consequently have a large impact on the general orientation of ‘terrorism’ 
research. According to Miller and Mills (2009, p. 429) prominent ‘terror experts’ 
operate in “a number of overlapping networks”. 
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The professional connections between the high-ranking terrorism scholars and 
the “businesses and military personnel that support on going counter-terrorism 
activity” (Burnett & Whyte, 2005, p. 10) are further affecting the scope of research. 
Burnett and Whyte (pp. 10-11) provide an example where they describe the 
connection between a CSTPV scholar, his private military intelligence and security 
company, and its involvement in the lucrative business of introducing western 
companies into Iraq. Instances of the close collaboration between researchers and the 
military, or the so-called ‘embedded expertise’, are not uncommon and Burnett and 
Whyte (p. 13) describe “‘embedded experts’” as “the technicians of counter-
insurgency”.  
The particularities of the terrorism studies’ roots in the predominantly 
Western, Anglo-American cultural setting and its close relation to the centres of 
political, military and economic power result in a policy-oriented knowledge 
production (Reid, 1997, p. 97) while the co-dependent relationship between the 
researchers and the media contributes to the wider dissemination of what has become 
the established knowledge on terrorism (p. 100; Herman & O'Sullivan, 1989, pp. 191-
212). The challenges to this established knowledge in the form of critical incursions 
into the doxa have always been present at the margins of terrorism studies (Reid, 
1997, p. 101; Jackson, et al., 2009b; Ranstorp, 2009, p. 13) but have recently 
developed into an organised network connecting researchers working with critical 
approaches (Jackson, et al., 2009b, pp. 2-3).  
Critical scholars draw attention to the consequences of relationships and 
connections outlined in the above examples. In academic research these consequences 
feature in the absence of substantial research on state terrorism (Jackson, 2008; 
Blakeley, 2007; Raphael, 2009, pp. 58-62; Jackson, 2011b, pp. 174-197; Dalacoura, 
2009, pp. 125-127), and in the predominance of state-biased problem-solving 
approaches (Gunning, 2007b, pp. 363-379; Jackson, 2011b, pp. 18-21) often in a 
symbiotic relationship with policy-making (Jackson, 2011b, pp. 11-14; Gunning, 
2007a, pp. 239-241), some ideologically charged (Raphael, 2009; Jackson, 2009b) and 
mostly divorced from normative concerns (Booth, 1995b, pp. 107-109; 2008). 
The disturbances to these symbiotic relationships between the centres of power 
that came with the advent of organized forums for the criticism of official knowledge 
have often been met with stark criticism and indignation going beyond the level of 
	   90	  
academic debate. Scholars working in CTS report accusations of justifying terrorism 
and not spending enough time condemning terrorist attacks, they face political 
pressures and academic marginalization that affects their ability to secure funding for 
their research (Jackson, et al., 2009b, p. 8; Jackson, 2011a; 2011b, p. 13). A review 
article (Jones & Smith, 2009) of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism by David Martin 
Jones, an associate professor at the University of Queensland, a visiting professor at 
King’s College London, and a member of the editorial board of Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, and Michael Rainsborough (aka M. L. R Smith), a professor at King’s 
College London, an editorial board member of Small Wars and Insurgencies, and an 
associate editor of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism illustrates the extent of agitation posed 
by critical terrorism studies and the discursive strategies employed to discredit the 
challenges to the status quo of power distribution within the field.  
The abstract sets the tone for the text of the article: “[t]his review examines 
whether the claims of the critical approach adds [sic] anything, other than pedantry 
and obscurity, to our understanding of the phenomenon. It concludes that it does not” 
(Jones & Smith, 2009, p. 292). Authors employ devaluating descriptions of 
terminology and language which are referred to as “postmodern obscurantism” (p. 
295), “congealed prose, obscure jargon, philosophical posturing, and concentrated 
anti-Western self-loathing” (p. 293). The critical agenda outlined in Critical Studies on 
Terrorism is presented as no more than a personal attack, questioning “both the 
research agenda and academic integrity of journals like Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
and those who contribute to them” (p. 293). The editors and contributors of the new 
critical journal are accused of a wide spectrum of offences ranging from the “excessive 
fondness for italics”, “envy and disapproval” of the growing number of academic 
products on ‘terrorism’ (p. 293), of contempt for the “Western politicians and the 
Western media” (p. 299) and finally of not satisfying the criteria for ‘proper science’: 
A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also 
with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be 
demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy petitio 
principii. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favourite 
verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual 
standards of academic inquiry. (p. 294) 
The authors of the review article assume a similar dismissive attitude towards a 
substantial part of continental philosophy, describing Heidegger as “the Third Reich’s 
favorite philosopher” (p. 296) and accusing Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, and Derrida 
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of casting a “relativist pall /…/ over the social and historical sciences” (p. 296). The 
ideas of these philosophers are devalued as a “radical assault on the possibility of 
either neutral fact or value” which “functions unfalsifiably, and as a substitute for 
philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language” (p. 296). 
A connection between Islam and critical thought is suggested and based on a 
highly controversial and unsupported claim that “both Islamist and critical theorists 
share an analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the 
international order these structures inhabit and have done much to shape” (Jones & 
Smith, 2009, p. 298). Critical theorists are accused of “relativism and the bizarre 
ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other” (p. 298). 
The supposed affinity of critical approaches for ‘terrorism’ is reiterated in another 
provocative statement, complete with the emphasis on the cultural and religious 
component of Islamic terrorism: “[i]n its desire to empathize with the transformative 
ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical 
theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking” (p. 298).  
Some of the most severe notes of the review article stray even further away 
from the constructive tone expected of an academic critique. The “core contributors” 
of the new journal seem to ‘sicken’ the authors by repeating the “journal’s overriding 
assumption /…/ ad nauseam” (Jones & Smith, 2009, p. 293). Contributors to the 
symposium on the state of terrorism studies that was featured in the first two issues of 
Critical Studies on Terrorism are referred to as “Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood” 
(p. 296). A search of the several dictionaries of English language fails to provide a 
definition of the word “symposistahood” and the reader is left to infer the meaning of 
the new term, which, given the context, resembles a slur. Furthermore, Ken Booth, a 
distinguished professor and academic, is made a protagonist of an elaborate metaphor 
in which he is compared to “an Old Testament prophet” supplying “his critical 
disciples” with “Ken Commandments” (pp. 296-297). Normative concerns of critical 
approaches are addressed with sarcasm:  
the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an 
un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, 
Osama bin Laden, President Obama, and some European Union 
sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to 
promulgate norms of transformative justice” (p. 299).  
Burke’s (2008, p. 47) application of normative theory to terrorism studies and his call 
for cosmopolitanism is quoted by Jones and Rainsborough (2009, p. 299) and 
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accompanied with an image of one bursting “into spontaneous chanting of 
Kumbaya”. Finally the Aberystwyth School is denounced as “critical internationalist 
utopianism” which “has refined a higher order of incoherence that may be termed 
Aber jabber” (p. 301). 
The commentary of the select excerpts is intentionally kept to a minimum 
since the narrative is illustrative enough to stand on its own and confirm the 
previously mentioned challenges that critical scholars are faced with. Jones and 
Rainsborough would disagree with the idea that critical scholarship is at a 
disadvantage in comparison to traditional approaches. In fact the authors suggest that 
IR departments are moving away from “dispassionate analysis” (Jones & Smith, 2009, 
p. 299) and are instead increasingly supportive of critical ideas. The motivation that 
supposedly drives critical scholars is a quest for funding as they have “identified a 
source of government grants and academic perquisites” (p. 299). Jones and 
Rainsborough do not explain the logical inconsistency of obtaining government 
funding while supposedly propagating ideas that are critical of the questionable 
actions of Western democracies regarding ‘terrorism’ (p. 299). Jones and 
Rainsborough’s whole antagonistic stance reads less like constructive criticism and 
more like the defence of the status quo and the traditional power distribution within 
the field.  
The Smith-Jones review article, even though singled out for illustration 
purposes, is not a lone example of fervent gatekeeping (see also Bendle, 2008; Lane, 
2008; Jones & Ungerer, 2006). Academic posturing is not uncommon in orthodox 
texts and is intended to set a clear border between proper academics that gets things 
done and jabbering academic activists divorced from reality and facts. The academic 
merits of the collection of essays The Long Shadow of 9/11 – America’s Response to Terrorism 
published by RAND (Jenkins & Godges, 2011) are narrated by emphasising this 
distinction: 
These are not the laments of insulated academics, dovish dons, or 
adherents of the kumbaya school of counterterrorism. Almost all of the 
authors were involved in terrorism research years before 9/11. Several 
of them complement their research with decades of firsthand experience 
in the armed forces; in the Central Intelligence Agency; in the U.S. 
Departments of State, Justice, and Defense; or as advisers to military 
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. These authors have been 
involved in intelligence collection and analysis. They have been on the 
front lines of diplomacy. They have seen war. (Jenkins & Godges, 2011, 
p. 3) 
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The language used to describe academics that show an affinity for finding peaceful 
solutions is condescending, while the language used to describe the ‘real’ academics is 
significantly different in tone. Mixed agency is not seen as problematic in terms of 
maintaining scientific objectivity, and the inextricable bond between the centres of 
power in the academic and political fields is endorsed as a positive characteristic.  
The emotional charge of the responses to the relatively abstract ontological 
and epistemological issues of the metatheoretical realm adds a practical problem to 
the mix, which makes for a highly combustible situation. The Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict is the epicentre where emotions tend to run highest. The combination of two 
peoples, two histories of oppression, and one land is a complex and multifaceted 
problem. But the asymmetric distribution of power between the parties involved 
results in a very clear and simple dominant narrative according to which the Israeli 
state fights a defensive war against Palestinian ‘terrorism’.  
The simplistically constructed narrative supporting the asymmetric status quo 
is maintained by intentionally avoiding a deeper understanding of the complexity of 
the situation. Harvard Law School professor Alan M. Dershowitz “has been called 
‘the nation’s most peripatetic civil liberties lawyer’ and one of its ‘most distinguished 
defenders of individual rights,’ ‘the best-known criminal lawyer in the world,’ ‘the top 
lawyer of last resort,’ ‘America’s most public Jewish defender’ and ‘Israel’s single most 
visible defender – the Jewish state’s lead attorney in the court of public opinion’” 
(Dershowitz, 2011). Dershowitz, an academic of considerable status, who has been 
teaching generations of students during his four decades at Harvard, wrote a book on 
understanding ‘terrorism’ (Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the 
Challenge) in which he uses an example of Palestinian ‘terrorism’ to mandate: 
We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its 
alleged root causes, but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue 
and negotiation. Our message must be this: even if you have legitimate 
grievances, if you resort to terrorism as a means toward eliminating 
them we will simply not listen to you, we will not try to understand you, 
and we will certainly never change any of our policies toward you. 
Instead, we will hunt you down and destroy your capacity to engage in 
terror. /…/ The search for ‘root causes’ smacks more of after-the-fact 
political justification than inductive scientific inquiry. (Dershowitz, 
2002, pp. 24-25) 
The scholars who do choose to understand the context of ‘terrorism’, 
regardless of the discipline they work in, are prone to personal attacks beginning with 
denying the scientific legitimacy of their work (Roy, 2007, pp. xi-xii), and going as far 
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death threats (Pappé, 2010, pp. 24, 161). With the space for thought severely 
constrained it is not surprising that scholarship, which falls in line with the dominant 
narratives on ‘terrorism’, thrives especially well, flooding the discursive space with 
what is considered acceptable knowledge. The stakeholders themselves represent the 
only regulating authority drawing “their legitimacy from the relative strength of the 
groups whose interests they express” (Bourdieu, 1975, pp. 24-25). The resulting 
uniform academic knowledge production can have long-reaching detrimental 
consequences when presented in the form of the ‘objective truth’. 
 
3.3 OBJECTIVITY AND DESENSITIZATION TO HUMANITY 
 
In order to conform to the demands of ‘proper’ science for scientific objectivity 
scholars, even in social sciences, tend to prefer working with ‘facts’, often translated to 
numerical data and statistically analysed which are considered verifiable and 
objective. The effects of this approach that attempts to emulate the principles applied 
to the study of the natural world in the study of social phenomena need to be 
examined and evaluated from a normative perspective. Unwelcome, even though 
perhaps unintended, consequences of achieving objectivity in a manner better fitted to 
the natural sciences are manifested in the asymmetries analysed in this chapter. 
Analysis points towards the desensitization to humanity – the spiralling path towards 
the ultimate detachment from the individual subjective face and the ultimate denial of 
the involvement in the construction of the reality to which the human face is exposed 
only to become reduced to a number as the spiral continues. The desensitization to 
humanity is closely connected to the myth of neutral social science, which attempts to 
detach the study of social phenomena from the political struggles in which it is 
implicated by close association (Bourdieu, 1975, pp. 36, 38-39; Booth, 2008, p. 71).  
The evaluation of objectivity as a part of the foundational structure of the 
social sciences needs to begin by disturbing the perception of objectivity as a self-
evident necessity of scientific research, and present approaches that consider the 
diversities and differences of the social world. The analysis of power asymmetries in 
the fields of IR and Terrorism Studies shows that the unequal power distribution is 
sustained through the workings of many interconnected mechanisms. The need to 
question the presuppositions employed in these mechanisms requires the identification 
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of the common underlying mechanism. The legitimizing force of objectivity is often 
evoked in order to justify the asymmetries identified above.  
In order to effectively address the complicity of the academic field in the 
perpetuation of the asymmetries of power underlying the Terrorism Complex, the 
invocations of value-neutrality need to be examined for their role in the perpetuation 
of status quo and stripped of their legitimizing powers. Objectivity is treated here as a 
central metatheoretical issue of the social sciences even though it is generally 
approached as a practical issue that can be solved through a methodological 
orientation responsive to the positivist demands (Smith, 1996, pp. 14-18; Hollis, 1996, 
pp. 303-305). It is precisely this practical approach to objectivity that is inspected for 
its role in the desensitization to humanity. 
According to Foucault (2002b, p. 47) ever since the sixteenth century the 
connection between language and the world has been getting fainter. This split has 
had a profound effect on the shifts in the episteme of Western culture (p. 60) and on its 
growing reliance on the numerical explanations of the social world. Resemblance, as 
the basic category of knowledge in the sixteenth century, became divided into identity 
and difference during the seventeenth century rationalism (pp. 60-61). As the written 
word lost its connection to truth, and language started to be perceived as merely a 
vessel for the meaning instead of as its constitutive part, the rise of mathematical and 
empirical approaches to knowledge signalled the arrival of the classical episteme, 
marked by order (pp. 62-64). Order and its manifestation in identity, unity, and 
sameness, is still considered the key to knowledge, to truth, which discourse only 
conveys to the best of its abilities. Nineteenth century saw “the withdrawal of 
knowledge and thought outside the space of representation” (p. 263) which, with 
Kant, enabled the rise of transcendental philosophy and consequently presented the 
possibility of objective knowledge (pp. 263-264). Epistemological concerns were 
directed towards recovering the unity of transcendental foundations with what lent 
itself to the “formalization” and “mathematization” of the modern scientific project 
(pp. 267-268).  
This brief historical sketch illustrates the gradual development of the bond 
between objectivity and knowledge that at present seems ahistorical and is accepted as 
a given. Even though each new generation is handed tools of previous generations to 
use in the pursuit of knowledge, it should not accept them without a critical inspection 
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of their continued relevance or of the possible negative effects that might have 
surfaced through previous use.  
This historical overview also exposed the potential weakness in an otherwise 
functional and beneficial concept of objectivity, which is its overreliance on the 
rationalist empirical approaches to the social world. After all “the recourse to 
mathematics, in one form or another, has always been the simplest way of providing 
positive knowledge about man with a scientific style, form, and justification” 
(Foucault, 2002b, p. 383). Social sciences axiomatically adopted the model of 
uncovering the objective truth from the natural sciences and the hermeneutic 
departures from this model have often led to charges of relativism (Hollis, 1994, p. 
203). The epistemological break between the factual absolutist realism and the 
historicist relativism has been imposing and deepening the divide between philosophy 
and human sciences ever since the nineteenth century (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 4) thus 
blurring the realization that social sciences cannot pursue knowledge in the same way 
as the natural sciences because their ‘object’ of research is fundamentally different. 
Methodologies and theories are consequently devised on foundations that presuppose 
the existence of ‘objectivity’ leading to the one single truth in the matters of the social 
world (Hollis, 1994, p. 42; Benton & Craib, 2001, pp. 23-24).  
Scientific progress may consist, in some cases, in identifying all the 
presuppositions and begged questions implicitly mobilized by the 
seemingly most impeccable research, and in proposing programmes for 
fundamental research which would really raise all the questions which 
ordinary research treats as resolved, simply because it has failed to raise 
them (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 65). 
There are valid and important aspects of the social world that would remain 
closed off if the sciences of man adhered solely to positivism and uncritically accepted 
its canons. Smith (2004, pp. 499-515) holds a mirror to the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) and its preoccupation with separating facts from values. He finds IR 
supportive of “specific forms of social power” as it ignores “ethical questions in the 
pursuit of value-neutral explanations” (p. 513). Smith’s take on the fact/value 
distinction combined with the focus on the Terrorism Complex sparked the 
hypothesis of a growing desensitization to humanity as a side product of the number-
oriented, policy, and power driven discourses across the fields. In IR the privileging of 
facts over values is a postulate of objectivity, which seems as an unlikely point of 
contention but has surfaced in the course of the critical analysis of academic 
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discourses in the investigation of the Terrorism Complex as one of the most acute 
issues.  
The West has a record of ignoring certain actors’ human rights violations in 
the international realm, and of responding only after the violations become too 
obvious to ignore (Booth, 1995b, p. 107). The decisive role of the power asymmetries 
in justifying certain actions in the international realm while condemning other actions 
is betrayed by the conclusion that “[h]uman wrongs may be plain facts, but they are 
not necessarily plain political truth” (pp. 107-108). This deeply ingrained partiality, 
legitimized and normalized through the power relations among the mutually 
strengthening centres of power struggling for symbolic power, has implications that 
manifest themselves in the ever deteriorating state of humanity (p. 108).  
The scholarly study of IR, with its distinct centres of power and their close 
relation to the centres of political power, plays a significant role in the construction of 
compatibly selective narratives, often set to “rationalize the inhuman” (Booth, 1995b, 
pp. 108-109). How to explain this complicity of the academic field in accepting “so 
many human wrongs” (p. 108)? The explanation can be found in the appreciation of 
the complexity of the social world and in the acknowledgement of the impossibility of 
assuming any sort of an outside position in relation to the social world. According to 
Bourdieu (1975, p. 36) “[t]he idea of a neutral science is a fiction”. The social order, 
with its complex relations and elaborate structures, affects every individual in a 
particular time and space and is something that cannot be escaped. Moreover the 
constant exposure to a particular order limits the array of choices we perceive as 
viable (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 10-11). The way power is distributed in society is 
replicated in the distribution of symbolic power that grants the authority to express 
“the way things are” (pp. 135, 182). The power of bringing things to life by naming 
them (p. 55) is an immense responsibility that can only be assumed if the myth of 
scientific detachment from the world is exposed.  
Booth doubts the ability of actors to produce objective analyses while playing a 
role in the political world, especially when it comes to ‘terrorism’ (Booth, 2008, p. 71). 
A similar objection towards assuming “disinterestedness, detachment and objectivity 
of the author” is raised by Said (1988, p. 51) who points out that “with few exceptions 
the discourse of terrorism is constituted by an author whose main client is the 
government of a powerful state opposed to terrorism”. This acute situation is made 
	   98	  
worse at times when the “fight against terrorism” becomes the basis of the foreign 
policies of powerful states such as the United States and Israel (p. 51). The invocation 
of objectivity while presupposing and clearly marking the lines between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ can result in the construction of highly volatile limited realities where the 
publics are led to believe that a single rational choice remains available in certain 
situations. “The very appeal to scientific objectivism becomes a political move in 
establishing a certain mode of understanding as the privileged one” (Cilliers, 2005, p. 
256).  
Probably the most well known recent large-scale example is the construction of 
the pre-emptive War on Terror as the only possible solution to the global ‘terrorist’ 
threat (Jackson, 2005b; Bellamy, 2005; Flint & Falah, 2004). The precedents created 
by justifying such operations are contributing to the desensitization to humanity, the 
consequence of which is the degradation of international standards for the ‘legitimate’ 
use of force (Alston, et al., 2008; Democracy Now, 2005; Steyn, 2004; Brooks & 
Wohlforth, 2005, p. 518). The effects of the progressing desensitization to humanity in 
relation to ‘terrorism’ have manifested in the May 2, 2011 open targeted killing of 
Osama Bin Laden by the United States government, an act met with wide public 
approval, even euphoria (Jenkins & Godges, 2011, p. 1).  
The case of Bin Laden’s killing has shown that a human life can be devalued 
through the application of the ‘terrorist’ label successfully enough for the execution of 
a person without a fair trial to become unproblematic. The assassination attempt on 
Mohammed Deif, a Hamas military leader, during Israel’s 2014 military incursion 
into Gaza is an example of how with each decision to override the system of checks 
intended to protect human rights the desensitization to humanity grows. The five 
bombs dropped on his family home in Gaza claimed the lives of his 28-year old wife, 
his 8-month old son, a 48-year old woman, and her two sons, aged 18 and 14 years 
(Kershner & Akram, 2014). Five civilian lives were found expendable in an effort to 
kill a ‘terrorist’. “Israeli Interior Minister Gideon Saar said the attack was justified 
because Mr Deif was ‘personally responsible’ for dozens of deaths” ("Gaza conflict: 
Israel 'targets Hamas leader Deif'," 2014) and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
said: “The heads of terror organizations and their commanders are a legitimate and 
top priority target. Nobody is immune”  (Kershner & Akram, 2014). The deaths of the 
civilians present at the site of the bombing were reported but not questioned further in 
either of the two news reports cited. The absence of a public debate on such 
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problematic circumstances of an attempted targeted killing contributes to the 
desensitization to humanity.  
Israel has led the way towards the normalization of the legally contested policy 
of targeted killings since 2000 when the IDF started publicly confirming targeted 
killings they had been denying thus far (Ben-Naftali & Michael, 2003, p. 240). The 
policy has entered public discourse where it has continued to “feed a public 
atmosphere that legitimizes these practices rather than questions them” (p. 240). The 
War on Terror has demonstrated in more ways than one that “one of the dangers 
inherent in uniting behind clichés is an ideological mystification of reality, a reductive 
understanding of the latter and a consequent loss of reflexivity” (p. 235).  
 The way to counter the damaging consequences of ideological discourses 
masked by supposed objectivity and neutrality is to acknowledge the power of 
discourse and explore the benefits of reunifying Language and Being (Derrida, 1997, 
p. 43) in the study of social phenomena.  
The exact sciences constitute a monologic form of knowledge: the 
intellect contemplates a thing and expounds upon it. There is only one 
subject here – cognizing (contemplating) and speaking (expounding). In 
opposition to the subject there is only a voiceless thing. Any object of 
knowledge (including man) can be perceived and cognized as a thing. 
But a subject it cannot, while remaining a subject, become voiceless, 
and consequently, cognition of it can only be dialogic. (Bakhtin, 1986c, p. 
161) 
A shift towards the exploration of the role of communication in the social sciences 
enables a break with the foundations of objective truth and seeks knowledge in the 
complexities of the mutually constitutive relationship between humankind and 
language. Subjectivity is interwoven in communication, in the way discourses are 
structured and made intelligible, and is as such the prime object for analysis in the 
human sciences (Lévinas, 2000, pp. 145-150; Bourdieu, 2003, p. 282).  
By insisting on objectivity, this subjective input into every form of human 
communication, including academic research, is obscured. The largely undisturbed 
presence of presuppositions and constructs endowed with the status of truth in the 
dominant discourses is facilitated by a very narrowly defined concept of objectivity 
that relies on working with ‘facts’ as they present themselves in the social world. 
Consequently our approaches to ‘terrorism’, be it in academic research, political 
strategies or media coverage, end up reproducing the existing power asymmetries. By 
obscuring subjectivity, we not only close off the understanding of what guides the way 
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we structure our research, but more importantly, we also disregard the demand for 
responsibility that comes with having human subjects as objects of analysis (Lévinas, 
2000, pp. 160-162, 172-175, 185-186; Breen Smyth, 2009, p. 195).  
[O]nly a rigorous critical disposition can dissolve the practical 
certainties that insinuate themselves into scientific discourse through the 
presuppositions inscribed in language or the preconstructions inherent 
in the routine of daily discourse about social problems, in short, through 
the fog of words which ceaselessly comes between the researcher and 
the social world (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 189). 
Discourse-oriented approaches, mindful of the creational power of words, have the 
potential to encourage reflexivity and open a space for the analysis of the foundations 
on which theories and practices based on the idea of objective truth rest, detached 
from the consequences they may exercise on the social world. 
As an agent debuting in the field’s struggles, I23 harbour no illusions about my 
ability to view the field from outside, or about my impartiality. This does however not 
imply a relativist attitude. “[T]he claim that we cannot have complete knowledge does 
not imply that anything goes” (Cilliers, 2005, p. 260). Avoiding the performative 
contradiction between “what you say, and the way in which you say it” is an ethical 
endeavour which calls for a performative reflexivity that reflects on the ability to 
convey the complexity of the subject matter (pp. 260-261). The knowledge gained will 
necessarily be limited by reductions and choices (pp. 263-264) made in the process of 
analysis and even more so in the process of the text construction. In this respect, the 
research into the Terrorism Complex comes close to Cilliers’ rendering of complexity:  
The view from complexity entails that we cannot have perfect 
knowledge of complex systems. We cannot ‘calculate’ the performance 
of, for example, complex social systems in their complexity; we have to 
reduce that complexity; we have to make choices. Normative issues are, 
therefore, intertwined with our very understanding of complexity. (p. 
264) 
I thus assume a ‘modest’ position in this text and denounce any claim to the objective 
truth. A ‘modest’ position, according to Cilliers (p. 256), is a position mindful of “the 
reach of the claims being made and of the constraints that make these claims 
possible”. What I am able to offer is but a particular vision of affairs, inevitably 
influenced by my position in time and space, geography and culture. Constructed 
through a rigorous process of argumentation, my account is only one of the possible 
descriptions of a complex system (p. 257), one face of the polyhedron surrounding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  I, as a reflexive subject (see Finlay, 2002, pp. 224-227) 
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terrorism as an object of research. The aim of the text is to be persuasive enough to 
sustain my reflexive scrutiny and the professional scrutiny of fellow agents in the field, 
thus acquiring the symbolic power necessary to join other similar texts in the push 
towards a more reflexive and responsible discipline.  
 
3.4 BEYOND THE ASYMMETRIES 
 
Midgley (1989 p. 246) warns of the extreme conflict of interests, which can 
“absolutely stop communication and absolve both sides from the responsibility, which 
is normally basic to human life, of looking for ideas in common so as to get on 
speaking terms again.” The field of Terrorism Studies, as other fields of cultural 
production, has a limited scope of research determined by the “the universe of 
problems, references, intellectual benchmarks (often constituted by the names of its 
leading figures), concepts in –ism, in short all that one must have in the back of one’s 
mind in order to be in the game” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 176).  Even though this 
dominant path is clearly illuminated there are also side roads. Both need to be 
explored and their respective contributions must be appreciated in search of insights 
that can only be gained through the genuine exploration of intertextuality.  
The constructivist turn in the latest stages of the debate between rationalism 
and reflectivism at first glance suggests a development towards increased plurality of 
acceptable approaches. Ultimately it serves to legitimize and further entrench the 
methodological and epistemological tenets which the accepted strand of 
constructivism shares with other rationalist approaches (Smith, 2000, pp. 387-392). 
Hynek and Teti (2010) observe the debates, processes, and objectives that have been 
involved in the “normalization of constructivism” over the past two decades. They 
identify the two stages of the “construction of Constructivism” through a set of 
disciplinary debates during which its links to poststructuralism had been severed and 
foundations had been set for its secure placement “within the social scientific 
consensus” (p. 179) until eventually constructivism became “absorbed into 
mainstream IR” (p. 194). 
In the potential wake of the fifth debate (Kavalski, 2007) between the linear, 
state-centric traditional approaches and the nonlinearity of networks, relations and 
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processes suggested by the complexity24 theory (Kavalski, 2007; Bousquet & Curtis, 
2011; Urry, 2005; Cudworth & Hobden, 2010b, 2010a) the study of the asymmetry 
reproduced by the narrative of the disciplinary debates remains relevant. This is not 
only as the signpost of the discipline’s future trajectory but also as the active limit 
imposed on the study of the social world. The epistemological options associated with 
complexity theory offer a wide range of approaches, from radically relativist and 
subjectivist discourse-oriented ones to computer based mathematical modelling and 
simulation (Kavalski, 2007, pp. 447-448; Bousquet & Curtis, 2011, pp. 56-59)., These 
diverse epistemological options that share a common ontological ground and have the 
potential to complement each other in the explanation and understanding of the 
complex social phenomena (Geller, 2011, p. 76; Bousquet & Curtis, 2011, p. 56) are 
placed on the opposite sides of the legitimacy divide in the context of the IR’s Great 
Debates. The computational techniques that relate to the dominant empiricist way of 
doing research25 (Geller, 2011, pp. 68-70; Bousquet & Curtis, 2011, pp. 44, 56; 
Cilliers, 2005, p. 257) stand a better chance of being awarded sole legitimacy judging 
by the trajectory of power distribution maintained throughout the course of the 
previous disciplinary debates.  
Complexity Theory shares the “sensitivity to the inherent complexity of the 
social” and objection to “simple one-dimensional theories” with the post-positivist 
approaches to IR (Bousquet & Curtis, 2011, p. 58). Herein, in the margins of the 
discipline, has for decades been building the potential for change, for the transgression 
of the limits placed on legitimate knowledge, and for the eventual successful challenge 
to the doxa. The transformation is contingent on the ability of these paradigms to 
sufficiently resist the pressures of the doxa while transcending the boundaries 
constructed by its mechanisms. An expansion of the boundaries is possible only when 
the divide between the dominant and the marginal approaches to IR is transgressed in 
a cooperative effort to pursue knowledge instead of power. In respect to the Terrorism 
Complex, this entails the acknowledgement and the engagement with the academic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 One of the more succinct definitions of complexity as it applies to IR is provided by Geller (2011, p. 
67) as “the concept of a decentralized system on the edge of chaos which is hierarchic and the sub-
systems of which interact with each other in a non-absolute dependence”. A list of characteristics of 
complexity is presented by Cilliers (2005, p. 257). 
25 For example Miodownik and Cartrite’s (2010) research of decentralization and its impact on ethno-
political mobilization, Bhavnani and Backer’s (2000) development of a computational agent-based 
modeling (ABM) for the study of ethnic violence and the differences in genocidal tendencies, 
Bhavnani’s (2006) application of ABM to the study of ethnic norms and their role in interethnic 
violence.	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processes that are actively involved in the construction of knowledge on ‘terrorism’ 
through reproducing the political power asymmetry underpinning the use of force. 
Being critical in a constructive sense is a responsible task that does not involve 
only identifying the problems with the research approaches different from one’s own. 
This responsibility entails finding the common ground among the scholars who 
respond to autonomous principles of hierarchization and are willing to forego the 
many advantages of embracing the heteronomous principles of hierarchization often 
connected to the preservation of the deeply seated social asymmetries of power. 
The similarities between academic texts of traditional scholars and critical 
scholars reveal that drawing a border between the Orthodox Terrorism Studies (OTS) 
and Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) is less helpful than distinguishing between the 
scholars adhering to the autonomous principles of hierarchization and those that 
accept the heteronomous principles. Martha Crenshaw, a traditional scholar (Reid & 
Chen, 2007, pp. 48, 52-54), often deals with the root causes and the political 
components of ‘terrorism’ thus contextualizing the phenomenon (Crenshaw, 1995b, 
2003c, 2003a; 1972). She draws attention to the discursive aspects of ‘terrorism’, 
especially to the problems surrounding the unreflective use of the value-laden term 
(1995a, pp. 9-11; 2011, p. 4) and argues against the myth of ‘new terrorism’ (2003b; 
2011, pp. 51-66). Crenshaw’s nuanced work on ‘terrorism’ was instrumental in the 
development of my own critical thought on ‘terrorism’ as were the works of Jenkins, 
Hoffman, Wilkinson, and other traditional scholars26. The insights offered by studying 
the traditional works and problem-solving approaches are crucial for better 
understanding of the complex social phenomenon that is ‘terrorism’.  
Ultimately, none of the dividing lines in academia work to the advantage of 
understanding the phenomena of the social world around us. There are certain 
academic projects that epitomize the effort of pursuing knowledge beyond the 
constructed boundaries. One such example is Bitterlemons Publications (Bitterlemons, 
n.d.) – “a joint Palestinian-Israeli effort to promote a civilized exchange of views about 
the Israel-Arab conflict and additional Middle East issues among a broad spectrum of 
participants.” Bitterlemons was a collaborative project led by a Palestinian, Ghassan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Examples include remarks suggesting reflection on the inherently biased application of the term 
‘terrorism’ (Hoffman, 1998, p. 31; Jenkins, 2003, pp. 16-17), or looking into the importance of 
understanding the root causes for resorting to violence (Wilkinson, 1974, pp. 22-24). 	  
	   104	  
Khatib, Birzeit University, and an Israeli, Yossi Alpher, Tel Aviv University. The 
project began in 2001 with Bitterlemons.org, an on-line publication that dealt with 
controversial issues of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Bitterlemons Publications grew 
to include two forums where regional experts lead in-depth discussions on Middle 
East, and a specialised publication dealing with the Arab Peace Initiative 
(Bitterlemons, n.d.). All publications presented both Israeli and Palestinian 
perspectives and thus demonstrated the possibility of working outside of even the most 
entrenched asymmetries of power.  
The project ended in 2012 with an air of despondency present in the 
comments of the founders (Alpher & Khatib, 2012) who found the downward 
trajectory of the conflict too cumbersome to continue,. The status quo is contingent 
on the dominant currents putting pressure on the counter-currents that are 
undermining the asymmetry of power. The Terrorism Complex represents both the 
dominant currents and the counter-currents but the asymmetry of power implies that 
the counter-currents are at a significant disadvantage. They struggle under the 
pressures and end in various ways. In case of Bitterlemons the fatigue set in after more 
than a decade of not seeing improvements of the situation on the ground. The ending 
of the project does not detract from its spirit. Bitterlemons was transcending various 
imposed limits for eleven years and produced alternative knowledge that will continue 
to circulate and perhaps help enact change in the future. The lesson of Bitterlemons is 
not that all counter-currents inevitably succumb to the daily grind of the status quo 
but that it is the contribution to the upsetting of the power asymmetry that is 
important. 
Another example of working together to overcome the ideology divides 
associated with the asymmetry is the Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics 
and Culture that promotes dialogue and understanding by providing a space for the 
perspectives from both sides to be voiced. The positions of the chief editors, managing 
editors and of the editorial board of the journal are all equally distributed among 
Israelis and Palestinians (Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, n.d.).  
The search for sustainable solutions to long-term conflicts such the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict starts with opening the channels of communication and 
relationship building between the people involved in the conflict. Locally run 
academic platforms such as Bitterlemons and Palestine-Israel Journal supply locally 
informed knowledge, thus providing an interested researcher with an option to 
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transgress the Western cultural dominance of IR, and its sub-disciplines. These 
platforms for the production of alternative knowledge also offer a constructive way 
forward by encouraging dialogue and better understanding. Such initiatives are 
working constructively outside of the possibilities determined by the established status 
quo and thus fit into the currents of change that, marginalized as the are, still have the 
potential to grow and eventually disrupt the power relations dictated by the status 
quo.  
 
Regardless of the institutional mechanisms, which select and socialize agents 
by defining the limits of research and the terms of its conduct and validity (Bourdieu, 
1991, p. 9), change, innovation, and the widening of the field’s scope, even though 
slow and sometimes minute, do happen. New directions, with the potential to make 
way for scientific progress, are the result of  
the intervention of agents capable of going beyond the science already 
constituted (by other agents) in order to perceive in it (thanks to it and 
beyond it) possibles to be realized and to ‘do what is necessary’ (which 
is entirely different from mechanical submission to a physical necessity) 
(p. 11).  
Prior to submitting a finished product of the academic field to the autonomous 
principles of hierarchization operating within the field, a researcher must make a 
conscious decision to be guided by ethics and professionalism. The methodological 
choices must sustain the re-examination and sufficiency checks during the process of 
analysis in order to retain the necessary critical distance to the approach itself. A 
similar idea is expressed in Billig’s (2003, p. 36) suggestion “that critical analysts be 
self-critical” and that “we cannot use critical terminology unreflexively, as if our own 
words are somehow magically innocent”.  
Even the results gained through the strictest positivist methods can be 
influenced by a sequence of choices that result from the researcher’s being-in-the-
world. In the preparations for research and during the application of methods it is 
thus up to the researcher’s professional ethos to maintain the scientific standards 
regardless of the chosen approach. Without such reflexivity positivist overreliance on 
empiricist epistemology and hard scientific facts can potentially yield more 
compromised results than those obtained through the application of post-positivist 
critically oriented methodologies, based on the unrelenting poststructuralist 
questioning of even the most taken-for-granted assumptions (Edkins, 2007, pp. 88-89).  
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The questioning of the doxa is a demanding undertaking since it cannot 
automatically assume that a researcher will be able to achieve enough distance to even 
identify the most deeply embedded givens, which have become a part of their 
secondary habitus through the socialization into the field. The critical outlook does 
however help to provoke questions in situations when IR theory and IR policy 
support each other. In case of ‘terrorism’ the collaboration between theory and policy 
signals a need to examine the relations of power behind such symbiosis and to 
question the resulting counterterrorist practices, which are not only unable to 
adequately address a problem like ‘terrorism’ but often become a part of the problem. 
Due to the mutually supportive power relations between the centres of power in the 
academic field and the centres of power in the political field, certain theories become 
akin to self-fulfilling prophecies. Academic theories advocate policies in line with the 
dominant political discourse and provide political decisions with the legitimacy 
required to rally enough support for enacting the policies previously advocated. 
Centres of power gravitate towards each other in view of the common goal – 
maintaining the status quo and the distribution of power favourable to them that 
comes with it.  
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 4. THE POLITICAL FIELD (A GENEALOGY OF 
THE ISRAELI–PALESTINIAN CONFLICT) 
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All religious theologies and all political theodicies have taken advantage of the fact 
that the generative capacities of language can surpass the limits of intuition or 
empirical verification and produce statements that are formally impeccable but 
semantically empty. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1992, p. 41) 
 
The hypothesis that the centres of power have vested interests in the stability 
of the existing social status quo will be explored from the point of view of the political 
field. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the construction behind the term 
‘terrorism’ reflects and reinforces the power asymmetry that is pre-existent in the non-
discursive political realm. The focus will be on the processes involved in the 
construction of the ‘terrorist threat’ narrative and the relations of power that condition 
its legitimacy. 
By focusing on the political field as the source field of the Terrorism Complex 
and its asymmetries, this chapter will explore the narratives relating to the political 
realities preceding and surrounding the deployment of the term ‘terrorism’. The 
power in the international realm will be examined, in particular the role of the initial 
power asymmetry between state and non-state actors and its observable effects. This 
asymmetry will be explored in relation to the representations of reality that play a part 
in the struggles for legitimacy. The dissonance between the emerging political 
representations of the social world regarding ‘terrorist’ incidents on the one hand, and 
what can be verifiably known about the non-discursive political realities surrounding 
‘terrorism’ on the other will illustrate the workings of power that constitute the 
Terrorism Complex. 
The exploration of the power asymmetry that frames the ‘terrorist threat’ will 
be based on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which will serve to elucidate the 
theoretical points made thus far and to test the Terrorism Complex hypothesis. These 
power asymmetries marking the wider political context of the conflict will be related 
to the continuation of politics through the use of force. Attention will be paid to the 
corresponding application of the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘counter-terrorism’ and to the 
issues of legitimacy regarding the use of force by state actors in respect to the use of 
force by non-state actors. The struggle for legitimacy between the contending 
utterances marks the political narratives in a given time and space and is as such 
instrumental in the formation of a particular political discourse.  
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Official dominant political discourse will be contrasted with the narratives 
providing the social, political, diplomatic, economic, nationalist, and religious contexts 
of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Critical examination of the contexts in which the 
term ‘terrorism’ is used in the discourses of the political field will lend insight into the 
power currents shaping the construction of knowledge on ‘terrorism’ in this particular 
field. Narratives will be studied in the context of other, often contradictory, narratives, 
and with regard to the non-discursive context determining the formation, reception 
and understanding of the analysed utterances (Bakhtin, 2000, pp. 273-274).  
The chapter will conclude by arguing that current counter-terrorism practices 
only reinforce the Terrorism Complex and are not only ineffective in preventing the 
‘terrorist’ threat but are actually counterproductive in the fight against the surges of 
violence that are commonly labelled as ‘terrorism’. Finally, alternative approaches to 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict will be explored for their potential role in a future 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
 
4.1 POWER IN THE POLITICAL FIELD 
 
The premise this chapter seeks to confirm is that the definition of the term 
‘terrorism’ and the application of the said term to the use of force in international 
realm is a matter of political construction conditioned by the asymmetric distribution 
of power in the political field. The asymmetric distribution of power between a 
dominant, usually state actor, whose dominant narratives construct the dominant 
discourse and knowledge on the conflict; and a marginal, generally non-state actor, to 
which the negative labels of the dominant discourse are applied, will be the focus of 
research in this chapter. The asymmetry of power will be explored by looking at the 
domination/subjugation of knowledge through discourse. 
The state-centric character of the international system, coupled with the lack 
of an authoritative international higher power, form the initial disparity in the 
distribution of power when it comes to conflict between state and non-state actors. 
This asymmetry is maintained and reinforced through the dominant discourses of the 
political field. These discourses are amalgamations of dominant and official narratives 
provided by the representatives of the dominant actor in the conflict, and accepted by 
its allies, and other actors with vested interests in the status quo. 
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The political field27 is, much like other fields, engaged in the production of 
truth (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 32). Truth is ultimately the result of struggles emanating 
from the social world, which refer back to the social world, create, and legitimize it 
(pp. 134-135). The political field is the quintessential arena for such struggles since it is 
a field of oppositions. These oppositions are marked by the struggle for power that 
permeates political relations between governments, political groups, parties, fractions 
within parties, various branches of the administrative apparatus, and lobbies (1992, 
pp. 188-189).  
The political field is thus also the prime arena for the mechanisms of power, 
which employ discourse in order to shape and present the ‘legitimate’ visions of the 
social world (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 137). This is where the push for change clashes with 
the pull for the preservation of the established social order, henceforth referred to as 
the status quo. This struggle is marked by the power asymmetry that emanates from 
and reinforces the advantage of the political representatives holding the positions of 
power. These are the actors that are working hard to maintain their positions in the 
face of the opposition, who are working equally hard to bring about change that 
would shift the balance of power. The task of the opposition is made more difficult 
because they, due to their subordinate position in the social order, have considerably 
less symbolic capital and symbolic authority, which is needed to produce a discourse 
alternative to the one reproduced by the status quo (pp. 137-138).  
The dominant group’s symbolic capital and authority stem from the constantly 
reaffirmed position in relation to other social groups and the consequent favourable 
allocation of power (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 138). This perpetual recreation of the social 
order comes to be recognized as the ‘objective reality’ and readily lends itself as the 
truth, obscuring the fact that “nothing is less neutral, when it comes to the social 
world, than expressing the way things are with authority, that is, with the power of 
making people see and believe” (p. 182).  
When undertaking research into the very production of knowledge about the 
social world, an individual needs to be aware of one’s own inability to be exempt from 
participating in those very political struggles under study since. The previous chapter 
has shown that the products of the academic field “immediately become instruments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Bourdieu’s (1992, pp. 190, 196) concept of the political field, which denotes a field of political 
professionals, representatives of the people, was initially used. The research soon revealed the need to 
expand the scope of Bourdieu’s definition to include political action located outside of this purely 
professional scope, such as the grassroots initiatives and the non-governmental sector. 
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in the struggle” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 40) of the political field. Any claims to the 
objective representation of the ‘truth’ should be relinquished and replaced by an acute 
awareness that truth is dependant, not on some outside objective criteria, but on 
discourse as an asset in a political struggle (Foucault, 1972, p. 120) and as a space 
where “most formidable powers” can be exercised (1981, p. 52). 
The interconnected complexity of the power relations and discursive struggles 
in the political field encompasses structure and agency and as such defies narrow 
explanations. The complexity spans from each individual’s personal realm to the 
global social structures and constitutes what Foucault (1995, p. 223) refers to as the 
“panopticism” of “a machinery that is both immense and minute”, a “productive 
network that runs through the whole social body” (2002d, p. 120). Any attempt to 
understand the complexities of the social world when discussing ‘terrorism’ must start 
by perceiving ‘terrorism’ as a complex. Such an approach brings together the analyses 
of the power relations and of the networked struggles for power over constructs, 
representations, and perceptions that play out through the discourses of the political 
field. These power dynamics underscore social activity, thereby actively creating the 
image of ‘reality’ of the social world and sustaining its asymmetries.  
The intimate connection between power and discourse directs the focus to the 
abstract level of texts, even though the tangible ‘reality’ of armed conflict imposes itself 
as the primary object of analysis. The use of force, including ‘terrorist’ tactics, 
represents an escalation in political conflicts that happens under specific circumstances, 
which arise from the asymmetries of power in the political field. These circumstances 
are a mixture of the realities on the ground and of discursive constructs that interact 
with those realities. They exacerbate the power asymmetries at the root of conflicts but 
also obscure them. As was concluded in the chapter on the academic field, the policy-
oriented analyses of ‘terrorism’ tend to downplay the role of root causes by shifting 
attention towards the practical questions of how to respond to ‘terrorism’. The 
processes and mechanisms of power behind the root causes are mentioned even less. 
The focus is set mainly on the physical manifestation of violence, which is only a 
symptom of the underlying conditions of power asymmetry. By diverting attention 
from the root causes, this narrow focus thwarts effective efforts to resolve conflicts, .  
United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (United Nations General 
Assembly [UNGA], 2006b) and the Report of the Secretary General (UNGA, 2006a) 
acknowledge the need to address the “conditions conducive to the spread of 
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terrorism”28. However, as the analysis of the political field will aim to confirm, the 
interest of states, as dominant actors, to sustain the power asymmetry that produces 
‘terrorism’, is the very interest that effectively prevents the measures for addressing the 
underlying conditions from being implemented in the form of actual policy measures.  
The principal method employed in maintaining a favourable distribution of 
power is the construction of a particular and limited representation of the social 
world. This obscures the underlying power asymmetry by legitimizing and 
normalizing it. This construction is conducted through the dominant political 
discourse launched from the authoritative positions of power (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 
180-181). Power struggles are decided on the political actors’ ability to convince, 
control, and mobilize the non-professionals outside of the political field, which endows 
the political professionals with the legitimacy necessary to speak and act on behalf of 
particular groups of people, and consequently with the cumulative power of the group 
itself (p. 190).  
The political field generates “political products, issues, programmes, analyses, 
commentaries, concepts and events”(Bourdieu, 1992, p. 172) in order to amass the 
necessary support of the non-professionals. These political products are intended for 
the constituents, often too remote from active participation in the political process to 
be anything but mere consumers of the produced “instruments for perceiving and 
expressing the social world (or, if you like, principles of di-vision)” (p. 172).  
What is at stake here is the power of imposing a vision of the social 
world through principles of di-vision which, when they are imposed 
on a whole group, establish meaning and a consensus about 
meaning, and in particular about the identity and unity of the group, 
which creates the reality of the unity and the identity of the group (p. 
221). 
Political power is primarily exercised through discourse, through the struggles 
over representations and classifications, which are ultimately rendered 
indistinguishable from what is commonly referred to as “reality” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 
221). Varying degrees of political power affect the outcome of the struggle for 
dominance between competing discourses since the authority to appropriate discourse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Plan of Action of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGA, 2006b) defines 
these conditions as “including but not limited to prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of 
victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of rule of law and violations of human 
rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic 
marginalization, and lack of good governance, while recognizing that none of these conditions can 
excuse or justify acts of terrorism”. 
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remains confined to particular groups of individuals (Foucault, 1972, p. 68). The 
“concentration of speech” in the hands of very few representatives and the resulting 
“monopoly of access to the means of legitimate manipulation of the vision of the 
world” (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 34-35) is how the dominant discourse is produced and 
perpetuated. Social groups, ethnicities, countries, territories, borders are all defined 
according to the principles of di-vision established through authoritative discourse that 
is recognized as such and has the power to bring “into existence what it asserts”(1992, 
p. 222).  
In the case of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and its competing discourses it is 
crucial to determine what contributed to the hierarchical positioning of the opposing 
accounts, what made the Israeli discourse the authoritative one, and how the resulting 
asymmetry is sustained. The genealogical approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 
that follows will lend insight into the processes of the Terrorism Complex that instigate 
the root causes of ‘terrorism’, impede practical engagement with those causes, and 
enable the more powerful, dominant actors to pursue their particular interests. 
 
4.1.1 Israeli–Palestinian Conflict and The Primacy of the Sovereign State 
in International Politics  
 
Upon delving into the particularities of the decades-long strife between the 
State of Israel and the Palestinian people the distinction in the status of the two 
principal stakeholders in this conflict became apparent. Israel’s status as a ‘state’ has 
ever since 1948 been in stark opposition to the longstanding undetermined status of 
the Palestinian people, who have yet to see the fulfilment of their struggle for self-
determination. This distinction is at the heart of the enduring asymmetry of power that 
determines the hierarchy of the two opposing discourses and is constantly reaffirmed 
by that same hierarchy. 
In line with understanding ‘terrorism’ as the Terrorism Complex, the main 
implication emerging from this initial asymmetry of power between the two principal 
actors is its replication in the equally asymmetrical relationship between the two 
opposing discourses describing the conflict. One is relating the non-discursive reality 
from the Israeli point of view and the other from the Palestinian point of view and yet 
it is the Israeli construct of reality that emerges as the dominant one and is awarded 
legitimacy in the international realm. In the political field the rise of a particular 
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discourse to the dominant status depends on the extent of the political power, which 
provides the dominant actor with the authority to make a partisan discourse appear as 
if it is conveying objective reality. The political power, however, is conditioned by the 
primacy of nation states among the actors in the international field.  
The full extent of this fundamental difference between the two main actors in 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict can only be fully appreciated when we consider that the 
contemporary international political landscape still largely rests on the notion of a 
sovereign state29 as the principal actor. The very concept of international relations 
emerged in relation to the concept of a sovereign state (Morris, 2004, p. 198; Jackson 
& Owens, 2005, p. 53). Regardless of the approaches challenging the realist paradigm 
that treats states as primary rational actors in international politics (Vasquez, 1998, pp. 
156-167), and irrespective of the diverging opinions on the future direction and 
strength of the concept of sovereignty, the dominance of the realist paradigms means 
that in IR there is formally still no authority above the sovereign state (Schoenbaum, 
2006, p. 38; Krasner, 2001, pp. 230-231, 233-239; Walker, 2003, p. 267).  
The opposition between the sovereign state and the anarchical international 
realm remains an influential construct (Wendt, 1992), which is ultimately reflected in 
the unilateral political practices where powerful state actors can influence or even 
choose to ignore international institutions, international organizations, and 
international law (Schoenbaum, 2006, pp. 10-11; Burchill, 2005, p. 69; Morris & 
Wheeler, 2007). States are the privileged actors in international politics and their 
security is posited above the concerns for the security of humanity or of individuals 
(Smith, 2004, p. 504). The security of the state being “the moral referent point” in IR 
(p. 504) further explains the ease with which a state actor in a position of power can 
appropriate and adapt the rules to suit their particular interests over those of sub-state 
or supra-state political entities. The efforts to change the laws of war to better serve 
state interests at the cost of human rights and human security were addressed already 
in the academic chapter but will be discussed further in this chapter. The erosion of 
individual’s rights related to the extrajudicial targeted killings will be part of this 
chapter as well. 
This asymmetry of power is most evident when it comes to international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For a detailed definition of the linked concepts of modern state and sovereignty see Morris (2004). 
For definitions of different types of sovereignty (international legal sovereignty, Westphalian 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty) see Krasner (1999, pp. 3-4, 14-25). 
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disputes. In the conflict between the State of Israel and the non-state political entities 
representing the Palestinian people, the manifestations of the disproportionate 
distribution of power are reflected in the political, social, administrative, and economic 
realities on the ground. These realities are fraught with deep-seated systemic violence 
that stems from the prolonged inequality between the two principal actors and will be 
discussed in the course of this chapter.  
The ability to maintain the status quo and with it the favourable distribution of 
power is in no small part dependent on the concentration of the symbolic capital in the 
hands of Israel as the state actor in the conflict. According to Bourdieu (Wacquant, 
1993, pp. 39-40), a state, as an embodiment of accumulated symbolic capital, holds the 
“monopoly not only of legitimate physical violence but also of legitimate symbolic 
violence”. Any attempt to understand the Israeli–Palestinian conflict also has to take 
into account what Bourdieu says (p. 41) about the manner in which a state functions 
“as a formidable instrument of naturalization of the arbitrary” as it systematically 
diverts attention from the social construction that goes into its representations of 
reality, especially when faced with an outside ‘enemy’. Attempts at the normalization 
of the systemic violence woven into the everyday life and attempts at the 
delegitimization of the political struggles opposing such structural violence precede the 
use of armed force by the Palestinians and are crucial for the understanding of 
Palestinian ‘terrorism’ and for the potential peaceful resolution.  
The discussion on the primacy of the sovereign state in international politics 
has led to the conclusion that there is an inherent bias of the international system 
towards accepting the Israeli discourse. This dominant discourse frames the conflict 
from the position of a state actor and overrides the Palestinian discourse, which is 
framing the conflict from the position of a non-state actor. The underlying asymmetry 
of power also determines to which side the ‘terrorist’ label will be applied. Presenting 
the knowledge constructs on ‘terrorism’ emerging from the dominant discourse as 
objective facts erases their partisan origins. Insistence on acknowledging the bias 
involved in the production and reception of the dominant discourse and its constructs 
is a prerequisite for the questioning of ‘facts’ used to garner legitimacy for counter-
terrorist policies in the international realm. 
In terms of the Terrorism Complex this means dispensing with the myth of 
‘terrorism’ as a senseless and baseless proclivity for the indiscriminate use of force. The 
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focus needs to be shifted from this narrow conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as physical 
violence to a wider conceptualization of violence that stems from the 
power/knowledge nexus that is the Terrorism Complex. The Terrorism Complex 
must be addressed in its entirety, as an interconnected system that relies on the narrow 
historical and social contexts to obscure a wide range of knowledge. The structural 
mechanisms are in place to sustain the asymmetries of power that breed ‘terrorism’ 
and enable the unhindered pursuit of particular interests in the shadow of the 
Complex. In the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict this means that Israel’s 
dominant position allows for unchecked territorial expansion that is facilitated by the 
mechanisms of power tied to the occupation of the Palestinian Land. Palestinian 
resistance is labelled as ‘terrorism’, taken out of context, and used as a diversion and as 
justification at the same time. The particularities of these relations, mechanisms, and 
processes will be approached in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
4.2 ASYMMETRIES OF POWER  
 
A two-pronged approach will be applied to the deconstruction of the 
authoritative discourses on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in an attempt to disperse the 
concentration of speech that is constructing partisan knowledge with the status of truth 
about this conflict. Firstly, a historical background will be provided, wider and more 
varied than the one usually applied by the political elites to the framing of this conflict. 
Secondly, the social and political contexts of the Palestinian ‘terrorism’ will be 
expanded to include relevant narratives that fill the contextual voids strategically 
unaddressed by the dominant narratives. Reliable30 alternative narratives will be 
located, and they will be assumed to have an equal claim to the ‘truth’ as the dominant 
ones. The juxtaposition of the two sets of narratives will aim to uncover the knowledge 
subdued during the decades of the power asymmetry that favours dominant 
explanations. This knowledge will be used to disclose the workings of the Terrorism 
Complex and challenge the very foundations of the dominant discourse. The following 
section thus explores the origins of the dominant narratives that have benefited from 
the dominant status of Israel as a state actor. These historical narratives continue to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30   Scholarship providing alternative information and authoritative voices occupying the marginalized 
political positions, dissenting from dominant positions, or those disclosing relevant information from 
their dominant political positions.  
	   117	  
frame the contemporary dominant discourse by forming the knowledge basis 
supporting the deployment of the term ‘terrorism’ in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict of 
today. 
4.2.1 Historical Narratives of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict 
 
A cursory glance at history is enough to illustrate the fluidity of the borders 
subject to invasions, colonialist and imperialist endeavours, and the subsequent rise 
and fall of empires, alliances and federations, which testify to the arbitrariness of 
divisions. The constants of history are the similarities in the discourses aimed at 
mobilizing support and providing legitimacy. Calls to arms at different historical 
periods feature unmistakable continuity (Graham, et al., 2004). From fighting in the 
name of God during the crusades, to fighting in the name of democracy and freedom 
embodied in the authority of the modern sovereign state during the War on Terror, 
the power asymmetry and the particular interests entrenched in the status quo remain 
cloaked in lofty narratives. These narratives establish supreme authority and legitimate 
causes for the use of force, tap into the collective consciousness of audiences by 
appealing to their shared history and values, define an enemy ‘other’ to be eliminated, 
and call for unity necessary to achieve these important tasks (pp. 204-215).  
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a fitting contemporary example with which to 
test these theoretical points by focusing on the narratives pertaining to the birth of the 
State of Israel. These narratives serve as an example of the power of discourse 
produced from the positions of power in the construction of reality. The importance of 
the following discourse analysis is in the insight it lends into the construction of the 
interconnected narratives that continue to shape the present day discourse on the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This analysis expands the historical background of the 
conflict to include a wider time frame and alternative historical accounts thereby 
challenging the knowledge constructs sustaining a particular version of history 
surfacing from the dominant narratives.  
 
4.2.1.1 Victim Status and the Responsibility to Protect 
 
The partition of Palestine and the subsequent establishment of the State of 
Israel closely followed the Second World War and the Holocaust, which invoked an 
	   118	  
imperative to act and protect the Jewish people from further persecution. A sense of 
urgency, credibility, and legitimacy was added to the formation of a nation state that 
would safeguard the Jewish people (Pappé, 1995, p. 77; Kaufman, 2009, p. 418).  
This narrative is focused on the victim status of the Jewish people and their 
right to self-defence (Pappé, 1998b, p. 16) and is promoting an inverted perception of 
the power asymmetry. This narrative that casts Israel as the victim has shaped the 
international discourse surrounding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict ever since. 
Widening of the narrowly defined context that misrepresents the power asymmetry is 
thus key to the understanding of the current conflict. Alternative narratives provide a 
wider historical context that includes the Zionist 31  colonial project, which was 
underway for decades prior to the Second World War and the horrors of the 
Holocaust (Khalidi, 1997, p. 6; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2008, pp. 92-95).  
The project of actively re-establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine can be 
traced to the turn of the previous century when the leaders of the Zionist movement 
(Jabotinsky, 1922; Ruppin, 1929) advocated increased Jewish immigration to the 
region and the colonization of the land by using a narrative combining the historical 
legitimacy of the claim to the land with the dangers of anti-Semitism, repression and 
persecution, and the need for a safe haven in the form of a nation state (Kaufman, 
2009, p. 416; Zerubavel, 1995, pp. 13-18). This narrative also facilitated social 
integration by serving as a cohesive element with the power to bring together a diverse 
group of people (Ohana, 2012, p. 6).  
Similar, but amplified themes of an imminent threat to survival, profound 
general endangerment and the existential need for security can be found in the post-
Holocaust narrative that shaped the international discussion on the establishment of 
Israel (Pappé, 1998b, p. 16). These themes continue to be instrumental in shaping the 
collective national character of the State of Israel and its policies (e.g., Israel Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs [IMFA], 2008; IMFA, 2010b, [Ottoman Rule (1517-1917), British 
Rule (1918-1948)]) and are closely entwined with the narrative that seeks to establish a 
Jewish right to the entire land of Palestine (e.g., IMFA, 2003a, [Facts]). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010b, [Ottoman Rule (1517-1917)]) defines Zionism as “the 
national liberation movement of the Jewish people” guided by the idea of “the redemption of the 
Jewish people in its ancestral homeland” – the Land of Israel. 
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4.2.1.2 The Right to the Land 
 
After Palestine, which had not been the only possible choice for a future Jewish 
state (see Herzl, 1896, [The Jewish Question – Palestine or Argentine]), was chosen, 
religious overtones were highlighted in the nationalist narrative of the Zionist 
movement by evoking references reaching back to biblical times that sought to 
establish ancient Jewish connections to the region and thus legitimize the colonialist 
aspirations to the land (Pappé, 1995, p. 68; Bard, n.d.; Kaufman, 2009, pp. 415, 417; 
Zerubavel, 1995, pp. 15-33; Jabotinsky, 1922, p. 257).  
The official narrative (IMFA, 2010a) promoting a legitimate claim to the land 
of Palestine begins nearly four thousand years ago and combines biblical stories with 
archaeological artefacts and written sources in order to establish a continuous Jewish 
connection and attachment to the land. It is an archaeological and a historiographical 
project of legitimation that is aimed at obscuring the role of Jewish agency in making a 
conscious decision to build a Jewish nation state on the territory claimed by another 
ethno-religious group (Khalidi, 1997, p. 6). The official dominant narrative differs 
from the alternative narrative, which states that Palestinians lived on and cultivated the 
land of what was to become the future Jewish state (Khalidi, 2004). Israeli narrative is 
built on the notion that the land was largely empty, abandoned and neglected, and 
that Jewish immigrants were “pioneers” who “reclaimed barren fields, built new 
settlements and laid the foundations for what would become a thriving agricultural 
economy” (IMFA, 2010b, [Ottoman Rule (1517-1917)])32. This Israeli narrative that 
fosters the pioneering spirit of the national identity offers a strong ideological 
foundation for the continued colonization of the Palestinian land (Kaufman, 2009, p. 
403). 
The ongoing construction of the historical right to reclaim the land from what 
is considered foreign domination (e.g., IMFA, 2010b) shows continuity with the 
historical narrative supportive of the confrontational colonial mind-set focused on 
establishing a Jewish majority in Palestine (e.g., Jabotinsky, 1925). The continuity of 
colonial practices justified by these narratives in the contemporary Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict represents an important part of the Terrorism Complex and will be explored 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The history of Jaffa, today firmly within Israeli territory, is an example that challenges the official 
Israeli narrative as there is ample historical evidence of a thriving Palestinian town, known for its 
superior orchards of oranges (see Khalidi, 2004, p. 131).  
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further on in this chapter.  
The analysis of texts (e.g., Jabotinsky, 1923; Herzl, 1896) written by the Jewish 
leaders planning the future state for the Jewish people reveals a history of active Jewish 
involvement in the region, during which they expected and prepared for the resistance 
by the native population. This account is at odds with the narrative on the self-defence 
against an unprovoked and overpowering Arab aggression. 
 
4.2.1.3 David Versus Goliath 
 
The dominant narrative proposes that the Jewish community was under a 
sustained attack from all sides in the period surrounding the birth of Israel, as the large 
neighbouring Arab armies with their superior military equipment joined the 
Palestinian Arabs in an assault on the nascent Israeli state (e.g., Lorch, n.d.-b, [The 
War of Independence]). But the “ill prepared” Jewish defensive formations, that were 
consolidated and reorganized as the IDF shortly after Israel declared independence in 
May 1948, not only deflected the Arab invasion but also managed to capture 
significantly more land than envisioned in the partition plan (Lorch, n.d.-b).  
Initial challenges to the official narrative can be found in the narrative itself. 
The David versus Goliath myth (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2008, p. 81) sustained by the 
narrative does not align with the facts stated in the narrative (see also Pappé, 1998b, p. 
16). Were the Arab armies’ capabilities as overpowering as described and Israeli 
defensive forces as newly organized, barely equipped and underprepared they would 
not be able to effectively expand their number from a “mere handful of full-time 
soldiers” to a 100,000 soldiers (Lorch, n.d.-b) in the thick of war, utterly defeat the 
formidable Arab armies and, even less so, capture vast amounts of land. Instead of 
being exhausted and having its resources depleted from fighting the overpowering 
Arab armies, the narrative states that by the end of the war the newly formed IDF had 
developed infantry, artillery, armoured regiments, and a semblance of a Navy and an 
Air Force (Lorch, n.d.-b). This tension between trying to magnify the threat while 
maintaining the appearance of being small and endangered, and at the same time 
evoking national pride by reporting the impressive military achievements is common 
in Israeli political discourse.  
Terrorist tactics make an appearance in the narrative when the post-war 
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infiltrations of the Palestinian suicide troops are described (Lorch, n.d.-b). According to 
the official narrative, these infiltrators set out to steal farm equipment, lay mines, and 
massacre Israelis in an effort to appease the Palestinian people’s desire to continue 
fighting, harassing, and embarrassing Israel (Lorch, n.d.-b). The narrative describes 
how Israel inevitably retaliated, only to find its actions condemned due to the double 
standards of the Security Council (Lorch, n.d.-b). In failing to provide any context as 
to the social conditions that drove Palestinians to undertake measures as drastic as 
suicide missions, the narrative promotes an image of bloodthirsty, criminally inclined 
Palestinians engaged in baseless and senseless violence against the Israelis who were 
simply striving to live in their “home”.  
Inconsistencies and omissions in the official dominant narrative demand 
additional information and alternative explanations. The main challenge to the official 
historical accounts, the dominant political narratives they sustain, and the policies they 
help legitimate is provided by the alternative historical accounts based on the analyses 
of declassified Israeli and British archival material (Pappé, 1998a; 1995, p. 72). These 
accounts undermine the David versus Goliath myth (see Mearsheimer & Walt, 2008, 
pp. 81-86) and expose how the narratives combining victimhood, fear, sense of 
exigency, right to the land, and religion were used to legitimize a sequence of 
questionable practices on the ground that eventually led to actions that fit the 
definition of ethnic cleansing rather than the just war of self-defence (Pappé, 2006a, p. 
7).  
According to the alternative narrative, in the months preceding the 
establishment of the State of Israel vast numbers of Palestinian Arabs were either killed 
or permanently expelled from their homes during premeditated armed operations of 
the Jewish militias based on years of surveillance, information gathering, and planning 
embodied in the “Village Files” project of 1940-1947 (Pappé, 2006a, p. 10). The 
Village Files were detailed sets of information on specific Palestinian villages, such as 
the quality of land, existing water springs, the names of village leaders and of those 
who engaged in any kind of resistance (p. 11). These files were eventually used in 1947 
to determine a list of wanted persons for each village. In 1948 these files enabled swift 
and effective Jewish operations across Palestine (Pappé, 2006b, pp. 86-115) and the 
military often translated wanted persons lists into hit lists (Pappé, 2006a, p. 13; 2006b, 
pp. 90-91).  
A series of previous plans for the offensive campaign against the Palestinians 
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(Pappé, 2006b, p. 28) culminated in the Plan D, “a master plan for the ethnic cleansing 
of Palestine” (p. 49), especially of the areas of the future Jewish state where the 
establishment of a Jewish majority was paramount for the materialization of the 
Zionist vision (pp. 39, 41). The plan proposed “obtaining as much of Palestine as 
possible with as few Palestinians in it as feasible” (p. 42). As this plan was put into 
action, a national catastrophe, the Nakba (the Catastrophe), began on the ground in 
early 1948, the Arab countries postponed sending troops to engage in a war they knew 
they could not win (pp. 39, 117). Eventually the neighbouring Arab states sent small 
forces in an attempt to protect the Palestinian population, but the ongoing ethnic 
cleansing could not be stopped (2006a, pp. 39, 18).  
The result of Israel’s actions before and shortly after the creation of Israel is the 
ongoing Palestinian refugee problem that continues to be a powerful point of 
contention in the present day conflict. The Palestinian narrative of the Nakba has 
become a part of the Palestinian collective memory and national identity. As long as 
both the Nakba and the issue of the right of return of the refugees remain 
unrecognized by Israel and sidelined by the international community, they will serve as 
powerful mobilizers (Kaufman, 2009, pp. 403, 408) of the Palestinian people against 
Israel and powerful obstacles to the possibility of peaceful coexistence.  
Pappé (2006b) supports his critical historical account by various primary 
historical sources and offers a persuasive deconstruction of the dominant narratives 
that construct a reality in which Jewish forces had to resort to self-defensive measures 
after being faced with an overpowering Arab threat. Variations of these dominant 
narratives can be located in the Israeli security based self-defence narratives, which 
continue to govern the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
 
4.2.1.4 The Security Imperative in the face of an Existential Threat and 
the Right to Self-Defence 
 
Another prominent Israeli narrative is structured around the security 
imperative that justifies many of the mechanisms of power within the Terrorism 
Complex, such as the prolonged occupation of Palestinian land, and stringent counter-
terrorism measures. This narrative is attached to the just cause based on the right to 
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self-defence against the aggressive Arab usurpers on the lands of the ancient Jewish 
homeland. This narrative, too, is selective in terms of its historical time frame (starting 
in 1946) as well as in terms of incorporated themes. Securitization, which is one of the 
cornerstones of the present day conflict, appears in a succinct form on the Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website (see Lorch, n.d.-a) and combines the themes of the 
hostile environment in which the Jewish state was reborn in 1948, the just war of self-
defence Israel was forced to fight, and the subsequent rightful acquisition of the 
captured land. Disturbing this narrative by testing its inconsistencies against the 
following alternative historical accounts and sources is tantamount to exposing the 
mechanisms facilitating the workings of power within the Terrorism Complex today.  
One such alternative historical narrative is told from the perspective of the 
Palestinian Arabs, living on the territory increasingly populated by the Jewish 
immigrants. Palestinians found the proposed partition plan that awarded the majority 
of the land in Palestine to the Jewish state to be unjust (Pappé, 2006b, pp. 33-34; 
Khalidi, 1997, p. 11). During UN discussions on 29 November 1947 (Division for 
Palestinian Rights [DPR], 1979; UNGA, 1947) Israel’s would-be Arab neighbours, 
also strongly opposed the manner in which the partition was being decided. The Arab 
countries resented not being properly involved or consulted in the process. They 
pointed out the absence of meaningful efforts towards conciliation, and the lack of 
proper attention being given to the possibility of a single shared state (DPR, 1979; 
UNGA, 1947). The disappointment of the representatives of the Arab states after the 
United Nations General Assembly had voted in support of the partition on 29 
November 1947 was palpable as they referred to the injustice caused by the workings 
of power that had already been operating in Israel’s favour behind the scenes of the 
partition process intended to resolve the question of Palestine (UNGA, 1947). The 
representative of Saudi Arabia, Amir Faisal Al Saud, referred to this exercise of power 
directly: “We have felt, like many others, the pressure exerted on various 
representatives of this Organization by some of the big Powers in order that the vote 
should be in favour of partition” (UNGA, 1947).  
Even though the partition plan proposed by the United Nations was never 
implemented due to the increased violence between Arab and Jewish communities 
causing a “most serious deterioration of the security situation in Palestine” (UNGA, 
1948), the State of Israel came into being after independence was unilaterally declared 
on 14 May 1948, the date of the intended end of the British Mandate. The actual 
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establishment of the state of Israel in Palestine profoundly exacerbated the conflict, 
which had become acute during a period of prolonged and extensive Jewish 
immigration (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1946, p. 141). Two peoples 
suddenly lay claim to one land – the Palestinian people (of varied religious and ethnic 
backgrounds) who were indigenous at the time (Palestine Royal Commission, 1937, 
pp. 11-12; see also Pappé, 2006b, pp. 151, 159), and the Jewish people who were 
coming in from Europe legally and illegally in numbers feared greater than the ability 
of the land and the people to absorb them through gradual naturalization (see Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry, 1946, pp. 18-19, 25, 27; Government of the United 
Kingdom [GOV UK], 1939, [Section II. Immigration]).  
In contrast to the Jewish immigrants who came to Palestine in the past, 
immersed themselves into the new homeland and enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with 
their Muslim and Christian neighbours (GOV UK, 1939, [Section III. Land]), the new 
Jewish immigrants exhibited reluctance to assimilate into the local social environment 
and chose to build a new social and cultural environment in Palestine, one based on 
Zionist ideas, which contributed to the growing tensions (Palestine Royal Commission, 
1937, pp. 11-13).  
The Israeli narratives building on the security imperative and the right to self-
defence are based on the demonization and dehumanization of the ‘enemy’ that rally 
Israelis around the questionable ‘it is us or them’ counter-terrorist policies of the 
present day. Acknowledging the Zionist movement’s plan to construct and protect 
Israel’s exclusively Jewish identity begins by deconstructing the “never an arbitrary” 
national mythology (Ohana, 2012, p. 8). Shifting the focus to the alternative narratives 
is imperative in order to disturb the mobilizing potential of the securitizing narratives.  
4.2.1.5 The Use of Force as the Last/First Resort  
 
The official narrative on Israel’s War of Independence (Lorch, n.d.-b) focuses 
on defence and recounts the pre-emptive defensive preparations of the Haganah that 
began in 1946 with the build up of their modest military capacities in spite of the 
restrictions imposed by the British after they had become the targets of Jewish defence 
efforts. 
 In 1946, before Israel’s War of Independence, the Jewish defence 
organizations, Haganah, Irgun (Etzel), and Lehi, worked together to “carry out actions 
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blowing up road and railway bridges which link Palestine with neighboring [sic] states” 
(IMFA, 2002b, [1946]). A splinter group of the Haganah, the Irgun, did not shy away 
from a more “forceful line of action” which included “the bombing of the King David 
Hotel in Jerusalem, the headquarters of the Mandate government secretariat, which, 
the Haganah claimed, had not been coordinated with it” (IMFA, 2003c, [Irgun Zva’I 
Leumi (Etzel)]). Eighty people were killed in this attack (2002b, [1946]).  
In 1948, “Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is [sic] founded, incorporating all the 
pre-state defense organizations” (IMFA, 2002b, [1948]), including Lehi, an acronym 
that translates into “Jewish Freedom Fighters”. Lehi grew out of the Stern group, a 
radical splinter group of Etzel, joined by those of Etzel’s members believing in the 
necessity to fight the enemies of Zionism “by means of guerrilla action and terrorism” 
(Pa'il, 2003, [World War II (1939-1945)]).  
The defining element deciding whether Israel’s armed militias striving for 
“political independence” (Pa'il, 2003, [World War II (1939-1945)]) were going to be 
labelled a ‘defensive army’ or a ‘terrorist organization’ was Israel’s declaration of 
independence. Israel’s recognition as a nation state in the international realm, which 
institutionalized Israel’s power, granted its armed militias legitimate army status, and 
its discourse the legitimacy to define reality. Israel’s reality has ever since been 
constructed as dangerous, filled with existential threats that needed to be met with 
decisive defensive actions (Kaufman, 2009, p. 417). Israel, as the more powerful actor, 
has harnessed the power of discourse and has employed the authority stemming from 
its nation-state status to label its opponents as ‘terrorists’ and to present its stance as the 
self-defensive one. The asymmetry of power continues to work in Israel’s favour as it 
helps Israel to define its policies and actions in an opportune manner. The power to 
maintain the constructs of reality in which military aggression can be presented as self-
defence under the auspices of counterterrorism is at the heart of the Terrorism 
Complex.  
The willingness to resort to the use of force is closely connected to the 
security/self-defence narrative that has marked Jewish presence in Palestine since the 
beginning of the Zionist project. The benefits of the use of force are stressed at various 
points in the official security based narrative (see Lorch, n.d.-a). One of the best 
examples is the Six-Day War of 1967. The official narrative (see Lorch, n.d.-a, [The 
Six-Day War]; IMFA, 2010c, [1967 Six-Day War]) lists ‘terrorist’ incursions, sporadic 
bombardments, military flexing and ultimately Egypt’s positioning of troops in Sinai as 
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precursory signs of an imminent threat to Israel, alone and surrounded by a powerful 
Arab coalition bent on its destruction. Israel is presented as having no choice but to 
engage the Arab Goliath once again, and exercise its right to self-defence by pre-
emptively striking Egypt and engaging in counterterrorism against Jordan and Syria 
(Lorch, n.d.-a, [The Six-Day War]; IMFA, 2010c, [1967 Six-Day War]). According to 
the Israeli official narrative, it took Israel six days to catch its Arab neighbours by 
surprise, defeat them, and capture vast expanses of land. Gaza, the West Bank and the 
Golan Heights taken in 1967 have remained occupied ever since33 (Lorch, n.d.-a, [The 
Six-Day War]; IMFA, 2010c, [1967 Six-Day War]).  
Alternative historical accounts show that the 1967 war indeed was a war of 
Israel’s choice, a war of opportunity. Israel made a calculated decision to destroy 
Egypt’s army and use self-defence as a pretext (Quigley, 2013, pp. 27-30; Peled, 2012, 
pp. 43-45). The use of the home front to not only support but actually demand the use 
of force was ensured by drawing on the collective trauma of the Holocaust and by 
evoking powerful fears of Arab armies coming to “rape and murder them” (Peled, 
2012, p. 45). The amplification of the outside threats in order to garner public support 
for the use of force is a practice that has remained relevant to the present day. For the 
Terrorism Complex to work and be able to direct people’s reactions in the manner 
observed in the case of the 1967 war, the threat of ‘terrorism’ must be and, according 
to various studies (Jackson, 2011b, p. 131), is exaggerated. The governments, with the 
help of the media and academe, are actually complicit in ‘terrorism’ since, in terms of 
control over their own population, they are the ones that stand to gain most from the 
far-reaching terror effect of ‘terrorism’ (pp. 140-143).  
After instilling the population with the fear of the terrorist murderous ‘other’, 
the decisive use of force is presented as the single most efficient deterrent of further 
attacks against Israel. Alternative historical accounts consider Israel’s preference for 
the use of force over the political means in dealing with the Palestinians to be a matter 
of choice rather than necessity (Khalidi, 1997, pp. 6-7). This choice was reflected in the 
strategic plans and policies adopted by the Zionist leaders, such as Ben Gurion’s Plan 
C, which was an amalgamation of previous strategic guidelines of Plans A and B 
(Pappé, 2006b, p. 28). Plan C was oriented towards offensive military campaigns and 
their supposed capacity to deter Palestinians from attacking. They actively precluded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The occupation of the Palestinian territories will be addressed later on in this chapter, especially 
Gaza’s status as an occupied territory, which has become disputed in recent years.  
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possible diplomatic solutions by systematically targeting the Palestinian political 
capabilities, by directly executing political leadership or by administering punitive 
actions (Pappé, 2006b, p. 28). These efforts will be henceforth referred to as politicide. 
Baruch Kimmerling (2003, pp. 3-4), one of the Israeli “new historians”, defined 
politicide in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as  
“a process that has, as its ultimate goal, the dissolution of the 
Palestinian people’s existence as a legitimate social, political, and 
economic entity. This process may also but not necessarily include 
their partial or complete ethnic cleansing from the territory known as 
the Land of Israel. /…/ Politicide is a process that covers a wide range 
of social, political, and military activities whose goal is to destroy the 
political and national existence of a whole community of people and 
thus deny it the possibility of self-determination.” 
The politicide of 1948 carried out by the Jewish forces was premeditated and 
followed the logic of pre-emptive military action (Pappé, 2006a, p. 15). It 
complemented the British containment of the Arab Revolt (1936-1939)34, during 
which Palestinian leadership and defence capabilities had already sustained a decisive 
blow (p. 14). The methods, such as assassinations and arrests, used by the British to 
eliminate Palestinian leaders capable of political agency (Lesch, 1973, pp. 37, 38) were 
analogous to the ones later adopted by Israel. Israel’s preference to use military instead 
of diplomatic means does not reflect a particular disposition towards the use of force 
but, according to the historical data, corresponds with the colonialist interests of the 
Zionist leadership in Palestine to gain as much territory as possible while at the same 
time ensuring a Jewish majority on that territory (Pappé, 2006b, p. 37).  
It is imperative to acknowledge Israel’s role in closing off political means for 
resolving the conflict by engaging in the politicide of the Palestinian leadership as this 
lends vital context for establishing the continuity of the practice and for disturbing the 
dominant discourses that are employed to draw attention away from the workings of 
the Terrorism Complex today. The deconstruction of these discourses as a method for 
exposing the operation of the Terrorism Complex constitutes a central part of this 
chapter. The narratives on the Palestinian use of force, labelled as ‘terrorism’, will be 
analysed first. The workings of the Terrorism Complex will also be examined in 
relation to the vast array of security measures, including the periodic counter-terrorist 
military operations, Israel claims to employ against Palestinian ‘terrorism’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39 
(Hughes, 2009). 
	   128	  
4.2.2 The Discursive Continuity Between the Past and the Present 
 
The analysis of the historical narratives surrounding the establishment of the 
State of Israel shows how different accounts of the conflict employ different selections 
of facts within select historical timeframes. These provide different representations of 
reality one of which is the dominant one and the other is marginalized. The hierarchy 
of these representations is largely conditioned by the asymmetry of power related to 
the primacy of the sovereign state. 
The themes of the basic narratives have been featured in the dominant 
discourses throughout Israel’s history (e.g., IMFA, 2010a; Jerusalem Center for Public 
Affairs [JCPA], n.d.-b) and have been strengthened every time Israeli policies 
encountered opposition. The interconnected narratives pertaining to the early days of 
the Jewish nationalist aspirations, and to the necessity to protect the Jewish homeland 
form the ideological basis of the Israeli domestic dominant discourse and grant insight 
into the policies and interests that continue to underlie the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. 
These narratives are strengthened by the official “facts” (IMFA, 2010a) which state 
that Israel has re-materialised on the territory that has rightfully belonged to the Jewish 
people since the biblical times  
The imperative to protect the land that rightfully belongs to Israel represents a 
line of reasoning that has gone mostly unchallenged among the centres of political 
power in the international realm (Hirsch, et al., 2014; Lewis & Orlofsky, 2014) and has 
provided legitimacy and just cause for the policies implemented in Israel’s constant 
fight for survival. The moral imperative to support Israel in its stated identity as a safe-
haven for the persecuted Jewish people has throughout added gravitas to Israel’s case 
in the international realm. 
The dominant historical narratives analysed here feature Arabs as usurpers on 
the Land of Israel, a bloodthirsty and aggressive alien force that has understood only 
the decisive use of force and has therefore justly been contained primarily through 
military action. Alternative historical narratives provide a different history and 
support the Palestinian narrative of continuous oppression and dispossession. They 
expose Israeli policies that cause continued and progressive displacement of the 
Palestinians from the territory they base their own nationalist hopes on as the reason 
that drives the indigenous Palestinian population in their struggle. Palestinian history 
and their narratives have largely been denied any sort of legitimacy in the official 
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Israeli discourse.  
The deconstruction of the historical narratives on the birth of Israel attests to 
the constitutive power of discourse when it comes to the phenomena of the social 
world. The processes of active construction involved in the production of versions of 
reality through discourse are marked by the power asymmetries between the actors 
whose narratives seek to define that reality. The actor in the dominant position of 
power is the one who can impose a perception of inseparable unity between the reality 
and its constructed representations. ‘Reality’, according to Bourdieu (1992, p. 224), “is 
the site of a permanent struggle to define ‘reality’”.  
To analyse the features of the political world such as countries, borders, 
territories, national identities, relations between social groups, or conflicts as objective 
reality, ‘as they are’, and to look for facts to be observed and preferably measured to fit 
the established IR models is to narrow the context of the political world and its 
complexity. Such analyses have only a limited capability of explaining the world as 
they are concerned almost exclusively with the observable manifestations of the social 
phenomena, and with the parameters that can be measured. While such quantitative 
analyses contribute valuable knowledge to the study of ‘terrorism’ there is also a critical 
niche in the academic research of ‘terrorism’ that allows for taking a step back in order 
to locate the underexplored areas of ‘terrorism’ as a complex social phenomenon and 
to work with a wider set of relevant knowledge. A case for understanding ‘terrorism’ as 
the Terrorism Complex that is examined in this thesis is based on highlighting the 
areas of knowledge that are otherwise closed off by the ontological and epistemological 
limitations of the dominant approaches to IR. The knowledge subjugated as a result of 
these limitations is presented in the following sections. 
 
4.2.3 The ‘Terrorism’ Context - Status Quo and the Terrorising Effects of 
the Mechanisms of Power 
 
The remainder of this chapter will illustrate a point Jackson (2009b, p. 70) 
makes about the consideration of a wider socio-political context being largely absent 
from the discussions of violent conflicts in the international realm, where talking about 
state terrorism is mostly a taboo. ‘Terrorism’ is something states are supposedly not to 
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engage in (2011b, p. 176) or, at best, something only the ‘bad states’ do35 (p. 180). 
Smith (2004, p. 510) attributes the reason for this strangely narrow focus and lack of 
historical, social and political context to the academic discipline of International 
Relations and its defining of “its core concerns in such a way as to exclude the most 
marked forms of violence in world politics, in favour of a relatively small subset which 
ultimately relies on the prior moves of separating,” among other things, “causes and 
effects” (p. 510). Exceedingly state-centric academic research engages terrorism from 
the point of view of the state, consequently ignoring “the roots of terrorism and the 
contribution of the state itself to the creation of the conditions in which ‘terrorist’ 
action by non-state actors occurs” (Breen Smyth, 2007, p. 261).  
The presentation of the status quo of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 
complements the historical background analysis and completes the two-part approach 
to the unsettling of the dominant political discourse by situating ‘Palestinian terrorism’ 
in a wider social and political context. The particularities of the mechanisms of power 
operating within the Israeli–Palestinian conflict will be addressed in order to subvert 
the authority of Israel’s dominant discourse. This will be achieved by contrasting the 
dominant narratives with the non-discursive mechanisms of power Israel employs to 
sustain the asymmetry of power. When the mechanisms of power applied to the 
occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) result in adverse reactions, these reactions get 
divorced from the context in order to feed into the dominant political discourse on 
‘terrorism’. Dominant discourse decides the battles for symbolic power in the 
international realm and is instrumental in the battles for the political power and the 
associated authority to impose legitimate visions of the social world (Bourdieu, 1992, 
pp. 180-181, 221-222). The authoritative representations of reality thus sustain the 
status quo and ultimately hold sway over people’s lives and deaths. This circular self-
perpetuating dynamic of power is often evident precisely in the context of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict.  
To unsettle the discursive asymmetry of power that sustains this cyclical 
process of power relations, multiple sources of knowledge were consulted in the 
process of research. The alternative narratives found lend insight into the socio-
political context of ‘Palestinian terrorism’. They shift the focus to the Israeli policies 
that maintain the status quo of the current power asymmetry and are argued to cause 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Such discussions conform to the logic of ‘terrorism’ being “what the bad guys do” (Jenkins, 2003, p. 
17). 
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significant distress, fear, even terror among the Palestinian population. The manner in 
which Israel uses its dominant position to divert attention from these narratives and 
legitimize the use of force against the Palestinians will be addressed. The accounts of 
the mechanisms of power that emerge from the alternative, dissenting and 
marginalized narratives will be related to the Terrorism Complex and to its reliance 
on the power/knowledge nexus. The authoritative construct of reality relies on 
discursive omissions and on a selective approach to the historical and socio-political 
contexts. This line of inquiry into this particular conflict is not new (Jackson, 2011b, p. 
187) but the focus on the sources that lend insight into the workings of power within 
the political field might lend interesting insights. The aim is to map the complexity of 
the conflict and indicate the knowledge obscured every time the ‘terrorism’ label is 
used  
 
4.2.3.1 The Fragmentation and Displacement of the Palestinian People 
 
A brief introduction to the status quo starts in 1948, when amidst the violence 
and out of the fog of war, the State of Israel came to stand opposite a people without a 
state. The events leading up to and surrounding the birth of Israel in 1948 resulted in 
the entrenchment of the initial asymmetry. The indigenous Palestinian population was 
internally divided. Some Palestinians became internally displaced or took refuge in the 
neighbouring Arab states and around the world after being ordered off their lands in 
the Israeli military operations or after escaping the violence with the elements of 
ethnic cleansing (Pappé, 2006b). Others remained within Israel’s new borders and 
were given Israeli citizenship, even though many were not allowed to return to their 
villages or reclaim their property (pp. 152-153). The Palestinians remaining  in Gaza 
and the West Bank became geographically divided due to Israel’s capture of the lands 
that were supposed to maintain the contiguity of the potential Palestinian State under 
the partition plan (pp. 292, 293).  
The fragmentation of the Palestinian people continued in 1967 when another 
war in the name of self-defence resulted in Israel acquiring additional land and 
annexing Arab East Jerusalem and the adjacent lands to fulfil the vision of indivisible 
Jerusalem (e.g., JCPA, n.d.-a). The subsequent occupation of the Palestinian territories 
created more refugees and caused more displacement without any decisive 
intervention from the international community (Quigley, 2013, pp. 122, 180). By the 
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time of the Oslo II Accords of 1995 and the administrative division of the occupied 
West Bank into Areas A, B and C (Bisharat, 2002, p. 217; Bimkom, 2008, p. 9) the 
pattern of control through deliberate fragmentation and displacement started to 
emerge and signalled a general Israeli policy of ‘divide and conquer’ regarding the 
indigenous population. The subsequent patterns of the Israeli population transfer 
(B'Tselem, 2014c) to the oPt, the network of Israeli illegal settlements and the route of 
the Israeli wall between Israel and the West Bank (B'Tselem, 2011f) corroborate the 
intentional fragmentation of the Palestinian people. So does the account of the efforts 
Israel and the select Western countries invested into changing the trajectory of the 
Palestinian elections in 2006 (Longo & Lust, 2011, pp. 270-271), thereby creating a 
situation that added an internal political division to the physical and administrative 
ones.  
Two points of contention in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict deserve to be 
outlined in more detail. The first is the status of Jerusalem. Palestinians want East 
Jerusalem to be the capital of the future Palestinian state while Israel claims ancient 
Jewish rights over the entire Jerusalem and creates facts on the ground by 
implementing policies intended to undermine Arab majority in East Jerusalem 
(B'Tselem, 2011e; IMFA, 2007; Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations 
Affairs Department [PLO NAD], 2013).  
The second is the concrete wall meandering along the West Bank that Israel is 
building. Palestinians see the ‘separation barrier’ as a discriminatory apartheid-like 
project, an obstacle to the freedom of movement intended to separate the Palestinian 
people from their lands and East Jerusalem from the West Bank, to undermine the 
contiguity of the Palestinian settlement, and to facilitate the colonial settlement project 
in the West Bank (The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 2010; 
Monaghan & Careccia, 2012; Jweiles & Abul-Su’ood, 2008; United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory 
[UNOCHAoPt], 2013c). Israel claims the ‘security fence’ is necessary for the 
prevention of terrorism and the security of Israeli people (IMFA, 2004b; Israel 
Ministry of Defence [IMD], 2004).  
The West Bank is part of the occupied Palestinian territories and represents 
the majority of the land intended for the possible Palestinian state (Khalidi, 1978, p. 
701). Israel’s name for this resource-rich territory is ‘Judea and Samaria’ and the 
name itself conveys the idea of the historical Jewish right to this land. Israel contests 
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the occupation label, presents the territories under question as ‘disputed territories’ 
and justifies the continued Jewish presence in ‘Judea and Samaria’ by constructing the 
narrative around the terrorism-related need for security and the need for defensible 
borders justified by the existential threat posed by the hostile Arab neighbours (IMFA, 
2003a). The power of the delegitimizing potential of the ‘terrorism’ narrative is 
exercised in an attempt to accuse those who refer to Israel’s continued presence in the 
Palestinian territories as ‘the occupation’ of justifying terrorism (IMFA, 2003a, 
[Terrorism Cannot be Justified], [Terrorism and “the Occupation” Excuse]). 
The tableaux outlined in this introduction briefly refer back to Israel’s 
historical narratives, such as the ‘right to the land’ and the ‘security/self defence 
imperative’ connected to the overpowering ‘existential threat’ narrative, but mostly 
these examples serve to illustrate how certain selections of facts form particular 
discourses and how the hierarchization of these competing discourses follows and 
recreates the pre-existent asymmetries of power. Certain narratives provide insight 
into Israel’s creation of the “facts on the ground” (Americans for Peace Now [APN], 
n.d.) and unsettle the dominant discourse that insists on decontextualizing and 
delegitimizing the Palestinian use of force through the use of the ‘terrorism’ label. The 
discourse of ‘terrorism’-inspired securitization subjugates alternative knowledge and 
obscures the role of the system of control and domination in the production of the 
very ‘terrorism’ it warns against. These are the workings of the mechanisms of power 
that lie at the heart of the Terrorism Complex. The research into the Terrorism 
Complex is based on the deconstruction of the simplistic narrow dominant narratives 
by accumulating the subjugated knowledge and using it to situate the Palestinian use 
of force within a wider context.  
 
4.2.3.2 Occupation and the Settlement Project - The Facts Behind the Facts 
on the Ground 
 
Israel’s official narrative (see IMFA, 2002a) aims to dismiss the line of 
causation that could give rise to any kind of just cause for Palestinian resistance and 
categorically denies that Israel’s settlement policy and the system of military 
occupation and control in the Palestinian territories present the underlying causes for 
the Palestinian resistance. The official reasoning reaches the conclusion that “this 
deplorable violence can be traced back to the beginning of the renewed Jewish 
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settlement of the Land of Israel over a century ago” (IMFA, 2002a) and, in line with 
the Israeli historical narratives, seems to explain the phenomenon of Palestinian 
‘terrorism’ as just another instance in the series of hateful persecutions of the 
victimized Jewish people. There are parts of the official Israeli narrative that speak of 
the settlement of the disputed territories and the establishment of the Jewish 
neighbourhoods in places like East Jerusalem and Hebron as maintaining an ancient 
continuity of the Jewish presence in the “Jewish people’s ancient homeland” (IMFA, 
2001). The workings of power within the Terrorism Complex are able to dissociate 
Palestinian resistance from such vital context, from other relevant socio-political 
realities, and from historical background.  
 
Exercising the Right to the Land through Demography Manipulation 
 
The title of B’Tselem’s (n.d.-c) publication “47 Years of Temporary 
Occupation” indicates a major component of Israel’s system of control imposed on 
the Palestinians, which is time. Decades of Israeli presence in the Palestinian 
territories, and decades of peace talks stalling have resulted in a highly structured 
system aimed at maintaining control over another people while creating favourable 
facts on the ground “through construction”, which “is the best way to secure effective 
control in the field” (Bimkom, 2008). 
The passing of time seems to be exacerbating the issue of Israel’s transfer of its 
population into the oPt, which is illegal under the Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (International Committee of the Red Cross - Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), 1949) and the Rule 130. of the customary international humanitarian 
law (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2005). The report of the UN 
Secretary General on the Israeli settlements for the period from September 2010 to 
July 2011 (UNGA, 2011) noted Israel’s disregard for the international legal 
obligations, the continued expansion of the settlements in the occupied territories, 
land confiscation, and violence aimed at the Palestinian population, the adverse effects 
of these discriminatory practices on the basic rights of the Palestinians, and the 
impunity these practices enjoy.  
The report for the period from 22 March 2013 to 30 October 2013 (United 
Nations Human Rights Council [UNHRC], 2014) mentions still larger expansion of 
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the Israeli settlements, and reiterates the problems identified in 2010/2011. The 
report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the implications of 
Israeli settlements in the oPt found that the settlements and the related changes to the 
demographic and territorial composition of the oPt violate the right of the Palestinian 
people to self-determination and the right to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, lead to the dispossession of land and displacement of the Palestinian 
population, cause inequality, discrimination and intolerance, expose the Palestinian 
population to settler violence and intimidation, and violate a number of other basic 
rights (UNHRC, 2013, pp. 8-21). 
East Jerusalem and the Area C of the West Bank, which is under Israeli 
administrative and military control, emerge from the reports as the most vulnerable 
areas. A range of reliable sources including non-governmental organizations, 
international bodies, and institutions, such as B’Tselem, Al-Haq, Human Rights 
Watch, UNOCHAoPt, and UNHRC, bring the subjugated knowledge about the 
conflict into the forefront. These marginalized narratives include information on 
Israeli discriminatory settlement policies that enable confiscation of Palestinian land in 
order to build Jewish-only settlements, provide infrastructure for illegal outposts, and 
allocate most of the natural resources, such as water and minerals, for the settlements 
while limiting Palestinians’ access to lands, resources and vital infrastructure 
(B'Tselem, 2011c, n.d.-b, 2013a; Hareuveni, 2010, pp. 37-47; Human Rights Watch 
[HRW], 2010, pp. 29, 40-43, 89-94; UNOCHAoPt, 2013b; Koek, 2013; Al-Botmeh, 
2014, pp. 49-51; UNHRC, 2013, p. 9).  
Israel appropriates land and limits Palestinian expansion by classifying vast 
areas of land as ‘state land’, ‘uncultivated land’, ‘absentee land’, ‘survey land’, ‘closed 
military zones’, ‘nature reserves’, by stating security concerns due to the proximity of 
the settlements and by planning the route of the wall in manner that constrains the 
expansion of the living space and threatens the basic human rights and the lives of the 
Palestinians (B'Tselem, 2011c; Badil, et al., 2006, pp. 27-38; Bimkom, 2008, pp. 25-
34; UNOCHAoPt, 2012c; UNOCHAoPt, 2013c; UNOCHAoPt, 2014c; 
UNOCHAoPt, 2010; HRW, 2010, pp. 35-40; Rothman, 2014; Hareuveni, 2010, pp. 
21-55).  
Planning policies imposing severe restrictions on Palestinian building are 
forcing Palestinians to build without permits. While such illegal construction in the 
Jewish settlements is not prevented (Hareuveni, 2010, p. 33), the Palestinians are 
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living under a constant threat of home demolitions, evictions and displacement that 
severely impact their quality of life (Bimkom, 2008; Badil, et al., 2006, pp. 17-25; 
B'Tselem, 2013b; Al-Haq, 2014; HRW, 2010, pp. 130-152; UNOCHAoPt, 2012b). A 
closer look at home demolitions alone reveals effects beyond the loss of property, such 
as poverty, deep psychological effects affecting whole families, and displacement that 
further contributes to the fragmentation of Palestinian communities (Palestinian 
Counselling Center [PCC], 2009).  
Bedouin communities living east of Jerusalem are especially at risk, as they 
inhabit the area of planned settlement expansion that would connect the established 
Jewish settlements to Jerusalem and cut East Jerusalem away from the Palestinian 
West Bank (UNOCHAoPt, 2013a; UNOCHAoPt, 2014c, p. 4; Hass, 2014b, 2014d; 
Amnesty International [AI], 2013; "A3. EU Heads of Mission Report on Israeli 
Settlement Activity in East Jerusalem, 15 December 2008 (excerpts)," 2009; Adalah – 
The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, n.d.-a). 
The case of East Jerusalem, with evictions and demolition of Palestinian 
property in neighbourhoods such as Silwan (Rapoport, 2009; The Civic Coalition for 
Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem [CCPRJ], n.d.-a) and Sheikh Jarrah (Bacha & 
Wingert-Jabi, 2012; CCPRJ, n.d.-b) aimed at land and property appropriation for the 
expansion of the Jewish settlements, is another example of Israel’s continued efforts to 
change the demographic realities in places with the majority Palestinian population 
and to erode the contiguity of the Palestinian territory (Bimkom, 2008, pp. 15-23). 
The formula, much like in the rest of the occupied territories, is a combination of 
laws, administrative tools, and policies that minimize the number of Palestinians and 
maximize the number of Jewish inhabitants (B'Tselem, 2011e, 2014d; Adalah – The 
Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, n.d.-d, n.d.-c; UNOCHAoPt, 2012a; 
UNOCHAoPt, 2014b; Institute for Middle East Understanding [IMEU], 2013, [The 
“Judaization” of East Jerusalem: Ethnic Cleansing by Buraucracy]; The Coalition for 
Jerusalem [CFJ], 2013). 
The select information on the settlement project from a multitude of sources 
presented above is a representative part of the subjugated knowledge that forms an 
image of systemic oppression and coincides with the official Palestinian narrative, 
which claims settlements are a major obstacle to peace (PLO NAD, n.d.-c, [Our 
Position]). The policies restricting Palestinian expansion, affecting all aspects of 
people’s lives and contributing to the deterioration of the quality of life in the oPt can 
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be seen as placing demographic limitations on the Palestinian population while 
simultaneously bolstering the Israeli presence on the same territory. Israeli domestic 
narratives, such as the one surfacing at the Knesset meeting on the prevention of 
Palestinian construction in the Area C (Hass, 2014c), point to the same conclusions. In 
the meeting Col. Einav Shalev, operations officer of Central Command referred to 
the Palestinian communities as “weeds” and presented the policy of military zoning 
“as a way of reducing the number of Palestinians living nearby” (Hass, 2014c). Other 
statements by the representatives of the regional settlements called for the expulsion of 
the Palestinians and for the protection of the land that belongs to the Jewish people 
(Hass, 2014c).  
Prominent Israeli politicians have proposed plans to annex Area C, the largest 
part of the West Bank. Naftali Bennett’s Stability Initiative (2012, n.d.) cites 
‘terrorism’-related security concerns and the demographic threat that the potential 
Palestinian state would present as the reasons for proposing the annexation of the 
Area C and its water resources. The Stability Initiative suggests also the continued 
control and military presence in the rest of the West Bank, permanent dissociation 
and separation of Gaza and the West Bank, and the continued Jewish settlement of 
the land, while preventing the return of the Palestinian refugees. Disregard for the 
opinion of the international community and the reliance on the continued impunity 
are expressed in a straightforward manner 
The world will not recognize our claim to sovereignty, as it does not 
recognize our sovereignty over the Western Wall, the Ramot and 
Gilo neighborhoods [sic] of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Yet 
eventually the World will adjust to the de facto reality. (Bennett, 
n.d., p. 2) 
Jewish right to the settlement of the West Bank is widely accepted among the Israeli 
leaders (Bennett, n.d., p. 4), including former Knesset Speaker, now President Reuven 
Rivlin (Benari, 2012). The idea of annexing the occupied territories is gaining traction 
as well (Diakonia, 2014, pp. 10-11). 
A particular testament to the subjugation of knowledge is a letter of the former 
senior EU officials to the Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy for the European Union, at the time, Catherine Ashton. The 
letter acknowledges the complicity of Western policies in the continued occupation of 
Palestinian land, and expresses concern with the progressive creation of ‘facts on the 
ground’:  
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[t]he steady increase in the extent and population of Israeli 
settlements, including in East Jerusalem, and the entrenchment of 
Israeli control over the OT in defiance of international law, 
indicate a permanent trend towards a complete dislocation of 
Palestinian territorial rights (in Sheizaf, 2013). 
This letter supports similar narratives in constructing the knowledge on the role of the 
Israeli settlement project in the conflict and stresses the gravity of the situation by 
urging immediate action. Most importantly for present research, it indicates that 
prominent politicians feel comfortable enough to speak candidly on the matter only 
after they are no longer in office. 
The cumulative information on the occupation’s settlement project combined 
with the historical backdrop of the Zionist colonial project gives rise to an alternative 
reality in which Israel is pursuing a gradual expansion that would in time ensure the 
Jewish majority on the territories of the ancient Jewish homeland. For this aim to be 
achieved the recalcitrant Palestinian population needs to be controlled while the 
settlement project is under way. 
 
Control 
 
Some of the most tangible elements of control are the ‘security fence’ and the 
system of permits, checkpoints, roadblocks, forbidden roads, travel restrictions, 
closures and curfews (B'Tselem, 2012) which are said to be in place in order to 
accommodate the security requirements of Israel and the Jewish settlements 
(B'Tselem, 2014a). These extensive limitations on the freedom of movement of the 
Palestinians contribute to the fragmentation of the oPt and have a big impact on daily 
life in terms of time, dignity, family unity, health and other basic human rights 
(UNOCHAoPt, 2013d, pp. 36-52; HRW, 2010, pp. 14-17; Badil, et al., 2006, p. 32; 
Baumgarten-Sharon, 2014; B'Tselem, 2011b, 2014b). 
The security narrative which is based on the threat of Palestinian ‘terrorism’ 
fails to serve as persuasive justification since there are alternative narratives, which 
suggest that measures such as the ‘security fence’ can do very little to prevent possible 
terrorist attacks since breaches of the ‘fence’ without terrorist intent seem fairly 
common (Hammerman, 2010; Yashar, 2014; Harel, 2006). According to Israel’s 
security service Shin Bet, the drop in the attacks after the wall went up was more likely 
due to a combination of disengagement from Gaza, the negotiated truce, and the 
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opening of political options for the Palestinians in the form of the 2006 elections 
(Harel, 2006), which puts the apparent causal connection between the marked drop in 
the number of terrorist attacks and the construction of the wall into question. 
The ‘security fence’ is however effective as an obstacle separating East 
Jerusalem from the West Bank, and in keeping Palestinians from their agricultural 
lands, from vital resources and from each other (UNOCHAoPt, 2013c). Its planned 
route is contributing a geographical component to the extensive fragmentation of the 
Palestinian population and Palestinian territories while at the same time 
accommodating the connection between Israel and the major Jewish settlement blocks 
in the West Bank (Badil, et al., 2006; PLO NAD, 2014; Monaghan & Careccia, 2012).  
The continued construction of the separation wall in the oPt is in clear 
opposition to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ("Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion," 2004, para.163), which concluded that “the wall being built by Israel, the 
occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around 
East Jerusalem, and its associated regime are contrary to international law” and 
should be dismantled. 2014 saw the tenth anniversary of the advisory opinion with no 
change to Israel’s policy, which indicates a disregard not only for Palestinian rights 
but also for international law and international institutions. 
 
 Israel’s prolonged occupation, settlement and control of the Palestinian 
territories are accompanied by a heavy military presence and a civilian administration 
based on military judicial system that applies only to the Palestinians in the territories 
(Tilley, et al., 2009, pp. 106-119). The Jewish settler population is subject to Israeli 
civilian law (pp. 106-119). The end result is a system that controls most aspects of 
Palestinians’ lives through a number of military orders (The Applied Research 
Institute - Jerusalem [ARIJ], n.d.) that add another component to the long-standing 
structural violence and adversely affect the quality of life of the Palestinian population 
(Shehadeh & Kuttab, 1982; Tilley, et al., 2009; Hass, 2014a).  
Israel invokes security to justify a differential treatment of the Palestinians 
(Tilley, et al., 2009, p. 106; Shehadeh & Kuttab, 1982, pp. 2-4, 10; PLO NAD, 2003; 
HRW, 2010, pp. 5-6). In line with a series of military orders and a broad definition of 
security, which includes non-violent political activities, those suspected of security 
violations can either be detained for an indefinite amount of time without charge or 
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trial, arrested and tried in Israeli military courts, or executed in ‘preventive’ targeted 
killings (Addameer, n.d.-b; Ben-Naftali & Michael, 2003). According to the latest 
UNOCHAoPt humanitarian overview (2014a) “[a]rbitrary arrest and detention and 
ill-treatment of individuals while in detention, including children, women and elected 
members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and failure to respect due process and 
fair trial guarantees, all remain serious concerns”. These mechanisms of power betray 
the extent of the power asymmetry indicative of the Terrorism Complex. They 
represent a big part of the context that is missing from the dominant discourses on 
‘terrorism’. 
A brief focus on the narratives bringing forth the subjugated knowledge 
regarding Palestinian children, as a particularity vulnerable social category, reveals 
the practice of terrorising children and the wider community with an aim to prevent 
Palestinian social mobilization (Addameer, n.d.-a). The control through inducing fear 
among the Palestinian population manifests in night-time arrests of children and in 
the subsequent interrogations with elements of abuse and torture (B'Tselem, 2013c). 
These interrogations are conducted in a foreign language, without having their rights 
explained, without having their parents or council present, and result in the high rate 
of convictions that lead to idle jail time and cause gaps in a proper education (No 
Legal Frontiers, 2011; Unicef, 2013; Defence for Children International/Palestine 
Section [DCIP], 2014f; Sansour & Institute for Middle East Understanding, 2014; 
B'Tselem, 2013c; Euro-Mid, 2014). An integral part of child detentions is also the 
targeting of the children as potential informants (Addameer, n.d.-a). Testimonies of 
children reveal that this policy instils mistrust of their own social environments in the 
Palestinian communities (Auron, n.d.; No Legal Frontiers, 2011, [Appendix C – 
Synopsis of Testimonies]; DCIP, 2014a) and results in their further fragmentation. A 
fragmented Palestinian society is less likely to resist or organize any significant action 
against the mechanisms of power and control used against them.  
 
Impunity 
 
The quality of life of the Palestinian population in the West Bank is further 
eroded by the heavy presence of Israeli settlers (B'Tselem, 2014c). Government-
sanctioned (IMFA, 2001) ongoing process of establishing Israeli communities in the 
occupied West Bank (UNHRC, 2013) betrays not only Israel’s colonial aspirations but 
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also the power of the historical narratives discussed in the beginning of this chapter. 
The belief in the Israeli right to the land (IMFA, 2001) fuels settler violence that 
involves incidents of vandalism, destruction of property and livelihood, arson, 
shootings, vehicular and physical attacks (UNOCHAoPt, 2012d; Gurvitz, 2014; 
Friedman, 2014; Munayyer, 2012b, pp. 5-6). Due to the separation of the legal 
systems in the territories, the army has no jurisdiction over the settlers and mainly acts 
as armed guard that enables the minority settler population to increasingly terrorize 
the Palestinian majority without fear of repercussions (UNOCHAoPt, 2014a, pp. 9, 
11; Munayyer, 2012b, p. 2; IMEU, 2012a; Azarov, 2013; IMEU, 2014). Any 
Palestinian reaction is followed by the revenge attacks of the settlers that, though 
expected, go unchallenged by the IDF (Stein, 2002; UNOCHAoPt, 2014a, p. 10; 
Cohen, 2012).  
In 2012 the European Union officials called attention to the escalation of the 
campaign of intimidation aimed at the Palestinians and accused the Israeli 
government of ignoring the problem (Traynor, 2012). Carmi Gillon, the former head 
of the Israeli security service Shin Bet, and Shabtai Shavit, the former head of 
Mossad, recently agreed that the Israeli Government has little interest in undertaking 
actions or enforcing the laws that would address the terrorizing of the Palestinians 
(Haaretz, 2014a). A similar sentiment was previously expressed by Dan Halutz, a 
former chief of staff of the Israeli Army (Rudoren & Aker, 2012). The lack of 
accountability for the attacks of the “extremist Israeli settlers” against the Palestinians 
was noted in the U.S. State Department’s 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism (2014, 
pp. 147-148). The language used was sensitive to the distinction between the non-
violent settlers and the “extremist” settlers and avoided attaching the ‘terrorist’ label 
to the Jewish perpetrators or to their actions. Careful use of language did not prevent 
Israel from immediately mounting a campaign to contest the inclusion of the Israeli 
attacks in the 2013 report and the Israeli police spokesperson rebranded the Israeli 
attacks as “criminal incidents with nationalistic motives” (AFP, 2014). In view of the 
similarity of the methods used in Israeli and Palestinian attacks (firebombs, shootings, 
stabbings, rock throwing, abductions, assaults) (see Israel Security Agency, n.d.; 
Gurvitz, 2014) Israeli response demonstrates the power of the dominant discourse to 
construct reality in which the ‘terrorist’ label applies only to the actions of the other 
side. 
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The attacks of the Israeli civilians against the Palestinians are coupled with the 
systemic military violence. Testimonies of soldiers about their time serving in the 
territories reveal the extent of the institutionalized terrorizing that is integral to the 
Terrorism Complex while being obscured by its workings of power (Breaking the 
Silence, n.d.-c). Testimonies describe checkpoint brutality, random house searches, 
and house takeovers. They describe the policy of making the army presence known, 
which involves night-time ‘deterrent’ patrol involving random fire and mock arrests. 
Other army activities in the oPt include night arrests, arrests of children, brutality 
towards children, and the indiscriminate unsanctioned use of live fire as a response to 
Palestinian rock-throwing. Such military activities are contrary to international 
humanitarian law which obliges the occupying power to protect the civilian 
population (Yesh Din, n.d.-b, n.d. ).  
 
Lack of proper investigation of various attacks on the Palestinian civilians by 
the Israeli civilians and soldiers emerges as a major theme of the conflict (B'Tselem, 
2011a; Stein, 2010; Yesh Din, 2014). This constitutes the wider context of the 
occupation and plays a vital part in the understanding of the ‘terrorist’ incidents. Yesh 
Din reports (2013a) that only 8.5 per cent of police investigations of suspected attacks 
by Israeli civilians against Palestinians resulted in indictments while the rest of the 
investigation files were closed without further action. The number of investigations 
opened and the rate of indictments served to the soldiers are even lower and on a 
downward trajectory (Yesh Din, 2013b).  
The pervasive impunity has gradually constituted a toxic social climate which 
enables the growing systemic abuse and physical violence aimed at the local 
Palestinian population by the settlers and the army (Munayyer, 2012b, p. 21) to 
progress to the level of terrorising the Palestinians as a form of collective punishment. 
An especially harrowing practice that is gaining ground as a result of the near 
complete impunity is the lethal targeting of Palestinian children in the West Bank and 
Gaza that has resulted in 1,415 deaths since 2000 (DCIP, n.d.-b; DCIP, 2014b; 
Breaking the Silence, n.d.-b, p. 5; Strickland, 2014). The 480 deaths resulting from 
the 2014 operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip are still in the process of 
independent verification (DCIP, n.d.-b). A randomly chosen example shows that a 
child has been killed nearly every week in October 2014 and many were wounded in 
shooting incidents (Palestinian Center for Human Rights [PCHR], 2014). Palestinian 
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communities are subject to continuous terrorizing of this sort and are left without 
protection or recourse to justice, which exacerbates the weight of the occupation and 
adds another dimension to the conflict between Israel and Palestine.  
Israel continues to deepen the disregard for the safety and security of the 
occupied people by transferring some of the policing and security powers to the 
Civilian Security Coordinators (CSCs), the “quasi-military forces” of the Jewish settler 
communities, armed and financed by the Israeli government, thereby legitimizing the 
use of power and force by the settlers and justifying it under the guise of security 
(Hareuveni, 2014). This is an example of the continued relevance of the David versus 
Goliath narrative, which is replicated in the narrative that justifies the arming of the 
‘small Jewish communities’ with the fact that they are surrounded by the Arab enemy 
threatening their existence. The CSCs now have the authority to define security 
threats and although their ability to use weapons is constrained by the law (Hareuveni, 
2014, p. 53) the “culture of impunity” (UNOCHAoPt, 2014a, p. 11) relieves the 
pressure to uphold any set rules. This evolution of the attacks into a quasi-legitimate 
endeavour that protects the attackers attests to the mechanisms of power working 
within the Terrorism Complex to entrench and perpetuate the initial power 
asymmetries.  
 
4.2.3.3 Politicide 
 
Politicide, as a set of intentional Israeli activities aimed at stifling Palestinian 
political agency, was defined in the subchapter 4.2.1.5 and will be examined here in 
more detail. Politicide is a major mechanism of power and it operates at the epicentre 
of the Terrorism Complex. The workings of power within the Terrorism Complex 
sustain the initial power asymmetry of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by utilizing the 
dominant discourse to construct a reality in which a legitimate Palestinian struggle for 
self-determination and reactions to the suffering and injustice inflicted upon the 
Palestinian population are consistently labelled as ‘terrorism’. Israel’s settlement 
project and the objective to amass as much land for the expansion of the Jewish 
population as possible by sustaining a terrorizing military occupation of the 
Palestinian territories have emerged in the course of this chapter as the marginalized 
historical background and socio-political context that constitute the suppressed 
knowledge omitted from the dominant discussions on Palestinian ‘terrorism’ by the 
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mechanisms of power and by the delegitimizing potential of the ‘terrorism’ label itself. 
A selective narrative focused on the decontextualized Palestinian ‘terrorism’ as an 
existential threat to the state of Israel frames the conflict from a position of power and 
presents it to the international community in terms of the Israeli security agenda.  
The success of Israel’s construction of reality, which ensures the legitimacy of 
the status quo and maintains the favourable asymmetries of power, depends on the 
silencing of knowledge about the terror ingrained in the workings of power that 
constitute and perpetuate the status quo. Challenging the legal interpretations of 
international laws, and attempting to significantly alter the laws is another exercise of 
power. Silencing and lawfare complement the systematic denial of the political options 
that would allow Palestinians to challenge the status quo and to peacefully address the 
grave effects of the power asymmetry. The most direct manifestations of politicide can 
be observed in the Israeli practices of detention, targeted killings, and military 
operations against the Palestinian political representatives. Silencing, lawfare, 
exploitation of the political power asymmetry, and direct use of force against 
Palestinian political representatives have been identified as components of politicide 
that leave Palestinians without recourse to meaningful political action. These 
mechanisms of power will be addressed below. 
 
Silencing 
 
The Terrorism Complex operates in conflict situations where the processes 
emanating from the asymmetric distribution of power restrict access to political 
discourse. Foucault (1981, pp. 52-56) refers to such practices as “procedures of 
exclusion”, which are employed to put limitations on what can be said, by whom, and 
under what circumstances. These determine whose discourse is less important, 
insignificant or even irrational, and set the boundary between true and false. These 
external procedures of exclusion blend seamlessly with the reoccurring narratives, 
clusters of discourses, textual rules, principles, and formulas that people at certain 
points in time and space adhere and respond to and which function as internal 
procedures of exclusion (pp. 56-65).  
The dynamic of the “procedures of exclusion” can be observed in the 
replication of the initial asymmetry that exists between Israel as a nation state, 
fostering a stable identity and authoritative discourse through institutionalized effort, 
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and a fragmented identity and agency of a fragmented people. This asymmetry of 
power plays a vital part in the marginalization of the Palestinian discourse (Said, 1988, 
pp. 55-56). The absence of state terror from the study of ‘terrorism’ (Blakeley, 2008, p. 
154), coupled with decontextualization and dehistoricization (Said, 1988, p. 49) are 
features of the power asymmetry. The workings of power and knowledge that 
constitute the Terrorism Complex allow the dominant discourse to purge its 
narratives of the terrorising aspects of the mechanisms of power involved in Israel’s 
policies that maintain the status quo.  
The Palestinian narrative on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict acknowledges 
Israel’s colonial aspirations and suggests that addressing the root causes, such as the 
settlement project, occupation, control, and a long-term sustained effort to prevent a 
political solution through politicide, would alleviate the need for armed resistance 
(PLO NAD, n.d.-a; PLO NAD, n.d.-b; Gold, 2002). This narrative is met with the 
Israeli authoritative counter-narrative (Gold, 2002; IMFA, 2003a), which 
delegitimizes the notion of resistance by stating it has no connection to Israel’s 
presence in the Palestinian territories. Israeli narrative decontextualizes Palestinian 
resistance as anti-Jewish terrorism and erases any relevant historical and socio-
political background in order to portray the Palestinian use of force as the root cause 
of the conflict, and as an obstacle to peace. The application of the ‘terrorism’ label to 
Palestinian resistance is a powerful mechanism of delegitimization, which facilitates 
the marginalization of the Palestinian narrative.  
When the ‘terrorism’ label is applied to individuals, groups or situations it sets 
limits that close off any knowledge, which could challenge the careful selection of facts 
included in the dominant narratives (Jackson, 2012, p. 17). The term ‘terrorism’ is 
imbued with moral condemnation and connotations of irrationality and pathology 
that preclude any alternative explanation in an act of hegemonic closure (Jackson, 
2012, pp. 16-18). Popular resistance is dubbed “popular terrorism” by the Israeli The 
Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2014b); the appeals for 
boycott, divestment and sanctions are denounced as “economic terrorism” by Naftali 
Bennett, the Israeli Minister of the Economy (Benari, 2013); groups and individuals 
abroad calling for the investigation of possible war crimes are, according to the IDF, 
engaged in “legal terror” (Zarchin, 2009), and Palestinian political actions such as 
accession to international treaties are called “diplomatic terror” by Avigdor 
Liberman, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs (JPost.com Staff, 2014a; Keinon, 
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2012). Other examples of the Israeli narratives that use the tern ‘terrorism’ for 
delegitimizing purposes include a ruling party’s Knesset member Miri	  Regev	  referring 
to the hunger strike of the Palestinian prisoners protesting administrative detention 
and abusive treatment as “terrorism in prison”, the Israel Security Service Shin Bet 
listing the victims of Israeli friendly fire as the victims of Palestinian ‘terrorism’, and 
the then Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael Oren likening a critical journalistic 
report to a “strategic terror attack” (Schaeffer Omer-Man, 2014b).  
The last example points to another mechanism employed by the dominant 
discourse to silence critical or dissenting opinions, which is diverting attention from 
the issues raised and focusing on the act of criticism instead. Alain Finkielkraut 
(Malka, et al., 1989, p. 291) made a note of this mechanism in 1982: 
From the moment that Israel’s slightest act is greeted with rage by 
detractors guilty of bad faith, we see an exchange, a subtle dangerous 
dialectic, start to take place between that bad faith and our good 
conscience. Criticisms of Israel are so intolerable that we devote all of 
our time to those criticisms without always thinking about the acts 
that have been committed.  
In the 2014 case of Israel’s intelligence veterans’ dissenting letter to Prime Minister 
Netanyahu, the reactions were in line with Finkielkraut’s observations. After the 
veterans of the elite Unit 8200 voiced their reluctance to engage in the occupation’s 
methods of control that entail indiscriminate gathering of information about the 
Palestinian population and using sensitive bits “for political persecution and to create 
divisions within Palestinian society by recruiting collaborators and driving parts of 
Palestinian society against itself” ("Israeli Intelligence Veterans' Letter to Netanyahu 
and Military Chiefs - In Full," 2014) their action was met with a number of responses 
from top Israeli politicians. The responses left the content of the letter unaddressed 
and diverted the attention from the grave problems presented in the letter to the 
manner in which the criticism was voiced and to the damage to Israel’s image and 
security the act of criticism supposedly caused (Harkov, 2014; Ravid, 2014a; 
Jpost.com Staff, 2014c).  
All criticism of Israel, such as the findings of independent international 
investigations, the humanitarian work of international organizations, and human 
rights concerns voiced by various NGOs or dissenters, is promptly dismissed as the 
baseless rants of fringe groups (e.g., Holland, 2014; Williams, 2014; Ravid, 2014a) or 
as anti-Semitic at best (e.g., Sterman, 2013; Haaretz Service, 2009) and as supporting 
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terrorism at worst (e.g., Ben-Ari, 2013, 2014a; Harkov, 2014).  
The letter from a number of former prominent EU leaders who critically 
evaluated the merits of the peace process and the status quo and expressed concern 
with the progress of the situation was promptly dismissed in an expert opinion of the 
Council on Foreign Relations’ senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Elliot Abrams 
(2013). Abrams (2013) used a combination of mockery and accusations of an anti-
Israel bias to discredit the signatories. A collaborative effort of the academic and 
political fields (e.g., Ganor, 2012,Baker, 2013) is currently underway to definitively 
silence criticism and dissent by criminalizing it. Criticism is cast as “incitement to 
terrorism” (Ganor, 2012, p. 13) and the list of the witting and the unwitting supporters 
of ‘terrorism’ is comprehensive, including “naïve human rights organizations, sponsor 
states, charities /…/, supporters of terrorism, and the well-meaning international 
community” (Ganor, 2012, p. 17). Ganor (2012, p. 18) describes the potential 
perpetrators further: 
For example, the supporters of Hamas in the United States and 
Europe—Palestinians and others—are not being misled by Hamas’s 
propaganda; they know what the organization is, and nevertheless 
either serve as a front for it or otherwise support it in the 
international arena. As for unwitting supporters, they include those 
who may be deemed, rather bluntly, “useful idiots,” supporting an 
organization like Hamas genuinely, not because they support 
terrorism but because they believe the organization has indeed 
earned legitimacy through a legitimate democratic process, as 
described above, and because they believe it is the underdog, the 
“weak” side in the asymmetrical struggle between the state and the 
nonstate [sic] locked in multidimensional warfare. 
The Draft International Convention for the Prevention of Incitement to Terror that 
was presented to the UN (Baker, 2013) includes similar broad definitions of ‘terrorism’ 
that leave a lot of room for interpretation and can cast almost anyone critically 
engaging with the dominant views on ‘terrorism’ as an instigator. The fear of 
persecution is likely to have a silencing effect on public expression of dissenting 
opinions, which serves to consolidate the messages of the dominant discourse. 
“Incitement to commit an act of terror” is defined as  
directly or indirectly calling upon, provoking, urging, instigating, 
encouraging, advocating, or persuading others, whether groups of 
persons, members of the population or the public at large, to initiate, 
organize, participate or engage in an act, or acts of terror against any 
person, group of persons or members of any religious, national or 
ethnic group, where such conduct, whether or not directly 
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advocating terrorist offenses, causes a danger that one or more such 
offenses may be committed (2013, p. 5). 
The success of the push to criminalize criticism hinges on the delegitimization of the 
centres of critical discourse by associating them with ‘terrorism’. NGO Monitor is an 
Israeli organization dedicated to policing and discrediting the non-governmental 
organizations critical of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians.  
Intentions to limit the impact and silence the critical civil society are evident 
from the Israeli legislation that singles out and targets the funding of the leftist NGOs 
by imposing a legal limit on the donations and raising their tax rate (Peace Now, n.d.). 
This systemic attack on the freedom of expression from a position of power was 
described by the Israeli Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein (Lis, 2013) as “a kind of 
punitive measure, which aims to create a ‘chilling effect’ and prevent donations to 
organizations, thus harming free discourse in Israel, which is one of the key 
democratic anchors of the state.” The concern over the criminalization of the 
discussion on ‘terrorism’ is merited considering the silencing effect it can have on the 
critical challenges to the status quo, on a constructive public debate on ‘terrorism’, 
and on the critiques of the unchecked exercise of power. 
 
Lawfare 
 
An important part of politicide is the power to change the rules of the conflict 
so that the claims of legitimacy of Israel’s approaches towards the Palestinians 
transition from a powerful discursive exercise to the rule of law. This move in which 
“the narrative seeks to determine the normative” (Ben-Naftali & Michael, 2003, p. 
237) might be one of the most damaging mechanisms of power as it undermines the 
progress humanity has made in terms of international institutions, the laws of war, 
and international law in general (Diakonia, 2014, pp. 5-6). Israel uses its considerable 
power as a nation state with international backing for path-breaking advances in 
making the centres of power less accountable for their actions. Israel invokes the 
complicity of other states in human rights violations committed in military operations 
across the globe to coax its powerful allies into adopting a looser attitude towards 
supporting war crimes investigations, while at the same time making a sustained legal 
effort to remove certain policies from the realm of criminal liability altogether (e.g., 
Kasher, 2010). The changing of rules in order to legalize dubious state policies such as 
	   149	  
targeted killings was already addressed from the academic perspective. The 
mechanisms of power involved in the legalizations of targeted killings as a matter of 
policy will now be illuminated in relation to the political field.  
When Israel started publicly admitting targeted killings as a state policy (Ben-
Naftali & Michael, 2003, p. 240) a narrative based on the terrorism/security nexus 
consistently applied in Israeli discourse had a legitimizing and a normalizing function. 
The pejorative, delegitimizing, even demonizing connotations (Jackson, 2011b, p. 
101; 2005b, p. 59) of the term ‘terrorism’, especially in the post 9/11 era of “new 
terrorism” (Crenshaw, 2011, pp. 63-64) were repeatedly communicated through 
various authoritative channels of the dominant political discourse36. The narratives 
constructed in this manner greatly facilitated the justification of policies involving 
extreme measures on the grounds of urgency and relentlessness that dealing with 
‘terrorism’ supposedly demands (Crenshaw, 1995a, p. 11; Feldman & Blau, 2009).  
In a matter of years Israel managed to substitute a reality in which 
‘extrajudicial assassinations’ were perceived as an unacceptable clandestine tactic and 
the states categorically denied all association with the use of such measures (Ben-
Naftali & Michael, 2003, p. 240), with a reality in which “targeted preemptive [sic] 
killings” (p. 235) are a generally unquestioned mainstream policy (p. 240), adopted by 
other states (UNHRC, 2010), and even lauded as exceptional achievements, as was 
the case with the execution of Osama bin Laden (Phillips, 2011). The process of 
normalization was described in a candid Haaretz piece (Feldman & Blau, 2009) in 
which Colonel (res.) Daniel Reisner, a former head of IDF’s International Law 
Division (ILD) and other senior ILD figures revealed the internal processes behind the 
“revision of international law” which mainly involve persistence and solidifying weak 
arguments by working the term ‘terrorism’ into the reasoning.  
According to Reisner “[i]f you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. 
The whole of international law is now based on the notion that an act that is 
forbidden today becomes permissible if executed by enough countries” (Feldman & 
Blau, 2009). Targeted killings, though they might have become permissible, are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 There is a continuity in the imagery that establishes the existential threat from the then Israeli Prime 
minister, David Ben-Gurion (1956), pre-Sinai Campaign speaking of “[m]urderous gangs” that “cross 
our borders, sometimes penetrating quite deep into Israel, and killing innocent civilians as they work in 
the fields, women and children in their homes, and anyone who crosses their path”, to Benjamin 
Netanyahu (2014a), the Prime Minister in office during the Operation Protective Edge, saying “[t]hat's 
the first thing [the terrorists] do, they target civilians. Then they dig terror tunnels into our territory so 
they can send death squads to kill our children, our citizens, and kidnap our people”. 
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properly regulated and lack the transparency and accountability that serve as 
safeguards against the abuse of power (UNHRC, 2010, pp. 26-29). The 
mainstreaming and legalising of targeted assassinations is a part of a larger Israeli 
lawfare battle to rewrite the rules on fighting ‘terrorism’ (e.g., INSCT, n.d.; Yadlin, 
2004). The aim is to allow states to exercise maximum power while being bound by a 
minimum number of international law provisions. The following examples illustrate 
how efforts to dismiss Israel’s obligations as an occupying power have been coupled 
with efforts to loosen the rules regarding the use of force when it comes to Israel’s 
approach to the Palestinians. In April 2001 Israel made a case for an unprecedented 
transition from law enforcement to armed confrontation, which represented a nascent 
idea of a ‘war on terror’ (Feldman & Blau, 2009). In Reisner’s words “[i]t took four 
months and four planes to change the opinion of the United States” that had 
previously rejected such an idea (Feldman & Blau, 2009).  
With the transformation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict into armed conflict 
the laws of war became relevant. The distinction between law enforcement and armed 
confrontation implies differences in the principles of necessity, proportionality, and 
precaution (Gaggioli, 2013, pp. 8-9). Under the law enforcement paradigm the least 
amount of force can be used exceptionally as the last possible resort (p. 8). Every 
precaution must be taken to protect the lives of individuals not involved in the 
hostilities, the lives of individuals involved in the hostilities that are not posing an 
imminent threat, and to civilian infrastructure (pp. 8-9). In armed confrontation the 
use of force is presumed which means that combatants and individuals taking part in 
the hostilities are legitimate targets (p. 8). While civilians and civilian infrastructure are 
protected from direct attacks and must be taken into consideration at all times, they 
may come to harm if the expected military advantage of an attack on a legitimate 
target is deemed important enough to justify collateral damage (pp. 8-9). With the 
changed status of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict Israel’s accountability for the manner 
in which it uses force in its military operations against the Palestinians diminished. 
Except for the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) that oblige Israel 
to protect civilians in the oPt and enable them to lead normal lives. 
 Israel’s pre-existing obligations as an internationally recognized occupying 
power (Paulus & Vashakmadze, 2009, p. 113) can be regarded as incompatible with 
the transition from law enforcement to armed confrontation (Erakat, 2014). 
Problems of applicability may arise when the occupying state takes 
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military action against non-state opponents as part of the existing 
armed conflict (occupation) – in which case there is an ‘armed 
conflict within an armed conflict’. Should the rules of international 
armed conflict apply? Or the rules governing non-international 
armed conflict – that is, between a state and a non-state entity? Or 
both? (Paulus & Vashakmadze, 2009, p. 113) 
Since “[t]here is no agreed legal definition of a Non-International Armed Conflict 
within International Humanitarian Law” (Breau, et al., 2011, p. 4), the following 
examples show how Israel applies its power in order to manipulate the legal 
controversies to its advantage. The workings of the Terrorism Complex are signalled 
by the use of the ‘terrorism’ label for the purpose of constructing an exceptional 
situation, which allows for differential treatment.  
Centres of power in the political field have been working with centres of power 
in the academic field on lessening Israel’s legal accountability and responsibility, 
arguing that under the current set of rules ‘terrorism’ has an unfair advantage in 
respect to states’ ability to defend themselves (e.g., Samson, 2012, p. 200; Berkowitz, 
2012, pp. viii, 83-87). Since the Oslo Accords and the semi-autonomous position of 
the Palestinian Authority (Hajjar, 2014) Israel has stepped up the discursive campaign 
to detach itself from the status of the occupying power (e.g.,Gold, 2002) and has come 
to refer to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the “disputed territories” (IMFA, 
2003a). This move, even though at odds with its status as an occupying power, is 
making full use of the lack of effective international pressure that could make a 
powerful nation state with powerful allies conform to the international law without its 
full consent (Erakat). The implications are grave for the Palestinian population living 
in the oPt whose status of protected persons is effectively eroded and in practice 
substituted with a new status of an “enemy entity” (Hajjar, 2014). Israel is edging 
towards the legalization of its neglect of the responsibility for the Palestinian civilians 
while legitimizing its incursions into the oPt by establishing self-defence against an 
enemy entity as a just cause for its military incursions.  
The fiercest battles between the legal interpretations of the international law 
regarding Israel’s status as an occupying power are currently waged over the Gaza 
Strip (Heller, 2012). Israel’s stated goal of the 2005 disengagement from the Strip was 
to “to dispel claims regarding Israel’s responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip” (IMFA, 2004a). Hamas’ designation as a terrorist organization, its takeover of 
power in the Strip in 2007, and sporadic rocket fire into Israeli territory, which 
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enabled Israel to designate Gaza a “hostile territory” (Hajjar, 2014), have supposedly 
changed the situation enough to merit the re-evaluation of the occupation status. 
Claims that Gaza is still de facto occupied through Israeli effective control of its 
borders, including airspace and maritime borders, and through the restrictions placed 
on the movement of people and goods, while being subject to random Israeli 
incursions and regular surveillance (Li, 2006) are countered by claims that these 
measures are legitimate security features in the context of an armed conflict and do 
not constitute an occupation, which also waives Israel’s responsibilities as an 
occupying power towards the Palestinian population (Sharvit-Baruch, 2012).  
Israel’s approach to the principle of distinction between combatants and non-
combatants is to move the status of Israeli combatants towards the non-combatant 
status while conflating the two categories when it comes to the Palestinians (e.g., 
Kasher, 2010). Palestinian combatants are labelled as ‘terrorists’, Palestinian civilians 
are labelled as “terrorists’ neighbors [sic]”, and Palestinian children are presented as 
possible ‘terrorists’ [sic] (Kasher, 2010; see also Crane & Reisner, 2011, pp. 67-84; for 
the concept of ‘child terrorists’ see Khen, 2011, pp. 135-149; IMFA, 2003b). In 
contrast, this emerging construct of reality diverts attention from the combatant status 
of Israeli soldiers by referring to them as “citizen[s] in uniform” (Kasher, 2010). Such 
interpretation of the principle of distinction seems to be aimed at avoiding accusations 
of excessive collateral damage of Israel’s military operations that has been observed to 
fit the definition of collective punishment (UNHRC, 2009, p. 416). According to the 
Israeli narrative, the exceptional circumstances of fighting ‘terrorism’, where there is 
an “asymmetry in the values of the two societies” (Yadlin, 2004), supposedly bring 
about a situation where soldiers’ lives must not be endangered whilst protecting the 
persons who are “warned neighbors [sic] of an enemy or terrorist” (Kasher, 2010). 
According to Kasher (2010), this “mixture of terrorists and non-combatants” is not 
Israel’s moral responsibility.  
Considering that these views on the principle of distinction are expressed by Professor 
Asa Kasher, and Major General Amos Yadlin, the authors of the IDF Code of Ethics 
(Shalem College, n.d.; Yadlin, 2004), the practice that values the lives of Israeli 
soldiers above the lives of Palestinian civilians is likely to continue and is expected to 
be legitimized through discourse until the rules of engaging with ‘terrorism’ are 
permanently changed (Harel, 2009). Similar degradation of protection from the 
crimes of war is underway regarding the understanding of proportionality. The 
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military advantage of pre-emptive attacks against the Palestinians, even those 
expected to incur collateral damage, is determined on the basis of intelligence 
assessments regarding the potential threats, before any actual hostilities take place 
(Kasher, 2010; Yadlin, 2004).  
In the international realm where states still represent the “ultimate source of 
political power” (Morris, 2004, p. 198) the International Criminal Court (ICC) has the 
potential to restrain the states from unbridled use of destructive illegal policies and 
methods by placing state leaders in the position of accountability (Bosco, 2014, p. 1). 
At the same time the ICC has to navigate between its mandate and the pressures from 
the centres of power. Much like other international institutions, the ICC depends on 
the states willingly accepting its jurisdiction and suspending part of their power for the 
greater good (Bosco, 2014, pp. 182-188).  
Israel is not a member of the ICC, nor is its most powerful ally, the United 
States, which does not stop them both from exercising considerable power in order to 
prevent ICC’s investigation of war crimes committed by any side in the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict (Bosco, 2014, pp. 161-165; Borger, 2014). While the Palestinian 
factions, including Hamas, have stated their willingness to expose themselves to the 
investigation (Hearst, 2014), Israel has not, which is possibly the only political leverage 
Palestinians have in the conflict (Haaretz, 2014b; Kontorovich, 2014, pp. 80-81). 
Diplomatic efforts including the diplomatic backchannels (Bosco, 2014, pp. 161-162) 
imply that Israel seems to perceive a possible ICC investigation as a threat 
(Kontorovich, 2014, p. 79). Consistent pressure was put on Abbas and the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) not to pursue the ICC option (Nice & de Silva, 2014). A brief insight 
into such pressures was provided in the Baroness Warsi’s resignation letter from the 
United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Office (Holehouse, 2014) over the Operation 
Protective Edge where she wrote:  
As the minister for the International Criminal Court, I’ve spent the 
last two and a half years helping to promote, support and fund the 
ICC. I felt I could not reconcile this with our continued pressure on 
the Palestinian leadership not to turn to the ICC to seek justice. 
Similarly the account of Israel setting the UK straight by teaching “both 
Labour and Conservative leaders” about the “high costs of maintaining the system of 
‘private prosecution’ in universal jurisdiction proceedings” after UK’s attempt to 
exercise universal jurisdiction that nearly got Tzipi Livni accused of war crimes for 
her role in operation Cast Lead (Ben-Ari, 2014b) signals a network of power-plays 
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surrounding the accountability to the law.  
In spite of the diplomatic pressures, the Palestinian Authority acceded to the 
Rome Statute on 7 January 2015 (ICC, 2015), and “the ICC treaty officially went into 
effect for Palestine on April 1, 2015” (HRW, 2015). As the Palestinian case against 
Israel is being built in the ICC, the threat of further economic and political pressures 
on the PA and the ICC remains a factor in the process (Frykberg, 2015; Hatuqa, 
2015).The narratives revealing the workings of power relating to the ICC offer some 
of the best examples featuring the joint efforts of the political centres of power to 
maintain the status quo and the asymmetry of power it supports.  
 
Political Strangulation and the Preference for the Use of Force 
 
Analysis thus far has shown that Israel has come to rely on armed Palestinian 
resistance since invoking ‘terrorism’ serves to legitimize policies and practices that 
maintain Israel’s status quo in respect to the Palestinians. In the words of the former 
UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process Alvaro de Soto, “Israeli 
policies, whether this is intended or not, seem frequently perversely designed to 
encourage the continued action by Palestinian militants” (de Soto, 2007, para. 75). 
Narratives that support this conclusion cover two thematic clusters. The first cluster 
suggests that Palestinians turn to force mainly in response to Israeli actions and the 
second cluster explores Israel’s reactions to Palestinian non-violent struggle and 
political engagement.  
An illustrative and authoritative example from the first cluster of narratives is a 
study (Haushofer, et al., 2010) that used econometric techniques to “test the degree to 
which violence on each side occurs in response to aggression by the other side” (p. 
17927) and found that “a significant proportion of Palestinian violence occurs in 
response to Israeli behaviour” (p. 17927). IMEU’s fact sheet Self-Defense or Provocation: 
Israel’s History of Breaking Ceasefires (2012c) offers similar conclusions and presents 
“military advantage, for territorial aggrandizement, or to provoke their opponents 
into carrying out acts of violence that Israel can then exploit politically and/or use to 
justify military operations already planned” as possible reasons for Israel’s proactive 
role in eliciting a violent response from the Palestinians. Yousef Munayyer (2012a) of 
the ‘Permission to Narrate’ blog confronts Avital Leibovich, the IDF Spokesperson, 
when she attempts to frame the narrative in terms of Israel’s self-defence. Munayyer 
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(2012a) presents data that discredit her narrative. IMEU’s factsheet and Munayer’s 
data refer exclusively to armed violence and do not include the extensive systemic 
violence built into the mechanisms of power that sustain the occupation and the status 
quo in the oPt.  
Narratives on the dynamics of the political process in the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict are more diverse. Reports (Addameer, n.d.-c; B'Tselem, 2011d) show that 
Israel has the power to place in detention as many members of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) as needed to keep “the PLC from reconvening” (Addameer, 
n.d.-c). Human Sciences Research Council’s (HSRC) comprehensive study on Israel’s 
practices in the oPt notes that Palestinian political leaders are “subject to arrest and 
detention because of their political views and membership of political parties” and 
connects the policy of extrajudicial executions to “an institutionalised system designed 
to eliminate dissent or resistance to the regime in order to maintain domination by 
one racial group over another” (Tilley, et al., 2009, p. 177). This policy signals a 
continuity with the historical practice of active elimination of the Palestinian 
leadership (see Pappé, 2006a, pp. 10-15).   
The peace process has until recently been a central feature of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict in the international realm. The round of negotiations initiated by 
the US Secretary of State John Kerry in August 2013 that failed in April 2014 
prompted a retrospective. A closer and more critical look suggests that decades of 
peace talks have, intentionally or not, been a mechanism of subjugation and control 
that has enabled Israel to maintain the status quo geared towards the creation of the 
‘facts on the ground’, which include the exponential increase of the Jewish settler 
population in the oPt and the progressive constriction of Palestinian rights and lands 
(Khalidi, 2014, pp. 40-42).  
Leaked reports (e.g., de Soto, 2007) and candid statements under the condition 
of anonymity (see Barnea, 2014; Birnbaum & Tibon, 2014) offer an inside look into 
the dynamics of power, which signal that Israeli–Palestinian peace talks are a 
constitutive part of the Terrorism Complex. Confidential sources (in Barnea, 2014; 
Birnbaum & Tibon, 2014) reveal American liaisons with Israel on the important issues 
in order to appease Israeli concerns without the same preferential treatment being 
extended to the Palestinians. They agree that it was Israel’s unwillingness to discuss 
borders and the intransigence of the Israeli positions on the settlement project that 
effectively ended the talks (Birnbaum & Tibon, 2014). American officials spoke of 
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Palestinian willingness to compromise and make concessions and of the Israeli 
preconditions and actions that eventually broke that will (Barnea, 2014). Both 
Barnea’s (Barnea) and Birnbaum’s (Birnbaum & Tibon) sources mention Israel’s 
unwillingness to discuss borders, to agree to specific time frames, or to relinquish 
control over the oPt. This corresponds with the objectives of the Israeli territorial 
expansion that the status quo of the deadlocked negotiations enables. Netanyahu 
publicly revealed Israel’s expectations that the ‘facts on the ground’ created in the 
shadow of the protracted peace process and illegal under international law factor into 
the negotiations (Netanyahu, 2011b). Netanyahu’s demand received a standing 
ovation in the American Congress (Netanyahu, 2011a), which is a reaction that 
illustrates the extent of Israeli power and control over the situation. Israel’s dominant 
position in the asymmetry of power marking the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is 
facilitated by the reluctance of other powerful actors in the international realm to 
counter Israel’s claims (de Soto, 2007, paras. 132, 134, 140).  
UN Middle East envoy Alvaro de Soto’s leaked End of Mission Report (de 
Soto, 2007) is a rare assortment of information that is not covered in the discursive 
fog. Instead it reveals the workings of power that are shaping the conflict and it does 
so in an unusually direct manner, which at certain points indicates de Soto’s personal 
frustration with the intentional mismanagement of the conflict by the dominant 
centres of power (paras. 4, 92, 98, 118, 121). De Soto points out Israel’s unhindered 
‘creation of facts on the ground’ accompanied by a “multitude of diversions and 
excuses” (para. 140) as a present and ever worsening obstacle to the possibility of a 
future Palestinian state (paras. 44, 59, 131). Throughout the report he juxtaposes 
Israel’s unrestrained actions with the restrictions, demands, expectations and 
preconditions imposed on the Palestinian representatives. An inside look into the 
events surrounding the three major political events in the recent history of the conflict 
– the 2005 Gaza disengagement (paras. 8-22), the 2006 Sharon’s exit from the 
political scene (paras. 23-29) and the 2006 Palestinian elections (paras. 30-40) exposes 
the role of Israel and the high political echelons of its Western allies in the Palestinian 
internal political fragmentation and in the restriction of the practical political solutions 
(paras. 55-58).  
Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza was constructed and presented as 
a demonstration of Israel’s commitment to peace that Israel traded in for major 
political concessions in the peace talks, such as the US assurances regarding the 
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settlement blocks, and the stand against the Palestinian right of return (paras. 8, 16). 
However, outside of the scope of peace talks, the disengagement did little to change 
the nature of Israel’s approach to Gaza (Pappé, 2005, pp. 1-4). Israel maintained 
control over Gaza’s borders, which turned Gaza into an “open-air prison” and 
diminished its chances of economic development (de Soto, 2007, para. 21). The 
situation in Gaza worsened after Sharon’s sudden illness left his party weakened by his 
absence and his successor Olmert had to take a decisive stand against Hamas’ victory 
in the 2006 Palestinian elections in order not to appear weak (paras. 24, 25). 
‘Terrorism’ discourse was employed by Israel to persuade the international 
community to denounced the results of the democratic elections, exact pressure on the 
Palestinian political representatives and divide them internally by backing Fatah as the 
loosing party (paras. 35, 40-42). The political intervention, the clampdown on 
borders, movement, and communications, economic standstill, and a humanitarian 
crisis led to exchanges of force between Gaza and Israel that, due to their asymmetric 
distribution of power, exacerbated the severity of the situation in Gaza (para. 25). The 
dominant narrative omits Israel’s continued exercise of power over Gaza and presents 
the resulting dismal economic and security situation as a cautionary tale of what 
happens after the occupation ends (para. 22).  
De Soto is critical of the efforts to discredit the Palestinian exercise of political 
will in democratic elections (paras 41-51, 77), and of the application of the ‘terrorist’ 
label to Hamas as a means to prevent political dialogue, especially in light of the 
potential that engaging with Hamas would have in terms of its de-radicalization (paras 
30-33, 44). He (para 91) acknowledges that the lack of will to maintain the difference 
between “freedom or resistance fighters and terrorists” has closed off potentially useful 
diplomatic options for peace.  
Hamas’ designation as a ‘terrorist’ organization and not as a political party has 
a significant impact on the manner in which the Palestinian resistance is portrayed, 
perceived and addressed. A “struggle for liberation from colonial and foreign 
domination and alien subjugation by all available means, including armed struggle” is 
the right of the Palestinian people in their pursuit of self-determination according to 
the UN Resolution 3246 (XXIX) (1974). Even though Hamas has made progress in 
terms of adopting the democratic political processes (Rudolph, 2008, pp. 81-96), such 
as participating in democratic elections (de Soto, 2007, para 33), governing, 
administering, and policing the Gaza Strip (Zitun, 2012), taking the armed struggle 
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away from ‘terrorist’ methods (Siegman, 2009; Mish'al, 2007), abiding by ceasefires 
(Thrall, 2014a) and making public statements proclaiming its willingness to make 
concessions in order to achieve a political solution (Hass, 2008; McCarthy, 2008a; 
Ravid & Haaretz Correspondent, 2008), Israel’s official dominant discourse insists on 
the continued application of the ‘terrorist’ label and has reduced the description of the 
organization to a handful of sound bites that rely on the term ‘terrorism’ to strip away 
all history, context and politics.  
In the context of the 2008/2009 operation Cast Lead Israeli leaders relied on 
demonizing Hamas by establishing a distinction between what the then Prime 
Minister Olmert called Israel’s “supreme values” and what the then Foreign Affairs 
Minister Livni identified as Hamas’ detachment from the shared values of the 
international community (IMFA, 2009). Other attempts to dehumanize Hamas 
feature the official Israeli narrative that graphically describes the distinction between 
Hamas’ tactics, which supposedly include mounting bombs on Palestinian children 
while targeting Israeli children, and Israel’s defensive tactics, which are supposedly 
oriented towards avoiding civilian casualties (IMFA, 2009). This Israeli official 
narrative is constructed in a manner that shifts the responsibility for the victims on 
both sides on Hamas (IMFA, 2009).  
The demonization and the delegitimization attached to the use of the term 
‘terrorism’ facilitate the justification of a set of questionable ‘counter-terrorist’ 
practices such as the extrajudicial executions of Hamas’ members. One of the recent 
examples of this counterterrorism practice was the extrajudicial killing of Hamas’ 
military wing commanders. One was allegedly involved in a kidnapping of a soldier, 
tunnel construction and arming the resistance; one allegedly had a history of attacks 
against the IDF soldiers and was accused of directing the Hamas forces that infiltrated 
Israel and attacked Israeli soldiers during Israel’s 2014 incursion into Gaza; and one 
was allegedly raising funds and smuggling weapons to ‘terrorists’ (IDF Blog, 2014b). 
All of them were supposedly planning attacks that killed Israeli civilians but the only 
detailed accusations were the ones that described their engagement with the IDF (IDF 
Blog, 2014b), which is, as an invading and occupying armed force, a legitimate target 
under the international humanitarian law (Gaggioli, 2013, p. iii; ICRC Additional 
Protocol I, 1977).. 
The main difference between the IDF commanders that ordered the 
extrajudicial executions, now considered a legitimate counterterrorism measure, and 
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the Hamas commanders that were killed is not an existence of a supreme claim to a 
higher morality regarding the use of force, but stems from the foundational 
asymmetry between armed forces of a powerful nation state and armed forces still 
fighting for a state. Ultimately, in most cases, “a terrorist is somebody with a bomb 
but not an air force” (Booth, 2008, p. 73), or in the case of Hamas in Gaza, somebody 
with crude rockets but not an air force. The primacy of the nation state in the 
international realm is the unquestioned foundation, which enables it to “assume the 
role as the only legitimate site that can be violent” (Campos II, 2007, p. 85), in which 
it is unhindered by the burden of proof (UNHRC , 2010, p. 26). This asymmetry of 
power is what enables Israel to label Palestinian resistance to the belligerent 
occupation and their struggle for self-determination as ‘terrorism’ and to deal with it 
accordingly, without having to address the political context that elicits the exchange of 
force.  
The connection between the lack of political will in Israel to resolve the conflict 
and the time needed for Israel’s settlement project aimed at the expansion of Israel’s 
borders into the oPt asserts itself after considering the available subjugated knowledge 
presented above. In addition to the territorial expansion the prolonged status quo 
provides benefits related to the preference for the use of military power instead of 
diplomacy. Israel’s insistence on referring to the Gaza Strip as a hostile entity and to 
Hamas as the ‘terrorist’ organization facilitates the invocations of security concerns 
and the related right to self-defence that are used to legitimize the sporadic military 
incursions into the Gaza Strip where Israel is free to use its full military force in order 
to defend itself from the existential threat that these entities are said to represent. The 
disproportionate use of force during such operations in terms of damage to civilian 
infrastructure has been investigated and the fact-finding mission report on Operation 
Cast Lead found that it was “a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, 
humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic 
capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing 
sense of dependency and vulnerability” (UNHRC, 2009, p. 525). Recently an 
unnamed EU official spoke out and linked the wanton destruction of Gaza to the 
monetary benefits Israel stands to gain from what appears to be a deliberate policy of 
complicating the entry of rebuilding materials other than those coming from Israeli 
suppliers into the Gaza Strip (EurActiv, 2014).  
The lethal ‘wars’ in Gaza are not the only instances of the excessive use of 
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force in order to avoid political engagement in the conflict. The manner in which 
Israel addresses popular non-violent protest is another example of Israel’s actions that 
reveal a pattern of systematic restriction of non-violent political engagement, which 
suggests the use of force against the Palestinians to be the preferred choice of action. 
Military order 101 has been in effect since the early days of the occupation and it 
criminalizes civic activities including: organizing and participating in 
protests; taking part in assemblies or vigils; waving flags and other 
political symbols; printing and distributing political material. In 
addition, the order deems any acts of influencing public opinion as 
prohibited “political incitement”. Under the heading “support to a 
hostile organization”, the order further prohibits any activity that 
demonstrates sympathy for an organization deemed illegal under 
military orders, be it chanting slogans or waving a flag or other 
political symbols (Addameer, n.d.-b). 
The village of al-Nabi Saleh serves as an illustration of Israel’s methods aimed 
at supressing the grassroots protests against the Israeli policies of illegal land 
appropriation in the oPt (Tabar & Bari, 2011, p. 25). In addition to the use of 
administrative means, such as issuing “military orders to declare the village a closed 
military zone” (p. 11) Al-Haq’s case study details Israel sanctioning excessive use of 
force that causes serious bodily harm, and even death (pp. 11-14, 30-31), targeting of 
homes causing damage to the property and to the mental well-being of the residents 
(pp. 15-19), collective punishment of the villagers by dousing the homes in a pungent 
substance known as ‘skunk’ (pp. 15, 18-19; Who Profits, 2014) and performing 
disruptive military actions such as “arbitrary arrests, beatings and night raids” (Tabar 
& Bari, 2011, pp. 20-22).  
A testimony of an Israeli soldier documented by the organization Breaking the 
Silence (Annoymous, 2011) corroborates Al-Haq’s report from the perspective of an 
Israeli soldier, and New York Times feature presents the story of al-Nabi Saleh from 
the Palestinian viewpoint (Ehrenreich, 2013). The use of crowd control weapons, such 
as tear gas, a high power steerable acoustic beam “the Scream”, and already 
mentioned skunk, against the Palestinian protesters is often experimental and 
dangerous, even lethal, but ultimately enables the marketing of these weapons as 
‘proven effective’, causing many Israeli and international companies to profit from the 
repressive policies of the occupation (Who Profits, 2014, pp. 11-34). The narrative of 
al-Nabi Saleh is supported by the similar narratives from other West Bank villages 
engaged in regular non-violent protests, such as Budrus (Bacha, 2010), Bi’ilin (Khatib, 
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2010), Ni’ilin (McCarthy, 2008b), Wadi Fukin (Lynn, 2014) and Sheikh Jarrah (Bacha 
& Wingert-Jabi, 2012). Together they form a persuasive narrative of deep systemic 
repression that breeds ‘popular resistance’, which is in turn violently supressed as 
‘popular terrorism’.  
The liberal application of the term ‘terrorism’ to an array of Palestinian 
actions prompts an engagement with the narratives that refer to the extent of the 
‘terrorist threat’. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) lists 1,258 people as Israeli 
victims of Palestinian violence and terrorism since September 2000, a period which 
includes the years of violence during the Palestinian Second Intifada. Soldiers on 
active duty are included in the count. As a comparison in the same time period 1,415 
Palestinian children alone have been killed “as a result of Israeli military and settler 
presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (DCIP, n.d.-b). The number does not 
yet include the 535 children killed during the 2014 summer Operation Protective 
Edge (DCIP, 2015, p. 1).  
Israeli accounts (e.g., IMFA, 2015; IDF Blog, 2014c) on the Palestinian 
fatalities are constructed in the opposite manner. ‘Terrorism’ label is used to minimize 
the number of civilian casualties. For example, Israel claims that only 36 per cent of 
the 2,125 Palestinian fatalities of its 2014 Operation Protective Edge were uninvolved 
civilians (IMFA, 2015, p. A10). Other organizations report a higher death toll, 
between 2,131 (UNOCHA, 2014d) and 2,191 (PCHR, 2014) Palestinian fatalities, 
and put the percentage of civilian victims between 69.1 (UNOCHA, 2014d) and 76.8 
(Al Mezan, 2014). Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015, pp. A4-A7) justifies its 
assessment by claiming that intentional representation of combatants as civilians is a 
‘terrorist’ tactic for misrepresenting loses sustained, and for discrediting Israel. The 
IDF’s report ‘Operation Protective Edge by the Numbers’ (IDF Blog, 2014c) avoids 
mentioning civilian death toll altogether and diverts attention to the threats posed to 
Israel and focuses on the military objectives carried out. By stating that civilians and 
civilian infrastructure were abused “for terrorist purposes” (IDF Blog, 2014c) the IDF 
shifts responsibility for the damage incurred on Hamas.  
The ‘terrorist’ attacks perpetrated by the Palestinians in recent years involved 
rock throwing and Molotov cocktails, mostly during the clashes with the Israeli armed 
forces or aimed at the Israeli armed forces, contributing to the high number of 
‘terrorist’ incidents (Meir Amit, 2014a, pp. 1-2, 8-9, 20, 26-35). In 2013 out of the 
1,271 ‘terrorist’ attacks 858 were attacks involving the throwing of Molotov cocktails, 
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mostly in the clashes with the Israeli armed forces during the “weekly riots” in villages 
where “popular terrorism” was organized to protest the ‘security fence’ (pp. 9, 20, 26). 
In 2013 terrorist attacks in the West Bank and within Israel claimed the lives of five 
Israelis – three IDF soldiers and two civilians (pp. 2, 7). Even though the report 
establishes that the settlement project37 and the mechanisms of the occupation such as 
the ‘security fence’, roadblocks, checkpoints and the infrastructure that supports 
Israeli military presence are the friction points for the violence, no causal connection 
is made (pp. 9-10). Palestinian ‘terrorism’ is identified as the problem and not the 
symptom. The use of force in the form of counter-terrorism is preferred to the political 
engagement that would address the root causes.  
 
The need to conceptualize the use of force labelled as ‘terrorism’ as a wider 
phenomenon – the Terrorism Complex – evolved from comparing the exalted political 
proclamations about the protection of political values and ideals from the scourge of 
‘terrorism with the non-discursive reality of particular socio-political conditions and 
‘counter-terrorism’ policies. The disparity between what is said and what is done in the 
political field draws attention to the consequences of dominant narrow ‘terrorism’ 
narrative, which manifest in an exacerbated power asymmetry, hindered diplomatic 
efforts, deepened frustrations, and in the instigation of a violent response from the 
weaker party to the conflict. The power to frame the narrative that lies in the ability to 
assert particular selections of facts, allows the dominant political discourse to present 
this use of force as the starting point of the conflict and as casus belli for the retaliatory 
practices in the form of ‘counter-terrorism’. Indiscriminate tactics used by the parties 
involved in the spiralling violent asymmetric conflicts attest to the extent of the 
desensitization to humanity as the asymmetric power struggle continues through the 
legitimizing discourses surrounding the loss of human life and other questionable 
political decisions. The way in which the workings of power impact the interaction 
between the political discourses and the media in order to consolidate and disseminate 
particular constructs of reality will be explored in the last chapter.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Referred to as the “Jewish sites and regions near the Jewish villages” in the report (Meir Amit, 2014a, 
p. 9). 
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4.3 BEYOND THE ASYMMETRIES 
 
Information gained by exploring alternative narratives in the search for 
subjugated knowledge directed my attention away from the counter-productive 
counterterrorism and towards an entirely different approach to the resolution of 
protracted conflicts. The large number of grassroots initiatives, projects and 
organizations run by Israelis and Palestinians who are working tirelessly to counteract 
the damaging policies practiced by the centres of power suggests there is potential for 
peace and a possibility to develop this grassroots and people-to-people sector into a 
firm foundation on which to build a shared future. The work of these non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), movements and initiatives is based on 
addressing the underlying issues that are woven into the wider historical and social 
contexts.  
I have noted three loose categories of grassroots operations. The first group 
works on recognizing that there is a problem with the status quo, on acknowledging 
the injustice, and raising awareness by challenging the dominant narratives. The 
second group is actively involved in addressing the injustice and bringing about 
change. The third group is establishing contact and building trust between the people 
on the opposite sides of the divide thus challenging the terror instilled into both 
peoples. Some organizations and projects fit more than one category and all together 
they fight the lack of basic respect and trust that comes from being consistently 
exposed to incitement and indoctrination, which set clear limits between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ and dehumanize the face of the other in the name of security through labels 
such as ‘the enemy’ or ‘the terrorist’. Only after these damaging divides between the 
two peoples will be somewhat bridged the work on the root causes of the conflict will 
be able to begin in earnest. For that to even begin to happen these grassroots 
initiatives should be given a voice. Only the most notable examples will be mentioned 
at this point but the topic lends itself as a worthwhile subject for further research.  
 
Challenge to the Dominant Narratives 
 
The work of Zochrot (n.d., [Who we are]) acknowledges some of the initial 
historical injustice that underlies the conflict to the present day. Zochrot counters the 
efforts to erase ‘remembering’ of the past from the position that disturbs the dominant 
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narratives. Zochrot insists on remembering the Nakba and drawing parallels to the 
surviving “colonial concepts and practices” (Zochrot, n.d., [Who we are]).  
B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights (n.d.-a, [About 
B’Tselem]) in the Occupied Territories “endeavors [sic] to document and educate the 
Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in the Occupied 
Territories, combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among the Israeli public, 
and help create a human rights culture in Israel”. The in-depth reports and 
background information provide the wider context imperative for the understanding 
of the conflict. B’Tselem’s Camera Project is an exemplary project that is empowering 
the Palestinians by giving them a voice and the means to disturb the impunity of 
human rights violations (B'Tselem, n.d.-d). 
Breaking the Silence (n.d.-a, [About Us: Organization]) is “an organization of 
veteran combatants who have served in the Israeli military since the start of the 
Second Intifada and have taken it upon themselves to expose the Israeli public to the 
reality of everyday life in the Occupied Territories”. Their work exposes the moral 
issues involved in maintaining the status quo, encourages introspection and forms a 
sense of community for the individuals in the army who have doubts about the 
manner in which the army operates in respect to the Palestinians.  
Coalition of Women for Peace (CWP) (n.d., [About]) educates on the 
importance of ending the occupation and supports the Palestinian refugees’ right of 
return and the exercise of universal jurisdiction. It offers support for the Israeli branch 
of Women in Black, an international movement of women taking a stand for peace, 
holding regular vigils in public places and calling attention to the need to end the 
occupation. CWP’s sister organization Who Profits (n.d., [About]) researches the 
complicity of Israeli and international companies in maintaining the occupation.  
Combatants for Peace (n.d., [The Movement: About]) is a movement “started 
jointly by Palestinians and Israelis” who were once actively involved in the hostilities, 
have seen the futility of fighting for peace with weapons and have embarked on the 
mission towards reconciliation. They are committed to teaching the lessons of non-
violence and spreading the message of peaceful co-existence.  
New Profile – Movement for the Demilitarization of Israeli Society (n.d., 
[About Us, Recruitment and Refusal]) is standing against the pervasive militarization 
of Israeli society and is offering support to those who refuse to serve in the army. 
 
	   165	  
Fighting Injustice 
 
Most NGOs actively involved in directly addressing injustice are offering legal 
help, advice, and support to those affected by the mechanisms of power that run the 
conflict.  
Yesh Din (n.d.-a, [About]) is an Israeli organization “working to defend the 
human rights of the Palestinian civilian population under Israeli occupation” on 
individual and systemic level. In addition to “legal action and direct advocacy with the 
authorities” Yesh Din provides information on human rights issues and encourages 
public debate (n.d.-a, [About]).  
Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (n.d.-b, [About 
Adalah]) works “to achieve equal individual and collective rights for Palestinian Arab 
citizens of Israel and to defend against gross human rights violations against 
Palestinian residents of the OPT” and their list of strategic litigation includes 
significant achievements in legal cases against the violations of Palestinian rights. 
Adalah (n.d.-b, [Discriminatory Laws Database]) also keeps track of Israeli laws that 
discriminate against Palestinians and the Discriminatory Laws Database currently 
includes over 50 laws illustrating the extent of systemic social inequality. 
The inequality Between Arab-Palestinian and Jewish Israelis is the area of 
focus for Sikkuy – The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality (n.d., 
[About Sikkuy]), a joint Israeli-Palestinian civil society organization that considers the 
current institutional discrimination in Israel as “unjust and dangerous” and runs 
several projects to improve the situation. 
HaMoked: Center for the Defence of the Individual (n.d., [Home: About 
HaMoked]) is an Israeli human rights organization where Israelis and Palestinians 
work together to enable Palestinians to seek justice regarding the human rights 
violations they are subject to due to Israeli policies. No Legal Frontiers (n.d., [Who are 
We?]) has a similar mission as it strives to address legal discrimination in the oPt by 
providing legal help and advocating for change.  
Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement (n.d., [About]) is an Israeli 
organization focused on protecting the freedom of movement of Palestinians. It is 
another example where Jews and Palestinians work together to improve the situation 
generated by government policies.  
 
	   166	  
Bridging the Divide 
 
 A New Way (n.d., [About]) is among the most important counter-currents 
since it works with children, teaching them the lessons of co-existence and equality. 
They describe their mission to be “the development of trust and mutual respect 
between Jews and Arabs”. Similarly, The Jewish-Arab partnership project embodied 
in the Hagar Association is paving the way to a non-segregated education in the 
Negev with the aim to develop “an atmosphere of equality, mutual respect and 
tolerance” (Hagar - Jewish-Arab Education for Equality, n.d., [Who We Are]) 
Another feminist group with an important mission is Machsom Watch – 
Women against the Occupation and for Human Rights (n.d., [About Us]), a volunteer 
group of women who monitor daily the conduct of the Israeli forces at “checkpoints 
the separation fences, the agricultural gates, the military courts and Palestinian 
villages” thus contributing not only to minimizing the exercise of unrestrained power 
but also to bridging the chasm between the Israelis and the Palestinians by showing 
another face of the Israeli society to a large number of Palestinians and offering them 
help with a number of bureaucratic and other complications they face due to the 
occupation. Their educational work and organized tours are directly oriented towards 
bringing the two peoples closer together. 
 Comet-ME (n.d., [About Us]) is another example of Israeli-Palestinian 
collaboration. Comet-ME is demonstrating the possibility of productive co-existence 
while providing “green energy and clean water services to off-grid communities” and 
overcoming “barriers of hostility through joint work of Israelis and Palestinians on the 
ground.  
 Tiyul-Rihla (Project TRIP) (n.d., [About Us: What We Do]) is a joint 
educational travel project. Israelis and Palestinians organize trips to Israel and 
Palestine, where participants from both sides teach each other about the sites of 
shared significance. The aim of the project is to promote contact between the two 
peoples that is otherwise hampered by physical, “ideological psychological and social 
barriers” (Tiyul-Rihla, n.d., [About Us: Why Do It]). 
 Parents Circle – Families Forum (PCFF) (n.d., [About]) is a remarkable 
grassroots organization as it joins Palestinians and Israelis who lost their loved ones to 
the conflict and who come together to convey the importance of reconciliation in the 
prevention of further loss.  
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 Other notable NGOs and initiatives bringing people together and inspiring co-
existence are OneVoice grassroots movement, The Peres Center for Peace, Encounter 
– Transforming Conflict Through Face-to-Face Understanding, Jerusalem Hug, 
Interfaith Encounter Association, and the bi-national community of Wahat al-
Salam/Neve Shalom.  
 
Addressing the conflict by bridging the divide between the two peoples seems 
like the most sustainable way towards a peaceful future between the two peoples that 
have been engulfed in the conflict for so long that generations who have been born 
into it do not know a reality different to the one in which the belligerent dominant 
discourses on both sides inevitably trigger a certain level of indoctrination. The lack of 
support from the centres of power engaged in the conflict-based hierarchization and 
caught up in the status quo is a hindrance to the formation of any sustainable solution 
to the conflict. The other obstacle is the time needed to undo the carefully constructed 
and nurtured narratives of the shared violent history in place of which new narratives 
based on reconciliation, mutual respect and coexistence could rise. Time, 
determination, and the engagement of the wider international community will be 
needed to support and elevate these marginalized counter-currents of the Terrorism 
Complex, the ones fostering a discourse of peace, giving voice to the narratives of 
Israelis and Palestinians working together to promote justice and equality, 
constructing narratives committed to finding alternatives to mistrust and animosity, 
and narratives that focus on finding common ground, building trust, fostering 
understanding, and facilitating the journey of both parties towards eventual peaceful 
coexistence. The mechanisms and unwanted effects of the power asymmetry can only 
be challenged by sustained efforts oriented towards eventual reconciliation rather than 
annihilation.  
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5. THE MEDIA FIELD AND THE 
TERRORISM COMPLEX 
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WAR IS PEACE 
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY 
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH 
 
George Orwell (2009, p. 6) 
 
Ethno-political conflicts, especially those in which the use of the ‘terrorist’ label 
indicates extreme power asymmetry between the actors involved, constitute critical 
social events and as such usually draw significant attention from the media due to 
their newsworthy characteristics38. Even though objectivity is considered a journalistic 
staple (Hartley, 2002, p. 167) it, even in its ideality, rarely survives journalists’ 
dispositions and preconceptions (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 30), their conscious and 
unconscious adaptation to outside expectations that undermine the autonomy of the 
media field (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 33; Avraham, 2003, pp. 8-9), and the editorial 
practices responding to the power currents underlying the conflict (Avraham, 2003, p. 
9; Nagar, 2010, p. 534). When it comes to explaining conflicts only homogenous 
interpretations capable of bringing together heterogeneous societies get through the 
media sieve, filtering masses of information according to the rules and conventions of 
the trade (Said, 1981, pp. 45-49). This chapter will initially present the mechanisms of 
power operating in the media field that will inform the subsequent analysis of the 
Terrorism Complex as a case study.  
In conflicts marred by the pronounced power imbalance the emergent 
legitimized reality can be expected to correspond with the dominant political reality 
since the media are not inclined to challenge monolithic knowledge constructs 
enabled by the concentration of symbolic power on one side of the conflict (Sparrow, 
1999, pp. 55-56). In order to lend support to this claim, the analysis of the discourse 
explaining ethno-political conflict in the media is crucial for understanding how a 
uniform representation of reality is further constructed and legitimized. The selection 
of facts and the scope of context are the elements that need attention in order to gain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38 According to Harcup and O’Neill (in: Harcup 2009, 43) events with the biggest potential of making 
the news are connected to one or more of the following: power elites, celebrities, entertainment 
(including also human interest and unfolding drama), surprise, bad news (especially conflicts and 
tragedies), good news, magnitude (in terms of people involved or people potentially affected), events 
relevant to the audience, follow up stories previously introduced as news, and those corresponding to 
the media organization’s agenda.   
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insight into the media construction of knowledge and the relations of power that relate 
to it. While there are general theoretical considerations that can be applied to the 
media field in general, there are also important distinctions between the domestic 
media of the actors involved in a conflict and the international media that disseminate 
information to international publics. These distinctions will be made when relevant at 
various points in the following text. 
The case study in the second part of this chapter will encompass the evaluation 
of the relations of power and knowledge bearing on the entire scope of agents 
participating in the reality of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, ranging from belligerents 
to academics. The distinguishing of power struggles behind the scenes of the 
discursive constructs can be facilitated by the insights gained from locating the 
subjugated knowledge on the conflict in marginal media spaces as the events unfold. 
The power dynamics will be contextualized and if possible verified from multiple 
angles in order to evaluate the role of politics, media and academia in the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict as a quintessential asymmetric conflict. This chapter will look into 
the effects of the asymmetry of power in the media field and on the implications of the 
construction of knowledge from the positions of power that at times reflect in 
Orwellian constructs of reality. 
 
5. 1 MASS MEDIATED POWER 
 
 The power of discourse in the mass mediated world of the information age is 
not to be underestimated. The majority of the audiences are exposed to the news but 
do not consciously question the news (Harris, 2004, p. 187) and here lies the 
enormous power of media representations through which a constructed version of 
reality is disseminated and successfully established as the reality (pp. 50-51). When 
various discourses compete for the legitimacy of their representation of ethno-political 
violence, centres of power make certain that their preferred meanings remain 
prevalent (Entman, 2007, p. 165). Their endeavours to structure structures are 
facilitated by the instruments of domination at their disposal and by the self-
perpetuating tendency of the structuring structures already in place (Bourdieu, 1992: 
165).  
The maintenance of the status quo is facilitated by what most theories of mass 
communication explain as the self-affirming correspondence between audiences’ 
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perception of reality that has been gradually shaped by the exposure to the media and 
the subsequent ready acceptance of the media products that fit the established 
knowledge structures (Harris, 2004, pp. 27-39). Media play a central role in the 
knowledge production on ‘terrorism’ as they form the public understanding of 
‘terrorism’ as well as serve as a data source for ‘terrorism’ incidents databases (Reid, 
1997, p. 98). In light of the tendency to magnify the threat and rely on official state 
sources (p. 98) such knowledge relates directly to the struggles for power in the 
Terrorism Complex.  
The role of media in relation to ‘terrorism’ has long been argued to 
correspond with the desire of ‘terrorists’ for publicity and with the potential of 
terrorism to harness the media to advance its goals (Irvin, 1992, p. 64). “Although the 
image of terrorism is often a critical component of its effectiveness as a method of 
political communication”, interviews with ‘terrorists’ reveal their objections to the 
type of media coverage they receive (Crenshaw, 1995a, p. 8). ‘Terrorists’ see the 
media as hostile to their struggle and as a component of the domination set to 
maintain the political status quo (Irvin, 1992, p. 69). While recounting the narrative of 
‘terrorist’ violence the media often provide no context (pp. 75-76). The media also 
tend to overlook more discriminate use of force and the non-violent strategies, which 
can be seen as a contributing factor to escalations that involve indiscriminate violent 
acts (Irvin, 1992, pp. 77-82; Crenshaw, 1981, p. 386).  
Research shows that in reporting on ‘terrorism’ it is counterterrorism that 
dominates the agenda and “that governments have a privileged relationship with the 
press” (Hoffman, et al., 2010, p. 575). The perpetuation of the mistaken adage that 
there is a symbiosis between the media and ‘terrorists’ (e.g., Neumann & Smith, 2007, 
p. 47) can be seen as a diversion tactic that deflects attention from the active 
construction of knowledge on ‘terrorism’ from the dominant positions of power (Reid, 
1997, pp. 99-100). Herman and O’Sullivan (1989, pp. 55-212) refer to the production 
of knowledge on ‘terrorism’ as the “terrorism industry” that includes governments, 
security sectors, think tanks, lobbyists, experts and the media. Herman and 
O’Sullivan’s “terrorism industry” largely corresponds to the scope of the Terrorism 
Complex and serves to confirm the continuity of the power/knowledge practices that 
have been silencing alternative explanations of ‘terrorism’ through time.  
News media are also prone to the simplification of ‘terrorism’ by focusing on 
the newsworthy violent aspects of the phenomenon (Crenshaw, 1995a, p. 8). By 
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structuring media reports on ‘terrorist violence’ with securitizing political statements 
and complicit expert opinions it appears “irrational to the threatened individual, who 
therefore cannot respond rationally” (Crenshaw Hutchinson, 2006, p. 75). Herman 
and O’Sullivan (1989, p. 203) go even further and suggest that “the Western media 
regularly suppress evidence of primary terrorism, causing the responses of the victims 
to appear unprovoked and inexplicably evil”.  
Susan Abulhawa (2014), a Palestinian-American writer and activist, draws 
attention to the Western media’s complicity in sustaining the dominant discourse’s 
focus on ‘terrorism’ by ignoring the underlying asymmetries of power. The 
kidnapping and killing of three teenage Israeli boys from the West Bank settlements 
by suspects affiliated with Hamas elicited substantial international media coverage, 
widespread outrage and calls for action against ‘terrorist’ violence (2014). Abulhawa 
(2014) points out that Western media reports remained silent on the killings, 
kidnappings, and imprisonment of Palestinian children, on the siege of Gaza, and on 
the violence and pressures inherent in the multifarious Israeli mechanisms of power 
operating in the occupied West Bank.  
The Western media’s tendency to attribute the responsibility for escalations in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Palestinians (Kane, 2012) is another example of 
how the dominant discourse aligns with the dominant currents of power. An 
examination of the events leading up to the 2012 Israeli operation in Gaza exposes 
how major Western media outlets manipulated the timeline to exclude Israeli military 
actions that provoked Palestinian rocket fire (Kane, 2012; Murphy, 2012; IMEU, 
2012b). Subsequent Israeli military action was framed as a legitimate response to 
Palestinian acts of ‘terror’ (Kane, 2012; Murphy, 2012). 
Time and space constraints linked to the production of media items can 
explain the appeal of generalizations, use of stereotypes and labels. Jackson (2007b, 
pp. 402-412) identifies the narratives of ‘Islamic terrorism’ as a threat to security that 
is so violent, extreme and irrational that can only be countered by force. These 
narratives pervade the dominant Western discourse on terrorism and operate with the 
associated discursive strings of generalizing labels, such as ‘Islamic terrorists’, 
‘jihadists’, and ‘extremists’, that are indiscriminately applied to a vast array of diverse 
actors (pp. 412-414) in order to justify various domestic and international political 
objectives (p. 422). By leading the way in the stereotypical portrayal of ‘terrorism’ (p. 
400) the media can be seen as not only serving the urge of the dominant political 
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power to decontextualize and delegitimize ‘terrorist’ violence but also as contributing 
to the ”terrorising” of the audience by presenting ‘terrorism’ as “a vaguely perceived 
unfamiliar menace” (Crenshaw Hutchinson, 2006, p. 75). At this point the field of 
media intersects with the field of politics, charting another cornerstone of the 
Terrorism Complex. In instances of extreme social events such as armed conflicts the 
implications of monopoly over power and consequently over truth can have grave 
consequences for the less powerful side of the conflict since its lack of power is 
magnified by its lack of access to symbolic power.  
Fields of journalism, academia and politics are inextricably linked (Bourdieu, 
2005, pp. 29-31). The objective of the power struggles within and among the fields is 
the power for the legitimacy of the knowledge constructs that elevate particular visions 
of the social world to the status of reality (pp. 29-36-37). The media field is 
particularly vulnerable to the incursion of the external principles of hierarchization, 
which strengthens the least autonomous actors in respective fields and makes them act 
according to the external principles of hierarchization rather than aspire to the 
consecration within the field (pp. 41-42).  
According to the criteria for quality in the journalistic field, media reports 
should explain a broad historical, political and social context in order to preserve their 
aspirations towards objectivity. Instead objectivity is often employed as a weapon in 
the struggle for power as was observed already in the analysis of the academic field. In 
the media field the pursuit of objectivity in its crudest form, as balancing of the 
competing viewpoints, diverts attention from the asymmetry of power, which is 
inherently unbalanced and as such the root cause of perpetual tensions. In media 
constructs, the asymmetric distribution of power between state and non-state actors, 
and the state monopoly over the legitimate use of force reflect in the asymmetric 
distribution of symbolic power, which determines whose vision of the social world will 
be dominant (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 238-239). Symbolic power over the naming of 
social phenomena as a “symbolic act of imposition which has on its side the strength 
of the collective, of the consensus, of common sense” ensures the perpetuation of the 
asymmetric relations of power and secures the state “monopoly of legitimate symbolic 
violence” (p. 239).  
The exercise of symbolic power reflects in the combination of narratives 
surrounding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict where the narrative perpetuating the 
Western construct of ‘radical Islam’ as the external arch-danger of the day combines 
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with the narrative of Israel as the bastion of Western democratic ideals and of the fight 
against the extremist Islamic ‘terrorism’ while omitting the role of Israel’s extremists 
and religious settlers in the conflict (Said, 1981, pp. 31, 36-37). As evident from the 
previous chapter, the role of the oppressive state-operated mechanisms of power in the 
perpetuation and escalation of the conflict is absent as well. Together these and the 
associated narratives form a simplistic dominant discourse that lends itself to the mass 
media and shapes the preferred image of reality (p. 32). The spectre of Islamic ‘terror’ 
has only grown larger since 1981 and the role of the media in the persistent vilification 
of Islam (pp. 43-44) is not negligible. As Said (p. 142) puts it, ‘covering Islam is /…/ 
an assertion of power’ and as such joins dominant discourses from the political and 
the academic fields that construct ‘Islamic Terrorism’ as the quintessential ‘outside 
enemy’ of our time (Jackson, 2007a, pp. 394-426; Said, 1988, pp. 46-60; Thussu & 
Freedman, 2003, pp. 2-3), lurking from behind the boundaries of the nation state and 
endowing the state and its actions with unquestioned and unquestionable legitimacy.  
The dominant discourse on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict disseminated 
among the international audiences capitalizes on the preconceptions of the Western 
publics developed on the basis of the well-established imagery of ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
and ‘Muslim danger’. An analysis of the British TV news coverage of the 2008/2009 
Israeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza found the reporting largely adopting Israeli 
political narratives while lacking in wider explanation and context of the conflict 
(Philo, 2012, p. 154). The Israeli narrative of responding to Islamic terrorism in self-
defence was hardly challenged in the media and consequently was readily accepted by 
the publics as was evident from the audiences’ belief that the Palestinians have 
brought the disproportionate civilian death toll on themselves (Philo, 2012, pp. 158-
161; 2011) The dominance of the Israeli discourse in the international realm is largely 
connected to the replication of the power asymmetry across the fields through the 
various mechanisms of power operating within the Terrorism Complex.  
 
5.1.1 Media Manipulation and Silencing 
 
In order to attract vastly heterogeneous audiences, hold their attention and 
thus satisfy the requirements of the market and the advertisers most mass media have 
to weigh between their autonomy and structuring content according to the outside 
economic, political, even ideological pressures while at the same time satisfying 
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audiences’ expectations and tastes (Harris, 2004, p. 4; Utley, 1997, p. 9). Catering to 
the common denominator entails generalizations, labels and stereotypes, which 
reduce complex situations to supposedly readily understandable narratives. But even 
in an ideal form, a media product is still a reduction of the complexity and an arena 
where the struggles for power are won and lost over the choices made in the selections 
of elements to be included and the way they are assembled. These choices entail 
normative considerations that go unattended due to the erroneous assumption that 
objectivity can be achieved in situations where complexity limits our ability to make 
knowledge claims (Cilliers, 2005, pp. 259, 261, 263).  
These inevitable limitations are exacerbated by the use of “techniques of 
decontextualization and dehistoricization” (Said, 1988, p. 49) that result in skewed 
representations of reality and even more skewed public perceptions of reality. The 
Glasgow Media Group’s study on the public understanding of the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict in relation to the TV news found that the majority of people get their 
knowledge on the conflict primarily from TV news but also found this knowledge 
severely lacking (Philo, et al., 2003, pp. 133-134). The surveyed audience were found 
poorly informed about the basic elements of the conflict such as the issue of refugees, 
as the vast majority did not know whether the refugees were Palestinian or Israeli (p. 
134). Similar confusion arose when it came to settlers and the occupation, as the 
majority of the audience did not know which peoples were occupied and which were 
doing the occupying, or even believed it was the Palestinians who were the occupiers 
(p. 136). The image of reality surfacing from the news is very basic and distorted in 
that it conveys the message of a violent strife between two peoples (p. 139) without 
properly addressing the asymmetries of power involved.  
The absence of context and historical background contributing to the 
subjugation of certain knowledge is linked to time and space constraints, to the 
supposed audience’s preferences for action packed news but also to the controversy 
surrounding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which makes international news 
production a target of pressures from both sides (Philo, et al., 2003, p. 136; Corera, 
2003, p. 256). Israel has more power and consequently larger and more efficient 
“flak” producing systems and operations in place, which exert pressure on the media 
establishments by ways of “letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, law suits, speeches 
and bills before Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat and punitive action” 
(Herman & Chomsky, 1994, p. 26). Mearsheimer and Walt (2008, pp. 168-169) list 
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the domination of the public discourse in order to curb the criticism of Israel and 
promote Israel’s “strategic and moral rationales” as one of the key tasks of the 
powerful Israeli lobby in the United States. The mass media are at the forefront of the 
associated pressures. Journalists have come to expect negative responses following 
reporting critical of Israeli actions. These responses range from individual complaints 
to political interventions at the highest levels and manipulate reporting into falling in 
line with the dominant discourse (Philo, 2012, pp. 157-158).  
The ability to produce flak joins other imbalances associated with the initial 
power asymmetry that impact the media reporting on the conflict to favour Israel’s 
position by avoiding criticism of Israel, constructing headlines that do not cause an 
affront among Israeli supporters and readily tap into the official supply of information 
(Philo, et al., 2003, pp. 143-144). The language adopted from dominant sources 
subliminally conveys the intended dominant message of Israel as a victim of 
Palestinian violence. Israeli deaths are awarded more attention and are described as 
“’murder’, ‘atrocity’, ‘lynching’ and ‘savage cold-blooded killing’” (p. 144).  
Responsible journalism would critically expand on biased language constructs 
and generalizing labelling strategies that stem from other fields instead of 
indiscriminately disseminating them. However, it is often most difficult for journalists 
to maintain their independence and integrity since governments and commercial 
structures of ownership and control impose severe constraints on the freedom of 
journalism. “Media contents thus tend to present either government propaganda or 
contents catered to the lowest common denominator of taste, attracting the largest 
possible audiences and profits” (Tehranian, 2002, p. 75). Attempts to appease the 
widest swathes of audiences and stay in the good graces of the official spokespeople 
can have widespread negative effects and include journalistic anathemas such as bias, 
censorship, and surveillance, which are tacitly accepted on the grounds of the state of 
emergency directed from the political field.  
 
Bias 
 
The mechanics of the power struggle in the journalistic field can be 
represented by taking a closer look at the media bias incorporating framing, agenda 
setting and priming, which Entman (2007, p. 163) calls “tools of power”. Research on 
cognitive media effects (Edy & Meirick, 2007, pp. 120-121; Scheufele, 2000, pp. 297-
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298, 304-307; Weaver, 2007, pp. 142-145) mostly defines agenda setting as media’s 
choice of salient events to include on their agenda; framing as either second level 
agenda setting, where certain features of a salient event are emphasized, or as the 
structuring of the narrative about an issue in a way that shapes the understanding of 
the subject; and priming as the consequence agenda setting and framing have on the 
audiences’ attitudes towards issues connected to select items. The ways in which 
media construct media items and the patterns of such construction shape audiences’ 
knowledge about the world by presenting individuals with only seemingly factual, 
balanced and impartial media products.  
Entman (2007, pp. 163-164) substantiates the existence of news bias in which 
journalists’ motivations and preferences (decision-making bias) are influenced by the 
patterns imposed by powerful elites to produce news structured to support the view of 
one side over the other (content bias). Entman (pp. 163-173) persuasively interrelates 
agenda setting, priming and framing to explain bias formation and presents a system 
of interplay which includes considerations of external power bearing on media 
processes. Political power play unravels in strategic framing contests that operate on 
both levels of agenda setting thus determining salient issues and the way they are 
presented. Priming is where the results of the power struggle are revealed through 
increased public support of certain actors and their policies (pp. 164-165). Emergent 
public image of authority endows political agents with more symbolic capital in the 
political field which is an advantage in the constant power struggle for the control and 
eventual mobilization of non-professionals (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 188-192). This is why 
biased reporting during hostilities becomes even more common on both sides in the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Elmasry, et al., 2013; Avraham & First, 2010; 
International Press Institute (IPI), 2013b) and official pressures on the media coverage 
grow (IPI, 2013b, pp. 20-32).  
At times the media willingly participate in the political efforts to influence the 
public to accept partisan interpretations of reality as the reality. Jerusalem Post, an 
Israeli English language newspaper that caters to international audiences, holds 
annual conferences in the United States that bring together influential personalities 
from Israel, U.S. and the world and include politicians, diplomats, representatives of 
the IDF, Israeli intelligence officials, experts, journalists, and editors (The Jerusalem 
Post Annual Conference, The Jerusalem Post Annual Conference, n.d., [About], [Previous 
Event], [Speakers]). The 2012 event’s title was Fighting for the Zionist Dream and the 
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featured narratives echoed Israel’s historical narratives, security narratives and 
political agendas (The Jerusalem Post Annual Conference, The Jerusalem Post Annual 
Conference, n.d., [Previous Event – Videos from the Conference]). A similar gathering is 
organized by The Times of Israel (Times of Israel Gala, n.d.). Such coordination efforts 
behind the dominant discourse on Israel and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict illustrate 
the working of the Terrorism Complex that is geared towards defining reality in a way 
that perpetuates the asymmetry of power underlying the conflict and normalizes its 
manifestations. Considering that the Israeli media were government or party run until 
the relatively recent transition to the free market system in the mid 1990s (Levin, 
2003, p. 31) their active and ready alignment with the political narratives becomes 
easier to understand.  
The asymmetric distribution of power among the actors involved in the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict reflects in the asymmetry of discourses presented in the 
media. The asymmetry of power that underpins the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is 
directly replicated in the media field. A joint media-monitoring project by the 
Palestinian organization MIFTAH and Israeli organization Keshev (Nimri, et al., 
2009, p. 4) notes the asymmetry between the powerful Israeli media that have wide 
reach and high circulation, and weaker Palestinian media that have limited circulation 
and suffer from the limitations imposed by the occupation. The circulation of the two 
media discourses reflects this asymmetry, which means that the Israeli narratives (p. 7) 
of violent Palestinian terrorism, of Palestinian unwillingness to work for peace, and of 
Israel as a victim dominate the public space in respect to the Palestinian narratives (p. 
7) that focus on the occupation, and on the aggressive state actions that victimize 
Palestinians and present an obstacle to peace. Both discourses assume confrontational 
positions and construct narratives reflecting the messages of dehumanization and 
delegitimization of the ‘other’ (p. 4) emanating from the political field. Israeli domestic 
media space is almost entirely closed off to Palestinian views and the media items 
which feature Palestinians are framed in the adversarial ‘us versus them’ manner 
(Levin, 2003, p. 28).  
In addition to dominating the local media discourse Israel has the capacity to 
maintain a strong media presence internationally by combining authoritative voices 
with an efficient public relations operation (Philo, et al., 2003, p. 136; 2011). Israel’s 
status as a democratic nation state with strong ties to the West endows its 
representatives with the authority needed to make their statements adopted as ‘facts’. 
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In the international media the power asymmetry is most straightforwardly replicated 
in airtime awarded to Israeli voices, which are likely to appear at least twice as much 
as the Palestinian voices (2003, p. 146). The result is an increased presence of pro-
Israeli voices and views in the dominant media, replication of power asymmetry, and 
a loss of impartiality that manifests in the words and labels used to frame ongoing 
events as a cycle of Palestinian violence that is countered by Israel’s security-oriented 
responses (pp. 143,146). This imagery of the ‘cycle of violence’ creates a false 
impression of an equal footing between the two sides since the understanding of the 
drastically asymmetrical capabilities between the Israeli forces and the Palestinian 
factions requires a fair amount of background knowledge. In this respect the reporting 
on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict demonstrates the distorting effect of artificially 
balancing the two sides in the conflict for the sake of objectivity (Davis, 2007, p. 40). 
This too is a feature of the asymmetric distribution of power indicative of the 
Terrorism Complex. 
When the mass media frame the images of the suffering others in a way that 
corresponds with the dominant political narratives of existential threats and security 
imperatives they assist in justifying extreme measures that the publics would otherwise 
perceive as an erosion of “the universal human rights culture”(Linklater, 2007, p. 26). 
The mainstream media ‘terrorism’ experts “are disproportionately linked to corporate 
and state institutions” (Miller & Mills, 2009, p. 431) and thus help solidify the 
dominant political representations of reality. Such collaboration between the centers 
of power across the fields involved in the production of knowledge on terrorism is 
illustrative of the Terrorism Complex. 
Systematic news bias as the product of consistently one-sided discourse 
imposes a select image of reality as the legitimate one thus bearing significantly on the 
knowledge and perception about the social world which in turn affects the social 
world itself (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 127). Davis (2007, p. 39) delivers a succinct description 
of the complexity that surrounds media bias: 
The inefficiencies, inaccuracies and omissions of journalism do not 
follow some random path. Instead, they result from powerful, external 
influences in society and produce partial outputs which favour [sic] 
certain groups, norms and values over others. It is corporate, political 
and military groups (or classes) and institutions which benefit.  
Producers of news are not impervious to the effects of the structures they assist in 
creating. The cycle completes with the decision-making bias which reflects journalists’ 
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own belief systems in the way they frame news (Entman, 2007, p. 166; Avraham, 
2003, pp. 8-9). These belief systems correspond to Bourdieu’s (1993, pp. 65, 71, 133) 
notion of habitus, a system of dispositions of each agent, which is forming subjective 
representations of their position and complementing their rational choices and 
decisions.  
 
Censorship 
 
“Words and texts are so much of the world that their effectiveness, in some 
cases even their use, are matters having to do with ownership, authority, power, and 
the imposition of force” (Said, 1983, p. 48). One of the more efficient political moves 
of actors in power who do not want the status quo to be challenged and are making 
good use of the power of discourse in constructing a favourable version of reality is 
censorship which persists even in democracies (Harris, 2004, p. 5). Mechanisms of 
censorship operate on multiple levels. Governments and militaries tend to limit access 
to information which could, according to the official explanation, jeopardise matters 
of national security or information which is so sensitive that the public would be 
opposed to revealing it (Graber, 2003, pp. 542-543).  
Israel’s policy of military censorship has a long unbroken history that is at odds 
with the democratic principles and practices elsewhere in the world and can be 
“defined as the operation of a permanent organization intended to prevent mass 
media dissemination of information that is potentially harmful to national security” 
(Nossek & Limor, 2001, pp. 2, 4). It affects not only the local media reporting but 
applies to foreign correspondents as well (p. 21). The comfortable coexistence between 
the media and censorship in Israel is an indicator of the power associated with 
prolonged securitization, which enables ready acceptance of extreme measures that 
would otherwise be considered unacceptable (pp. 16-17). Citing security concerns 
links to several Israeli historical narratives and to the corresponding political 
narratives that condition the media’s and the public’s willingness to make patriotic 
sacrifices in the name of national self-preservation. Appearing unpatriotic by raising 
controversial issues is consequently an especially important consideration for the 
media in Israel (Persico, 2014a). The public’s right to know is further compromised by 
the intelligence community’s influences on reporting that involve censorship, gag 
orders, and information manipulation that are considered inevitable to a degree but 
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are also problematic regarding their potential for the abuse of power (Magen, 2014, 
pp. 8, 10-12, 14).  
Dominant authoritative discourse not only legitimizes censorship through 
invocations of security but also strongly encourages self-censorship. Neumann and 
Smith (2007, p. 48) criticise what they see as undue attention of the media to the 
circumstances that drive people to commit suicide attacks. They attribute any 
attention to context as the consequence of skilful ‘terrorist’ manipulation of the pliant 
mass media (pp. 47-48). Since overt government interventions in the reporting on 
‘terrorism’ would be “counter-productive” they suggest the encouragement of 
“responsible reporting /…/ through voluntary means”, that should be built into the 
education process (p. 101). This example also illustrates the micro level of Terrorism 
Complex operations since one of the authors is M.L.R. Smith whose efforts to subdue 
alternative knowledge were discussed already in the third chapter in connection to the 
critical turn in terrorism studies.  
Another example of promoting self-censorship comes from Martin Sherman, 
an Israeli academic with close ties to the Israeli defence and political establishments, 
and Shabtai Shavit, former head of Mossad, who argue (2006, pp. 548-549) for the 
national security related need to restrict freedom of expression, and maintain that the 
media should conform to “greater restrictions” that the specific security needs of the 
state require and the public understands (pp. 556-557). They stress public’s attitudes 
towards reporting which relate media credibility to patriotism (pp. 558-559) and thus 
attempt to manipulate the media to conform to the expectations of the public and the 
state. The progressive weaning of the public debate in Israel on the morally 
questionable actions and policies performed by the state and the members of its 
dominant group (Kaufman, 2014) testifies to the success of such manipulation. It has 
led to an altered moral context in relation to the Palestinian ‘other’. Within the 
emerging media constructs of reality, the ‘us versus them’ mentality determines the 
“legitimate discourse” (Keret, 2014). Opinions that dissent from the dominant 
narrative are met with aggressive silencing that includes physical attacks, death 
threats, and ruined livelihoods (Santo, 2014). A reporter’s personal choice to conform 
to external expectations is a way to avoid such problems.  
Self-censorship is further imposed through education and professional 
socialization as the power struggles in the field determine the “space of possibles” 
which subtly and quite subconsciously limits agents’ perception of the access to 
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expression and of the acceptable forms of expression (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 138; 1993, p. 
176). Dominant discourse fixes the meaning of the constitutive elements of reality and 
thus predetermines discussion of events by limiting the scope of possible narratives to 
those that maintain a “semantic fit” with the dominant discourse (Näslund & Pemer, 
2012, pp. 92-95, 104-106). When the authoritative political voices present a united 
front that amounts to policy monopoly the risk-averse media are inclined not to 
question the political stance in order to avoid controversy (Sparrow, 1999, pp. 63-64). 
The power of the dominant discourse lies in its united and coherent presentation. 
Producers are motivated to adjust the production process of media contents to the 
expected reactions from audiences, advertisers (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 76-77), peers 
(Corera, 2003, p. 256), editors (Davis, 2007, p. 41), and official sources (Altheide, 
2009, p. 65). An example of the resulting self-censorship is selective reporting such as 
the media silence on the incidents of settler violence involving extensive destruction of 
Palestinian olive trees in the IDF-controlled areas of the West Bank. In 2013 Israel’s 
left-leaning newspaper Haaretz obtained a confidential document that detailed the 
incidents and questioned IDF’s commitment to the prevention of such vandalism 
(Hass, 2013). Bits of information from the document had previously been leaked in the 
social media but the defence officials were reportedly pleased with the mainstream 
media’s reluctance to run with the story and with the “reporters’ responsibility and 
restraint on the issue” (Hass, 2013). This example points to the complicity of the 
Israeli mainstream media in the construction of reality that corresponds to and 
perpetuates the power asymmetry underlying the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. 
Palestinian perspective is omitted from Israeli public discourse and Palestinian 
reactions to such repetitive grievances are not contextualized, which facilitates the 
application of the ‘terrorist’ label and legitimizes counterterrorism measures.  
Journalists are especially reluctant to make “people feel queasy about the 
struggles for which they are being mobilized” (Sontag, 2003, p. 58) or to appear 
unpatriotic in troubling times (Graber, 2003, pp. 545-547; Ridley, 2003, p. 250; 
Altheide, 2009, p. 68). Talking about ‘terrorism’ has come to follow established 
patterns that not only avoid delving into the circumstances that drive individuals and 
groups to resort to ‘terrorism’ but actively vilify attempts to contextualize such use of 
force by accusing explanatory lines of reasoning of justifying terrorism (Corera, 2003, 
p. 255). Similar demands are imposed on ‘terrorism’ experts. While the demands for 
professional competency remain rather lax (Stampnitzky, 2011, pp. 6-7) the authority 
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to speak on the subject publicly is contingent on adhering to the pattern of moral 
condemnation of ‘terrorism’ (Jackson, 2012, p. 18). Such influences of the envisioned 
reception on the media production process are a form of self-censorship (Bourdieu, 
1992, pp. 76-77).  
Self-censorship in the scope of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict also has an 
international component. Mondoweiss, a progressive American–Jewish news blog, 
draws attention to The New York Times changing the title of an article in order to 
stay in line with the dominant discourse’s unflinching support for Israel (Weiss, 
2014d). After John Kerry blamed Israel’s announcement of new settlements for the 
failure of the 2014 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks, The New York Times reported the 
story under the title “Israel Settlement Plan Derails Peace Talks, Kerry Says” (Weiss, 
2014d). This title was soon changed to a vague “Mideast Frustration, the Sequel” and 
the story was adapted to appease Israeli complaints (Weiss, 2014d).   
 
 
Legal Silencing 
 
 The Council of Europe issued study by David Banisar (2008) reveals 
disturbing effects of the widely adopted counterterrorism legislation on the freedom of 
the media. Banisar (pp. 13-34) identifies the limits imposed on accessing and gathering 
information (pp. 13-18), the limits imposed on freedom of expression (pp. 19-24), the 
undermining of the journalistic right to protect sources (pp. 25-27), and the increased 
surveillance and control (pp. 29-34) as some of the most damaging consequences of 
the counterterrorism laws that seem to cater more to political than to security 
objectives (p. 5). It follows that in certain cases journalists now face arrest and legal 
persecution for doing their work according to the principles of autonomous 
hierarchization.  
The expanding yet vague definitions of ‘terrorism’ in the adopted legislation 
are exposing the media to “new forms of criminal liability” (Cram, 2006, p. 339). The 
growing tendency of states to “criminalize speech” by using the ‘support for terrorism’ 
accusation functions as the means to silence critical discourse and narrow the public 
space for debate (Banisar, 2008, pp. 19-20). The UK Terrorism Bill 2005 includes 
“encouragement of terrorism” among other “dissemination” offences (Cram, 2006, p. 
343). The pattern of silencing dissent through the criminalization of critical 
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approaches to dominant narratives can by now be characterized as one of the key 
mechanisms of power of the Terrorism Complex. Providing context and explanation 
of ‘terrorism’ can get reporters accused of justifying ‘terrorism’ (Corera, 2003, p. 254), 
which, considering the counterterrorism laws, will increasingly act as a deterrent to 
explore the plurality of available views. Banisar’s (2008, p. 35) concluding remark 
corresponds with the insights gained in the analysis of the power/knowledge in the 
previous chapter: 
The international bodies have developed unbalanced instruments that 
do not adequately ensure that human rights are protected. In part, 
that is because some of the worst national governments are the 
strongest supporters of expansive international instruments to justify 
their domestic abuses.  
The efforts to achieve the conformity of the media narratives on ‘terrorism’ reflect the 
centrality of discourse in the Terrorism Complex as it creates the reality in which the 
status quo of the power asymmetry is normalized and allowed to persist unchallenged.  
 
Restrictions and Attacks 
 
Given the proximity and relevance of the journalistic field to the field of power 
conclusions can be drawn about the relatively weak autonomy of the journalistic field 
which makes it more susceptible to external pressures and principles of 
hierarchization. “[O]bjective relations of power tend to reproduce themselves in 
symbolic relations of power, in visions of the social world which contribute to the 
permanence of those relations of power (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 238).” Every field is 
characterized by the tension between the established order and the pretenders to the 
dominant status (1993, pp. 182-183). Agents involved in the production of media 
contents that align with the less powerful actor in a conflict and thus represent a direct 
threat to the constructs of the dominant discourse are often affected by structural 
pressures, which draw directly on the power asymmetry of the conflict.  
In terms of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict this means that the Palestinian 
media are subject to the same mechanisms of power as the rest of the Palestinian 
population. Israel does not recognize Palestinian media organizations, which makes it 
impossible for the affiliated journalists to be accredited and recognized as journalists 
(Kuttab, 2013; IPI, 2013b, p. 25). Palestinian journalists’ freedom of movement is 
limited, as their crossing between Israel, West Bank, and Gaza, if permitted at all, is 
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hampered by requiring additional accreditations, and delayed due to crossings and 
checkpoints (IPI, 2013a; 2013b, pp. 29-30). Attacks on Palestinian journalists are 
common, especially during military operations in Gaza where media establishments 
are repeatedly targeted and a number of journalists have been killed in the last decade 
alone (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2004; PCHR, 2009, pp. 3-6; Reporters 
Without Borders, 2009; HRW, 2012).  
The case of Majd Kayyal’s arrest in April 2014 illustrates several aspects of the 
reproduction of the asymmetry of power in relation to the media field as it touches 
upon restrictions of movement, restrictions of reporting and upon legal discrimination 
on the basis of ethnicity thus signalling attempted silencing through intimidation. 
Majd Kayyal, a reporter and an activist associated with the independent ezine 
Jadaliyya and the human rights organization Adalah, was arrested by Israeli secret 
service Shin Bet and placed in detention after attending a journalistic public event in 
Lebanon (Abunimah, 2014a). Israel’s Prevention of Infiltration Law is a “little known” 
law, which restricts Israeli citizens’ travel to Arab countries considered ‘enemy states’, 
but as Lisa Goldman (2014) observed from her own experience, its enforcement 
depends on the Israeli citizen’s ethnicity. Other Israeli journalists have observed the 
same discriminatory pattern (Bar'el, 2014; Fishbain, 2014). Jewish Israeli journalists 
have reported from ‘enemy states’ without being subject to arrest, isolation, 
interrogation and denial of the right to counsel, as was the case with Kayyal, a 
Palestinian Israeli (Goldman, 2014; Silverstein, 2014). A gag order was placed on the 
reporting about Kayyal’s case, after the news of his arrest had already been published, 
which enabled certain foreign media establishments and some Israeli independent 
media outlets to ignore the order, even though the latter could be subject to lengthy 
and costly legal implications for their transgression (Reider, 2014). Adalah questioned 
the legality of the gag order and contributed its imposition to “Israel’s efforts in 
preventing a legitimate public and political debate about these issues” (Adalah, 2014).  
The closing off of access to journalists by the Israeli and Palestinian authorities 
alike, has become acute and reciprocal (IPI, 2013b, pp. 24-26) and exacerbates the rift 
between the two peoples by preventing the plurality of opinions and the possibility of 
a dialogue thereby allowing “stereotypes and misinformation” to go unchallenged 
(IPI, 2013b, p. 26). The result is two inevitably partisan, often contradictory media 
discourses, competing for the status of the ‘true’ representation of reality. The 
workings of the Terrorism Complex and the mechanisms of power associated with the 
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media field assist in making Israeli representations of reality dominate the public space 
in spite of the increasing challenges posed by the new media technologies. 
 
5.1.2 New Media  
 
The most important ‘tool’ for disrupting the media constructs that feed into 
the dominant discourse are the alternative media narratives that started to be 
available to the wider publics with the advent and the Internet and have gained 
unprecedented access to the publics through a wide range of new media outlets. New 
media have begun to disturb the established power patterns in the media field and 
have so far managed to escape the principles of hierarchization that still seem to have 
a firm hold over the other fields relating to ‘terrorism’. The relatively limited reach of 
the new media is conditioned by audiences’ access to the Internet as well as with their 
patterns of use.  
The Pew Research Center (Anderson & Caumont, 2014) conducted a study on 
the impact of the social media, a subgroup of the new media, on the news and found 
that among the social media Facebook is most often used as a news source. 64 per 
cent of Americans use the site and 30 per cent of those get news there. A related Pew 
study (Desilver, 2014) revealed that the majority of those 30 per cent get news on 
Facebook as “a byproduct [sic] of their other activities there”. A more detailed look 
into the consumption patterns of news on Facebook reveals that the majority of people 
(73 per cent) are interested in entertainment news while international news get the 
attention of only 39 per cent of users (Anderson & Caumont, 2014). Facebook is 
followed by YouTube, LinkedIn and Twitter. Twitter, with the reputation of being a 
source for breaking news and for following the development of news in real time is in 
fourth place, reaching only 16 per cent of the population, 8 per cent of which actually 
use it as a news source (Anderson & Caumont, 2014). Gallup poll (Saad, 2013) found 
that most Americans still prefer to get their news on television (55 per cent), with Fox 
news leading the polls. Only 21 per cent of Americans choose to turn to the Internet 
for news (Saad, 2013). The low numbers of people that would actively seek out news 
on the Internet imply that locating alternative information and unearthing subjugated 
knowledge requires a level of engagement that remains rare and thus represents a 
relatively small threat to the mainstream discursive constructs.  
As the reach of the Internet and the new media extends so do the attempts to 
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control them, to curb their ability to disseminate information and to silence the 
alternative knowledge they convey. Efforts to apply the ‘terrorism’ label to the new 
media have already been stepped up in the political and academic fields. Internet as 
an information source has become a target of counterterrorism concerns and states 
are setting out to increase control (Banisar, 2008, pp. 22-24). Gabriel Weimann 
(2014), a fellow at the influential Wilson Center think tank and a professor at the 
Israeli University of Haifa, writes about the ‘terrorist’ use of the social media and 
labels new types of ‘terrorism’ as “Facebook Terrorism” (pp. 4-7), “Twitter 
Terrorism” (pp. 8-10), “YouTube Terrorism” (pp. 10-13), and “Instagram and Flickr 
Terrorism” (p. 13). Weimann (p. 14) identifies “the terrorist migration to new online 
resources” as a challenge for counterterrorism and academia alike. He finds that the 
responses from both camps have lagged behind as “[t]he meteoric rise of social media 
has let radical groups and terrorists freely disseminate ideas through multiple 
modalities, including websites, blogs, social networking websites, forums, and video 
sharing services” (p. 14). Weimann’s (pp. 14-15) suggestions for policy adjustments 
that would be able to recognize the dangers of the new media battlefield are indicative 
of what can be expected. Increasing amounts of expert studies on the Internet as a 
‘terrorist’ tool (e.g., Conway, 2006) will likely precede the use of such expertise in the 
justification of stringent legislation that will be enacted in the name of security and 
counterterrorism and will bring significant limitations of the freedom of expression 
online.  
 
 
5.2 THE TERRORISM COMPLEX: ISRAELI–PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
(APRIL – SEPTEMBER 2014) 
 
As the research of the mechanisms of power in the other fields has shown the 
sources of information that are the targets of the silencing efforts by the centres of 
power usually provide knowledge instrumental for the better understanding of the 
contested social phenomena. The new media and other alternative sources of 
information are explored in this section in order to locate media narratives that 
deviate from the narrow mainstream narratives on ‘terrorism’. These alternative 
narratives are chosen according to their potential to provide crucial insights by filling 
in the textual omissions in the dominant narratives. The understanding of the ways in 
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which the media construct their products assists in the following analysis of the 
Terrorism Complex as a time-limited case study and offers insights into the relations 
of power and knowledge behind the construction of reality. Special attention is 
awarded to the narratives that incorporate elements of the historical or socio-political 
context and avoid treating ‘terrorist’ incidents as outbursts of unprovoked irrational 
violence. Such narratives are tied together to form an alternative explanation of the 
events covered by the chosen case study.  
The framing of the media products on ‘terrorism’ reflects either the dominant 
or the marginal discourses from across the fields. The analysis of the way the 
knowledge constructions from other observed fields fit into the media construction of 
‘terrorism’ completes the exploration of the complexity of tensions between the 
centres of power striving to maintain the status quo and the subversive elements across 
the fields that attempt to bring about change. The aim of the following analysis of the 
media field is to present the social pervasiveness of the asymmetry of power while 
paying special attention to its consequences when it comes to the legitimizations of 
questionable policies and practices before the domestic and international audiences.  
The case study involves the application of the Terrorism Complex framework 
developed throughout this thesis to the series of events that unfolded after the 
dissolution of the Kerry-led peace talks. Contextual clusters connecting the 
mechanisms of power in the political, academic and media fields will be explored in 
order to perform an in-depth analysis of the patterns of knowledge and power that 
constitute the Terrorism Complex in the chosen time frame of the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict.  
 
Breakdown of the Peace Talks 
 
The international political position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict hinges on 
the professed commitment of the two opposing parties to the two-state solution. While 
the official narratives aim to convey the resolve of each side to achieve this 
internationally supported political goal the negotiated peaceful resolution of the 
conflict remains an elusive objective undermined by the actions and developments 
that constitute the non-discursive reality. The degree to which each of the sides is 
actively pursuing peace by conforming to the rules and agreements agreed upon 
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during the various rounds of diplomacy can be established by determining whose 
narrative is better supported by the available knowledge on the non-discursive reality. 
As the 2013-2014 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks became fatigued with the 
usual levels of intransigence associated with the Israeli tendency to maintain the status 
quo and the Palestinian reluctance to make concessions that would worsen the already 
considerably underprivileged position of the Palestinian people, Israel refused the 
previously negotiated release of the fourth round of Palestinian prisoners and 
Palestinians made a unilateral political move in signing letters of accession to 15 
international treaties (Ravid, 2014c). The Palestinian signing of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, UN Genocide Convention, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid and others (Ravid, 2014c) should have been viewed as a 
positive political action as it demonstrated a commitment to international integration, 
international law, and international norms but was instead met with Israel’s punitive 
reaction (Heller, 2014) and US indignation (HRW, 2014). The Human Rights Watch 
(HRW, 2014) pointed out the generally unchallenged logical fallacy of condemning 
the Palestinian move: 
“It is disturbing that the Obama administration, which already has a 
record of resisting international accountability for Israeli rights abuses, 
would also oppose steps to adopt treaties requiring Palestinian 
authorities to uphold human rights,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle 
East director at Human Rights Watch. 
The negative reaction to the Palestinian ebbing towards the possibility of statehood 
represents systematic politicide intended to prevent any and all disturbances of the 
status quo. The widely unquestioned and uncritically accepted Israel’s quelling of 
Palestinian political actions that had even been enshrined as one of the Israeli terms 
for entering the negotiations (Ravid, 2014c) is in line with the dominant patterns of 
power symptomatic of the Terrorism Complex.  
With the peace process already having been strained, the decisive blow to the 
talks was delivered when the Israeli Housing Minister Uri Ariel announced plans for 
additional new settlements (Barnea, 2014). John Kerry temporarily overstepped the 
boundaries of the dominant discourse by relating the announcement to the effective 
end of the peace talks that unfolded in its wake (Weiss, 2014e). Kerry soon pulled back 
and apologized for the discursive slip (Weiss, 2014e) but his initial frustration was 
likely related to the continuous expansion of the settlements throughout the duration 
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of the talks (Peace Now, 2014). During the active engagement in the peace process the 
Israeli government “promoted plans and tenders for at least 13,851 housing units in 
the settlements and East Jerusalem – an average of 50 units per day and 1,540 units 
per month” which amounted to a four times higher yearly average than in the recent 
years (Peace Now, 2014).  
After Fatah and Hamas announced the formation of a unity government 
official Israeli discourse seized the opportunity to overwhelm the public space with the 
‘terrorism’ discourse in order to shift the responsibility for the failure of talks to the 
Palestinian side and return to the maintenance of the status quo. Israeli Prime Minster 
Netanyahu appeared in an a series of interviews in the Western, especially American 
media, such as the one on 24 April, 2014 on Fox News Channel’s Special Report with 
Bret Baier (zidyboby, 2014), where he was able to present Israeli official narrative with 
unchallenged authority. Netanyahu maintained that while Abbas was intent on 
colluding with the ‘terrorist’ organization Hamas, Israel had no real partner for peace 
(zidyboby, 2014). He depicted Hamas as the embodiment of the existential ‘terrorist’ 
threat to Israel and even to the United States (zidyboby, 2014). By focusing on 
Hamas’ commitment “to the annihilation of the Jewish state” and “the murder of 
Jews wherever they are” and pointing out Abbas’ willingness to embrace Hamas 
(zidyboby, 2014), Netanyahu alluded to the alleged primal animosity towards the 
Jewish people as the sole motivation for Palestinian actions. He went on to depict 
Hamas as a formidable force that never relents in its attacks on the Jewish people, 
firing “about ten thousand rockets, ten thousand rockets [emphasized] and missiles on 
our cities, on our children, on our schools. They dig tunnels in order to send suicide 
bombers and kidnappers and terrorists into our communities” (zidyboby, 2014).  
Netanyahu kept the message clear and simple and repeated it often – it was 
the Palestinian proclivity for ‘terrorism’ that was the obstacle to peace. His narrative 
was framed according to the principles of The Israel Project’s 2009 Global Language 
Dictionary, which, according to Jennifer Laszlo Mizrahi, the founder and president of 
The Israel Project, is a manual for “fighting the media war for Israel” (in: Luntz, 
2009, p. 3). Netanyahu’s narrative began and ended with ‘terrorist’ imagery, as he 
provided no other political context or content. The power of the ‘terrorism’ label was 
enough to sustain the narrative. The general context and background that Netanyahu 
omitted from his narrative was discussed in the previous chapter. The specific context 
pertaining to the failure of the peace talks, to the Palestinian unity as another 
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Palestinian political move that had to be prevented, and to the events that followed 
will be explored by locating and examining alternative narratives and sources that 
provide a platform for the subjugated knowledge on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.  
Netanyahu’s discursive framing of the Palestinian national unity, and the 
Israeli reactions that followed are yet another example of the politicide discussed in 
the previous chapter. Any serious progress towards peace, involving determining the 
borders between Israel and Palestine, ending the occupation, determining the status of 
Palestinian refugees or East Jerusalem, would disturb the status quo and the vital 
national interests tied to the territorial expansion of Israel. Hence securitization on 
‘terrorism’ grounds has repeatedly been used to justify forceful Israeli responses to 
Palestinian political actions. Actual dedication to a negotiated political solution would 
entail the recognition of the internal Palestinian reconciliation as a positive step 
towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, considering that negotiating a sustainable 
peace deal would be complicated and significantly delayed if all the issues of 
paramount national importance would have to undergo internal Palestinian 
coordination among oppositional parties before reaching the negotiating table.  
Views presented in the former EU leaders’ letter (in Sheizaf, 2013) to the then 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy explicitly 
affirm this line of reasoning by stating that efforts towards Palestinian unity should be 
encouraged if a comprehensive peace deal was to be achieved. Yuval Diskin, a former 
head of Shin Bet (2005-2011) expressed a similar sentiment in an interview for Der 
Spiegel (Heyer, 2014). Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat (2014b) accused Israel 
of using national unity as another one in the long list of excuses to avoid negotiating a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict and to avoid discussing borders while continuing the 
settlement of Palestinian land. His take on the situation was supported by the insights 
offered in the exclusive interview with the unnamed American officials by Yedioth 
Ahronoth’s Nahum Barnea (2014) in which the American narrative diverged from the 
official Israeli narrative on the peace talks. Whether the Palestinian national unity 
would contribute to the peace process or whether the peace process itself could ever 
amount to actual peace are questions that are immaterial in a situation where the 
discrepancy between Israeli official narrative and the non-discursive reality points to a 
lack of Israel’s initial desire for the resolution of the conflict. Maintaining the status 
quo that enables effective pursuit of Israel’s interests from a position of power is in 
direct contradiction with the pursuit of peace.  
	   192	  
American sources recognized the implications of Israeli avoidance of 
discussing borders and of the continued growth of the settlements for the breakdown 
of the peace process (Barnea, 2014). They established a direct connection between the 
two issues and between “expropriating land on a large scale”, which brought Israel’s 
commitment to the two-state solution into question (Barnea, 2014). The continuous 
creation of ‘facts on the ground’ created a “reality that is very difficult for the 
Palestinians and very convenient for Israel” (Barnea, 2014). They spoke of the 
concessions Abbas’ had made in agreeing to the demilitarized Palestinian state, on 
adapting borders to accommodate the settlements and East Jerusalem’s Jewish 
neighbourhoods, on Israel’s security demands involving continued presence in the 
Jordan Valley, and on the issue of the Palestinian refugees (Barnea, 2014). Former 
Israeli advisor on the peace process Gershon Baskin (2014) presented a similar 
narrative, which also contested Netanyahu’s interpretation of the partnership for 
peace with a first hand account of the compromises Abbas was open to while 
Netanyahu kept refusing every chance for peace.  
But Abbas also insisted on an actual discussion of the borders, on determining 
the timeline for the end of the occupation and on the status of East Jerusalem as the 
capital of the future Palestinian state (Barnea, 2014). And Abbas rejected the 
recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, which was drawing a line in the sand that the 
American officials said they could not understand (Barnea, 2014). What comes across 
as an obtuse denial of Israel’s right to exist, which is a misunderstanding promoted 
through official Israeli discourse, is in fact as stance against accepting institutionalized 
discrimination on ethno-religious grounds against the Israeli Palestinian population 
and a stance against accepting the narrative that seeks to erase the Nakba from the 
Palestinian collective memory and the historical responsibility for the Nakba from the 
Israeli collective memory (Erekat, 2014a). The double standard according to which 
Israel, in contrast to the Palestinians, is not required to commit to nonviolence or 
recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination is, in Rashid Khalidi’s view (in: 
Weiss, 2014a), not a negotiation but a “subjugation process”.  
Parts of the US confidential diplomatic sources’ narrative were echoed in US 
special envoy to the Middle East peace process Martin Indyk’s39 address of the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Wilner, 2014). But as the time passed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39 It has been speculated that Indyk was Barnea’s source as well (JTA and Times of Israel Staff, 2014). 
	   193	  
Indyk’s position in the mainstream media was significantly softened towards the Israeli 
role in the breakdown of talks and the narrative of equal distribution of blame on both 
sides took hold (Landler, 2014). And after even more time had passed Israeli official 
discourse on the talks resurfaced to solidify its version of events in the public discourse 
and tip the scale in favour of Israel. Israel’s negotiator Tzipi Livni’s narrative on the 
talks, although briefly critical of Netanyahu’s government’s settlement policy, 
remained entrenched in the claims that the Palestinian side, especially the unity 
agreement involving the ‘terrorist’ organization Hamas, was to blame for the 
unceremonious end of the peace process (Cohen, 2014).  
The New Republic’s Birnbaum and Tibon (2014) constructed an impressively 
detailed inside account of the 2013/2014 peace talks based on the interviews with 
Israelis, Palestinians and Americans that were at some point participating in the talks. 
The article recounted the Israeli-American special relationship, the related 
foundational bias against the Palestinian positions, the outside restraints and pressures 
imposed on the chief negotiators, the rising tensions and the frustration fuelled by 
past, present and, as was becoming increasingly evident, future conflict (Birnbaum & 
Tibon, 2014). The issue of Israeli reluctance to discuss borders surfaced as a major 
point of contention in this article as well and no amount of American coaxing was 
able to sway the Israeli position (Birnbaum & Tibon, 2014). The territorial expansion 
across the ‘Greater Israel’ (Cohen, 2014) emerges from combining historical 
background and context provided from these various accounts as the national interest 
forming the foundations of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. The requirements for the 
fulfilment of the Israeli colonial aspirations in the Palestinian territories surface as the 
main obstacle for peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.  
The general Israeli public space was flooded with biased media products 
reporting the government-spun stories assigning all the blame for the failure of the 
talks to the unreasonable Palestinian positions and demands (Drucker, 2014). After the 
story of the three missing Israeli students broke across the world and the Israeli 
government got a tangible opportunity to employ the power of the securitizing 
‘terrorism’ narratives, the dominant Israeli discourse took over. The narrative of 
Israeli disinterest in peace due to its colonial interests and the narrative of the active 
role of ‘creating facts on the ground’ policy in the untimely end of the peace process 
were effectively relegated to the realm of the subjugated knowledge, never to enter the 
mainstream and never to reach the wider international publics. International public 
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opinion has remained decisively shaped by the consolidated official narratives of 
Israeli and other authoritative sources. An example of the completely uncritical 
adoption and authoritative dissemination of the Israeli narrative was Canadian 
Foreign Minister John Baird’s article in The Globe and Mail (Baird, 2014) in which 
he overturned the asymmetry of power of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and made 
Israel seem like the ultimate victim. Such connections between the centres of power 
strengthen the dominant discourse and make its messages more believable to the 
publics.  
 
On Provocation, Incitement and Israeli Military Operations 
 
 Wider international publics were heavily exposed to the tragedy of the missing 
Jewish teens and to the narratives of the existential threat that Hamas’ ‘terrorism’ was 
posing to Israel. Israel had been demanding the world to denounce the unity 
government but had been thwarted in its efforts. International community had 
decided to give a chance to the uniting of the Palestinian political representation in a 
form of a technocratic government until democratic elections could be held, the first 
after 2006. The kidnapping of the three Jewish students in the West Bank provided 
Israel with an excuse to attack the reconciliation between the two major Palestinian 
political parties, Hamas and Fatah with renewed fervour (Landau, 2014).  
The power of the ‘terrorism’ discourse to shape positions in the international 
realm was combined with the prolonged aggressive provocations across Gaza and the 
West Bank in order to put pressure on the tender union and ultimately destroy it 
along with any international support it might had had. Abbas’ statement that “the 
unity government with Hamas would recognize Israel and condemn terrorism” 
(Khoury & Reuters, 2014) could have been recognized as a major commitment to 
peaceful political engagement, but instead got buried under an onslaught of 
‘terrorism’ discourse. .  
Idan Landau (2014) of Ben Gurion University noted a discernible pattern of 
such undermining of Palestinian unity through “premeditated escalation”: 
Why is an escalation good? Because an escalation, and the stoking of 
flames on both sides of the border, always plays into the hands of 
extremists. The call for revenge trumps the call for reconciliation, and 
the voice of separation overrides the voice of unity. (Landau, 2014) 
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Examples of such escalation include extrajudicial targeted killings in Gaza associated 
with tragic collateral loss of life (Landau, 2014) that claimed the life of a ten year old 
boy, Ali al-Awour (DCIP, 2014c), among several others. Israel also exercised its power 
over the Palestinian Authority by withholding Palestinian taxes, restricting the supply 
of electricity (JTA, 2014), preventing the “payment of salaries to 43,000 civil servants” 
who administered Gaza (Thrall, 2014b), and enacted other punitive measures justified 
by the heavy use of the ‘terrorism’ discourse (Schaeffer Omer-Man, 2014a). 
Predictably enough, Hamas responded to the Israeli provocations with rocket fire, 
“seeking through violence what it couldn’t [sic] obtain through a peaceful handover of 
responsibilities” (Thrall, 2014b).  
Israeli Government’s announcement of more settlements in response to the 
formation of the Palestinian unity government corresponded to what Mairav Zonszein 
(2014) identified as a reoccurring “form of punishment” for any type of Palestinian 
political action in pursuit of statehood. This move was another example of Israel using 
its dominant position in the power asymmetry to pursue its own interests. The hyped-
up ‘terrorism’ discourse aimed at discrediting the Palestinian political representation 
took hold in Israel, radicalizing the public space. The attack on the Jewish–Arab 
school in Israel dedicated to fostering mutual respect and peaceful coexistence 
(Gordon & Rottenberg, 2014) was a symbolic precursor of the events that unfolded 
soon after. 
 Coinciding with the Israel–Hamas asymmetrical exchange of hostilities, the 
Israeli government engaged in punitive actions against the Palestinian Authority and 
the population of the West Bank in response to the kidnapping of the three young 
Israelis. Haaretz Editorial (2014) described Israel’s actions as “underhanded 
opportunism”, as the IDF, the secret service and the police raided the West Bank 
including the PA controlled areas indiscriminately arresting Hamas members, 
demolishing homes, imposing curfews and additional limitations on the freedom of 
movement, using wanton force and incurring the deaths of several Palestinians, 
including a 15-year old boy (DCIP, 2014d), in the name of security and 
counterterrorism. Haggai Matar (2014) was equally direct in his piece for the +972 
web magazine: 
Someone’s gotta [sic] say it: what Israel has been doing in the West 
Bank over the past several days goes way beyond any attempt at trying 
to find the kidnapped teens. It is a military and political attack on 
Hamas intended on serving the government’s agenda, with no 
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connection to the attempts to find the teens, and no clear connection 
between Hamas and the kidnapping. 
While astute observations of this sort occasionally interspersed the dominant 
Israeli discourse, it remained dominated by a daily mixture of the uncritical 
recounting of Hamas ‘terrorism’, the operational details of the search for the teens 
and of the actions against Hamas, and by the human-interest stories about the 
worried families of the missing boys. The Israeli public, along with the majority of the 
world publics, were familiarized with the names of 19 year old Eyal Yifrach, 16 year-
old Gilad Shaar and 16 year-old Naftali Frenkel through impassioned reporting that 
was in stark contrast with the scant reporting on the Beitunia killings of two unarmed 
Palestinian teens by the IDF live fire a month before (DCIP, 2014e). Sheizaf (2014a) 
relates the absence of the story from the Israeli public space to the Israeli media’s self-
censorship on reporting Palestinian stories, which is how the media adapted to the 
deep aversion of the Israeli public to the stories on Palestinian suffering. 
17 year-old Nadeem Siam Nawara and 16 year-old Mohammad Mahmoud 
Odeh Abu Daher were the two Palestinian teens shot and killed with live ammunition 
while commemorating the Nakba day by protesting the policy of administrative 
detention and the ill treatment of the hunger striking Palestinian prisoners in Israeli 
prisons. The contextualization of this event would involve the recognition of the 
individual tragedies combined in this single sentence as they represent some of the 
most pressing issues of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: the historical injustice of the 
Nakba, the excessive Israeli use of force in the silencing of unarmed protest, and the 
exercise of power and control needed to maintain the prolonged military occupation.  
An example of a media report on the Nakba killings that was not only lacking 
in context but was also constructing a distorted image of reality is the The New York 
Times’ article entitled Two Palestinians Killed in Clashes With Israeli Forces (Rudoren, 
2014a). Jodi Rudoren, The New York Times’ Jerusalem bureau chief, embedded in 
the Israeli society, avoided humanizing the Palestinian teenage victims in the title by 
omitting their age and their names (Rudoren, 2014a). The title also implied that the 
deaths occurred during an exchange of force between two equal sides, which glazed 
over the extreme asymmetry of power and enabled Rudoren to avoid having to 
provide a credible explanation of why a fully armed well organized military force shot 
live ammunition at protesters hurling stones from an unthreatening distance 
(Rudoren, 2014a). In the lead of the article the 16 and 17 year-olds were referred to as 
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“young Palestinian men” (Rudoren, 2014a). The article was factual and devoid of 
emotion. The Nakba day was contextualized from an official Israeli perspective 
(Rudoren, 2014a). A follow-up article by Rudoren (2014b) entitled Video Renews 
Questions on Death of Young Palestinians featured photo material that portrayed one of the 
victims on the floor after being shot, wearing a balaclava, looking like the embodiment 
of the Western construct of the ‘Islamic threat’ (Said, 1981, pp. 39-40). Rudoren did 
not provide context for the murdered teen’s apparel, which is protection from the 
IDF‘s regular use of teargas to disturb peaceful protests across the West Bank, often 
before any stone throwing occurs (Konrad, 2014a). Instead the image was left to freely 
invoke the imagery of the ‘terrorist other’.  
Reports of the incident were quickly met with official Israeli sources’ dismissal 
of the severity of the army shootings of youths that were posing no threat 
(Schwarczenberg, 2014), by suggesting that the videotaped killing of the 17 year-old 
Nadeem Siam Nawara and 16 year-old Mohammad Mahmoud Odeh Abu Daher 
was somehow doctored (Ronen, 2014; Siryoti, et al., 2014; Ehrenreich, 2014). Former 
Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael Oren (in Blitzer, 2014) turned CNN analyst 
appeared on Wolf Blitzer’s programme to claim that “the Israeli military has a way of 
investigating this thing”, which is at odds with what is known about the impunity with 
which Israeli soldiers are allowed to act. Oren (in Blitzer, 2014) also insisted in 
pointing out “inconsistencies” in the video implying that the incident was staged and 
that the video shows  
a Palestinian young man who's supposedly throwing a rock at Israeli 
forces. You're told that that's the same Palestinian young men. And 
later he's wearing different clothes, Wolf. You've got to ask some very 
serious questions. 
In engaging a former high Israeli official as an analyst CNN could not have expected 
a less biased take on the matter. The network ultimately decided to stop introducing 
Oren as an analyst and reverted back to introducing him as a “former ambassador” 
(Kane, 2014) thus eventually refraining from misrepresenting him as a non-partisan 
news contributor. 
As the search for the missing Israeli students continued, so did the Israeli 
violence and the Palestinian unrest in the West Bank. Netanyahu used the ‘terrorism’ 
label to justify Israel’s exercise of power across the West Bank and the abandon of all 
restraint. When prompted by Abbas to condemn the killings of young Palestinians 
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who lost their lives during the Israeli raids Netanyahu (Ravid, 2014b) refused by 
saying 
The Israeli forces are acting in a manner consistent with the 
requirements of self-defense, the prime minister said, "and 
occasionally there are victims or injuries on the Palestinian side as a 
result of the self-defense activities of our forces." 
The incitement and radicalization of the public space associated with such constructs 
of moral superiority of the Israeli cause was spreading fast. #BringBackOurBoys was a 
trending hashtag in the social media while the Israeli politicians engaged 
inflammatory language in their calls for revenge and collective punishment (Lazaroff, 
2014; Ben Porat & Ronen, 2014; Badawi, 2014). Dissenting opinions such as the 
Palestinian Member of the Knesset Haneen Zoabi’s insistence on the 
contextualization of the kidnapping incurred accusations of ‘terrorism’, death threats, 
and an official investigation into Zoabi’s supposed incitement (Cook, 2014; Derfner, 
2014). Palestinian ‘terrorism’ was not allowed to be contextualized in Israel and the 
International responses avoided peering behind the ‘terrorism’ label as well (Cook, 
2014).  
How was the ‘terrorism’ label actually used? The IDF’s (IDF Blog, 2014a) 
attempt to construct kidnappings as a major terrorist threat entitled Hamas Kidnappings: 
A Constant Threat in Israel deconstructs itself by contradicting itself. The text suggests 
that the kidnappings of Israeli citizen are a constant Hamas activity as  
Hamas terrorists prey on unsuspecting hitchhikers, luring them into 
cars before forcing them into captivity. The purpose of their efforts is 
often clear: to use civilians or soldiers as bargaining chips for the 
release of convicted Palestinian terrorists. In other cases, the terrorists 
seek to murder innocent civilians and instil fear in Israeli communities. 
(IDF Blog, 2014a) 
Considering the language used the reader would be right to expect a long and 
growing list of recently kidnapped and killed innocent Israeli civilians but the text 
provides no such information. Instead its “History of Hamas Abductions” features 5 
cases of kidnappings in the 25 years between 1989 and 2014, all of them military 
personnel (IDF Blog, 2014a). The provided infographic attempts to bluntly 
manipulate the reader into believing that there is an ever-present threat of Hamas 
kidnappings by using a large title ‘64 Kidnappings’ framed by a significantly smaller 
font relating the number to “attempted” kidnappings (IDF Blog, 2014a). The text 
	   199	  
does not provide any information to substantiate the claim that 64 attempts had 
actually taken place (IDF Blog, 2014a).  
After the bodies of the missing teens had been found, the details of media 
manipulations that had been fuelling the deep public emotions slowly surfaced. Israeli 
government manipulated the domestic and international media into believing that the 
West Bank operation was a search and rescue attempt (Horowitz, et al., 2014) and not 
an assault on the Palestinian pursuit of political options. The collective punishment of 
the Palestinians for their pursuit of national unity, and the attempted destruction of 
the relationship between Fatah and Hamas by exerting extreme pressures on the 
already uneasy partnership between the two Palestinian parties were exposed as the 
obscured purposes of the operation. A gag order was placed on reporting the details of 
the case that suggested there was little hope for the teens to be found alive (Horowitz, 
et al., 2014). Yet the public was misled into hoping for a positive outcome for a 
prolonged period of time, which made the acceptance of the tragic outcome all the 
more difficult (Horowitz, et al., 2014). Another case of media manipulation was the 
embedding of domestic and foreign journalists with the IDF forces whose subsequent 
accounts could not escape being influenced by a very particular perspective of the IDF 
soldiers (Persico, 2014b; Sheizaf, 2014b).  
Through such media manipulations a climate favourable to government 
actions was created but incidentally that was also the climate that was increasingly 
toxic for the Palestinians and for those expressing dissenting opinions. Israeli Foreign 
Minister Avigdor Lieberman suggested that those demonstrating against the brutality 
of IDF’s conduct in the territories “should be treated as terrorists in every sense of the 
word” (Jpost.com Staff, 2014b). The abduction and the exceptionally brutal murder of 
the 16 year-old Muhammad Abu Khdeir, who was abducted from the street in East 
Jerusalem and burnt alive, reflected such persistent and explicit incitement by the 
authoritative Israeli political figures (Schaeffer Omer-Man, 2014c). The 
confrontational ‘us or them’ securitizing narrative, the emotional charge of the 
situation and the wrong lessons drawn from the impunity of Israel’s actions created a 
situation in Israel that was prone to extreme escalations and showed no signs of 
settling down. “[G]angs of Jewish ruffians” started “man-hunting for Arabs” (Shalev, 
2014). 
Theirs was not a one-time outpouring of uncontrollable rage following 
the discovery of the bodies of the three kidnapped students. Their 
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inflamed hatred does not exist in a vacuum: it is an ongoing presence, 
growing by the day, encompassing ever larger segments of Israeli 
society, nurtured in a public environment of resentment, insularity and 
victimhood, fostered and fed by politicians and pundits - some cynical, 
some sincere - who have grown weary of democracy and its foibles 
and who long for an Israel, not to put too fine a point on it, of one 
state, one nation and, somewhere down the line, one leader. (Shalev, 
2014) 
Social media became filled with Israeli civilians and soldiers who kept demanding 
revenge and retribution (Abunimah, 2014b; Elizabeth, 2014) that they were promised 
in the political statements and speeches (Konrad, 2014b). Israeli military incursion 
into Gaza started to appear almost inevitable if the public pressure inside Israel was to 
be relieved.  
 On 7 July 2014 Israel launched one of its most devastating military offensives 
against the Gaza Strip that lasted for fifty days, claimed the lives of 2,131 Palestinians, 
including 501 children, and 257 women, displaced approximately 110,000 people, 
destroyed over 18,000 homes along with the water and power infrastructure 
(UNOCHAoPt, 2014d). Israeli operation Protective Edge was yet another harrowing 
illustration of the power of the power asymmetry in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. 
The workings of the Terrorism Complex identified throughout the analysed fields are 
embodied in the ease with which Netanyahu was able to take the podium at the 
United Nations only shortly after the Operation Protective Edge ended. 
 In his address of the UN General Assembly on 29 September 2014 Netanyahu 
(2014b) did not refrain from attacking Abbas yet again as he characterized his address 
of the UN as “brazen lies”. Netanyahu repeated his main messages often expressed 
elsewhere: Israel has the right to defend itself from the rampant militant Islam 
represented by the likes of ISIS and Hamas. Netanyahu did not avoid mentioning the 
devastation of Gaza that spanned the summer. Israel was merely exercising its right to 
self-defence against the “thousands of rockets” fired by Hamas and challenged other 
countries to consider what they would do if their cities were targeted by thousands of 
rockets (2014b). Netanyahu went on to blame the enormous indiscriminate death toll 
among the Palestinian civilians on the requirements of the Hamas’ propaganda war. 
Hamas was intentionally placing Gazan civilians in the line of Israeli surgical fire 
where they “were tragically but unintentionally killed” (2014b). “Israel was using its 
missiles to protect its children. Hamas was using its children to protect its missiles,” 
said Netanyahu at which point he got an applause from the General Assembly 
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(2014b). This applause defines the Terrorism Complex. It is the manifestation of 
power, which determines the reality in which the ‘terrorism’ label effectively erases all 
the history and the entire context and is able to detach the events of the non-
discursive reality from said reality and reattach them in a completely different way, 
one that serves the interests of power. Aggressors can become victims and attack can 
become defence. After the new reality is constructed from the position of power it 
serves as the basis for knowledge that is produced by the centres of power and widely 
disseminated. 
 
The Counter Currents of the Terrorism Complex 
 
 In the search for the knowledge that needs to be subjugated in order not to 
disturb the dominant constructs associated with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, subtle 
changes connected to the developments in the availability of the information have 
been noted. These changes are most readily observable in the media field. Dominant 
media outlets are increasingly challenged by the alternative sources of news. During 
the research process for the purposes of this thesis the following media sources stood 
out in their ability to provide consistently reliable information not readily available 
elsewhere: +972 (n.d., [About]), a blog-based magazine “jointly owned by a group of 
journalists, bloggers and photographers whose goal is to provide fresh, original, on-
the-ground reporting and analysis of events in Israel and Palestine”. Mondoweiss 
(n.d., [About Mondoweiss]), “a news website devoted to covering American foreign 
policy in the Middle East, chiefly from a progressive Jewish perspective”, and 
Jonathan Cook (n.d., [About]), “award-winning British journalist based in Nazareth”. 
Other notable sources include Haaretz, Middle East Eye, and Electronic Intifada. 
Taken together these sources provide a solid starting point for the exploration of 
alternative narratives, for the crosschecking of available information and for 
challenging the mechanisms of power that affect the mainstream media.  
 During the Operation Protective Edge and its unceasing sequence of atrocities, 
one of them was awarded special attention by the media. The Israeli surgical strike 
supposedly aimed at terrorist targets hit and killed four Palestinian boys aged between 
7 and 11 years while playing football on an open beach in front of the hotel where 
international journalists were stationed. The proximity of the attack and the surviving 
shell-shocked boys who got away with injuries and took refuge on the hotel terrace 
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made the conflict more personal for the reporters. NBC’s Ayman Mohyeldin, an 
acclaimed veteran reporter responded to the attack with a series of tweets in which he 
personalized the victims through his personal experience (Mohyeldin & Nassar, 2014).  
Moutaz Bakr, 1 of the boys who survived #Israeli shelling, was 
shaking w [sic] a broken army [sic], blood shot eyes, says he saw 3 of 
his friends killed. (Mohyeldin & Nassar, 2014) 
 
[Photo of a grieving mother] A #Palestinian mother reacts to the news 
that her son was one of 4 boys killed in Israeli shelling of #gaza 
seaport. (Mohyeldin & Nassar, 2014) 
The next day Glenn Greenwald (2014) of The Intercept reported that Mohyeldin was 
pulled out of Gaza by a top NBC executive David Verdi and replaced with another 
reporter, citing “security concerns”. Greenwald (2014) proposed that it was 
Mohyeldin’s quality reporting during which he provided “context to the conflict that 
is missing from most American reports” and his reluctance to uncritically adopt 
“Israeli government talking points as truth” what got him removed from his post. 
Greenwald’s reporting and his critical assessment of the narrative provided by the 
network got Mohyeldin’s case exposure. After being picked up by other alternative 
news outlets (Weiss, 2014b, 2014c), the news of his unusual replacement together with 
his original story spread quickly. Mohyeldin’s story was also trending on Twitter 
under the hashtag #LetAymanReport (The Stream, 2014). The pressure from viewers 
began to build and the NBC let Mohyeldin return to Gaza (Weiss, 2014c).  
 Social media were quickly spotted as the major new player in reporting on 
conflict. Paul Mason (2014) of the Channel 4 News posed an important question – 
“Why Israel is Losing the Social Media War Over Gaza?” He identified the 
characteristics of Twitter that set it apart as a news experience that has a big impact 
on the news consumer. Twitter’s ability to provide news in real time, unfiltered and 
unburdened by editorial policies, in an organically developing and self-correcting way 
presents a fresh news experience with a more direct impact on the consumer’s 
consciousness (Mason, 2014). Social media also offer an unprecedented platform for 
the marginalized discourses to reach wider audiences than ever before and 
Palestinians get a chance to present the world with their version of reality and 
humanize themselves when the mainstream media refuse to do so. Yousef al-Helou 
(2014) pointed out the 2014 attack on Gaza as  
	   203	  
“one of the first wars to be photographed mainly by amateurs and 
social media platforms, allowing those images to spread far and wide 
at the click of a button, helping the people of Gaza win hearts and 
minds, and subsequently causing unprecedented outrage against 
Israel”. 
 Al-Helou (2014) made a fresh point in his article by juxtaposing subjective and 
objective journalism, which is a topic worthy of further discussion not only in the 
scope of the media field but also in relation to the academic field. 
Authoritative, alternative, and dissenting voices with intimate knowledge of the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict provide a selection of narratives that expose Netanyahu’s 
UN address as a manifestation of the Terrorism Complex that emanates from and 
reproduces the current status quo. These alternative narratives address the contextual 
omissions found in the dominant discourse. Crosschecking these narratives with the 
historical background of the conflict, and with other narratives providing contextual 
information on the conflict, affirms that they provide a better semantic fit with the 
non-discursive reality. Alternative narratives have the potential to disturb the Israeli 
official discourse and expose its narratives as the constructs of reality that lack a 
persuasive connection to the non-discursive reality. As such they have to rely on the 
power/knowledge nexus of the Terrorism Complex for their credibility. Social media, 
along with the alternative online media outlets, and the dissenting journalistic voices, 
freelancing, or working for the traditional media establishments, provide a wealth of 
information that can be used to construct alternative knowledge on the conflict as it 
unfolds.  
 
	   204	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The soul is a thing so impalpable, often so useless, and sometimes so in the way, 
that I felt somewhat less emotion over its loss than if I had dropped my visiting 
card out walking. 
Charles Baudelaire (1970, p. 61)  
 
 
The definitional quagmire in relation to ‘terrorism’ and the controversy 
regarding the use of the term ‘terrorism’ had initiated the research question about the 
operations of the power/knowledge nexus behind the social construction of ‘terrorism’ 
as a political, academic and media subject. This thesis has hypothesized that the acts 
of ‘terrorism’ are merely the outward manifestations of conflicts which emanate from 
the intransigent nature of the deep-seated patterns of subjugation and control entailed 
in the asymmetry power between the actors involved. The hypothesis has further 
suggested that defining ‘terrorism’ is an exercise of power that perpetuates the status 
quo of the asymmetric distribution of power.  
The term ‘Terrorism Complex’ has been introduced as a theoretical concept 
that accommodates the expansion of the ontological and epistemological scopes 
needed to conduct research on the effects of the power asymmetry on the production 
of knowledge on ‘terrorism’. Terrorism Complex has thus been defined as the 
dynamic network of complex interactions between power and knowledge that precede 
and follow ‘terrorism’ in settings marked by the asymmetry of power. The aim of the 
proposed wider understanding of ‘terrorism’ has been twofold: to highlight the 
complicity of the socio-political currents geared towards the preservation of the status 
quo in ‘terrorism’, and to explore the potential of the socio-political counter-currents 
for finding sustainable solutions for protracted asymmetric conflicts. 
 
Before discussing how the research aim has been satisfied for each of the 
examined fields of academe, politics and media, a recapitulation of the main 
theoretical and methodological considerations serves to outline the abstract contours 
of the Terrorism Complex. The critical disposition of this thesis towards the dominant 
approaches to ‘terrorism’ research has demanded awarding special attention to the 
philosophical and theoretical guidelines that can support innovation in terms of 
ontology and epistemology. The theoretical foundation of the thesis needed not only 
provide the definitions of the central abstract concepts such as power, knowledge and 
discourse, but also illuminate their role in the Terrorism Complex. The connections 
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between power, knowledge and discourse had to be made salient in order to 
understand the most abstract but also the most fundamental workings of the 
Terrorism Complex. Building mainly on the works of Bourdieu (1992, 1989, 1988, 
1993, 2005, 1973), Foucault (1972, 1981, 2002b, 2002d), and Derrida (1997, 2001), 
the consolidation of select knowledge constructs in the form of discourses featuring 
‘objective truth’ about the social world has been argued to be an exercise of power 
aimed at maintaining and reinforcing the existing distribution of power. Only after 
‘truth’ is perceived as “a stake in the struggle” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 263) for power can 
the research into the Terrorism Complex begin.  
After establishing the constitutive relationship between power and knowledge 
as a valid research subject, the scope of analysis has been set on the fields of academe, 
politics, and media as the main areas where the production of knowledge on 
‘terrorism’ takes place. A melange of methodological choices has formed a customized 
methodology necessary to address the various levels at which the Terrorism Complex 
operations have been expected to manifest. Discourses on ‘terrorism’ have been 
approached as the primary indicators of the elusive interplay of power and knowledge 
in order to examine the construction of reality on ‘terrorism’. The analysis has 
addressed the omissions, emphases, inner tensions and unexpected information in 
individual texts; the combinations and juxtapositions of wider narratives; and the 
constitutive elements of reality featured in the dominant and marginalized discourses. 
The insights gained have informed a genealogical analysis of the Terrorism Complex, 
which has related the analysed discourses to the non-discursive reality they are the 
product of and to the non-discursive reality they are referring to. The multileveled 
analysis has illuminated the operations of the Terrorism Complex across the analysed 
fields. The following discussion will focus on the particularities of the Terrorism 
Complex in each individual field and conclude by pointing out the common patters in 
which the power/knowledge nexus operates.  
 
The examination of the Terrorism Complex in relation to the academic field 
in Chapter 3 has focused on the relations of power within the field that affect the 
academic construction of knowledge on ‘terrorism’. The analysis of the field of 
Terrorism Studies has indicated the main contours of the status quo within the field as 
West-centric, state-biased, and preoccupied with policing the borders of ‘proper 
science’. The invisible colleges of terrorism research (Reid, 1997; 2007) connect agents 
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that have been shaping the agenda of the field since its beginnings, and represents the 
orthodox elite of the field (Reid, 1997; 2007; Miller & Mills, 2009; Burnett & Whyte, 
2005). A strong connection that has been observed between these agents and the 
centres of power in the political field has been found to have an effect on the 
hierarchization of agents and products in the academic field: agents transitioning 
between the academic, political, and media fields are perceived favourably, and 
research aligned with state interests is regarded positively.  
Positivistic demands that impose ontological and epistemological limits on the 
production of knowledge have been argued to obscure the perception of knowledge as 
a social construct. The arguments presented in the third chapter have established a 
link between the narrowing of the Terrorism Studies’ research scopes, and the 
orientation of the dominant orthodox academic research towards the tangible, readily 
observable and quantifiable aspects of ‘terrorism’. The preoccupation of the 
Orthodox Terrorism Studies with ‘objectivity’ has been awarded special attention in 
the discussion of the Terrorism Complex in relation to the academic field. This thesis 
has suggested that perceiving ‘objectivity’ as the result of a rigorous practice of certain 
methodological techniques, is not only misleading but also damaging, as it leads to the 
progressive abandonment of normative requirements and ethical considerations that 
could safeguard against the desensitization to humanity in research.  
The blind spots of the orthodox production of knowledge on ‘terrorism’, such 
as the loss of connection with the normative considerations (Booth, 1995b, pp. 107-
109; 2008), and the lack of discussion on state terrorism (Jackson, 2008; Blakeley, 
2007; Raphael, 2009, pp. 58-62; Jackson, 2011b, pp. 174-197; Dalacoura, 2009, pp. 
125-127), have been pointed out from the margins of the field. The consolidation of 
such incursions of heterodoxy into the field in the form of Critical Terrorism Studies 
(Jackson, 2009b; Jackson, et al., 2009b; Jackson, 2011b) has been regarded as a 
positive development. Given the Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ proclivity towards 
aligning with the centres of power in the political field, CTS has been presented as an 
alternative to the field’s tendency to aid in the legitimization of controversial 
counterterrorist policies (Jackson, 2005b; Bellamy, 2005; Flint & Falah, 2004; Ben-
Naftali & Michael, 2003). A practical example of the dangers involved in the 
abandonment of normative considerations in favour of serving the interests of power 
is the attempt to abolish the protection of non-combatants during armed combat in 
favour of protecting the armed forces (Ben-Naftali & Michael, 2003). The academic 
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legitimization of the political practice (e.g., INSCT, 2011; Kasher & Yadlin, 2006) is 
adapting to the particularities and the dominant interests of the state in the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict. 
The analysis of the Terrorism Complex in the academic field has indicated 
that the existence of CTS does not automatically imply that there is a binary 
corrective in the field of Terrorism Studies. The status quo of the asymmetric 
distribution of power between the OTS and CTS has been discussed and the analysis 
of the field has identified the following mechanisms of power, which ensure that the 
top positions in the field remain occupied by the OTS scholars. With CTS entering 
the struggles over the representations of ‘terrorism’ in Terrorism Studies, the 
mechanisms of power limiting the space for the exploration of available knowledge 
have become more pronounced (Jackson, et al., 2009b, p. 8; Jackson, 2011a; 2011b, 
p. 13). The marginalization and silencing of dissenting opinions through 
delegitimization and stringent gatekeeping (e.g., Jones & Smith, 2009; Bendle, 2008; 
Jones & Ungerer, 2006; Lane, 2008) have been detected as the major mechanisms of 
power intended to maintain the status quo of the power distribution within the 
academic field.  
The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the academic field in relation to 
the Terrorism Complex underscore the need for furthering the ideas and 
recommendations put forth by the critical approaches to ‘terrorism’. The relations of 
power that underpin ‘terrorism’ are reproduced when the term ‘terrorism’ is used 
indiscriminately, without being properly contextualized, or when the subjectivity 
entailed in the production of the academic constructs of reality is kept out of the 
ontological scope of the field. Developing an understanding of the field’s role in the 
Terrorism Complex is thus instrumental in disturbing the status quo, not only in the 
academic filed but also in the political field, where its effects can be most detrimental. 
 
 The connection between the status quo and ‘terrorism’ has been the central 
focus of Chapter 4 where the Terrorism Complex has been examined in the context 
of the political field. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been selected as a case study 
in order to test the hypothesis that the application of the ‘terrorism’ label depends on 
the asymmetric distribution of power in a conflict and is ultimately an exercise of 
power. The more powerful actor has more symbolic power to define reality. This 
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conflict has been chosen for its pronounced asymmetry of power between the actors 
involved, and for the extensive use of the securitizing ‘terrorism’ discourse.  
In the introductory parts of the chapter, the initial power asymmetry in the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been attributed to the difference in status between 
Israel as a sovereign nation state, and Palestine, a non-state entity. This accumulation 
of power on the Israeli side has been linked to Israel’s ability to establish the 
‘monopoly over truth’ (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 180-181). Israel’s narratives on the origins 
of the conflict have been examined and countered with alternative narratives that 
challenge the dominant constructs by providing a wider context and a historical 
background. The elements of the dominant historical narratives have been traced to 
the contemporary political narratives defining the conflict. The remainder of the 
chapter has been dedicated to describing the status quo of the conflict and the 
working of power and knowledge surrounding it. The research has focused on the 
marginalized narratives that disturb the power/knowledge nexus, subvert the official 
constructs of reality and consequently make room not only for alternative 
explanations of the conflict, but also for alternative solutions. The sources of 
subjugated knowledge have been located among the international institutions (e.g., 
UNOCHAoPt, 2014d; UNHRC, 2009), non-governmental organizations (e.g., 
B'Tselem, n.d.-a; DCIP, n.d.-a; Adalah, n.d.-b; Yesh Din, n.d.-a; Al Haq, n.d.), 
grassroots initiatives (e.g., The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 
2010), movements (e.g., Combatants for Peace, n.d.; Machsom Watch - Women 
Against the Occupation and for Human Rights, n.d.; New Profile, n.d.), and 
dissenters (e.g., Breaking the Silence, n.d.-a; de Soto, 2007; Ravid, 2014a; Sheizaf, 
2013). This heterogeneous group of actors operating in directions other than the 
mainstream status quo has been identified as the counter-currents of the Terrorism 
Complex. These currents, though marginalized and weak in comparison to the 
dominant currents, present a potential threat to the status quo and face adversities 
that stem from the system and structures put in place from the positions of power in 
support of the power imbalance.  
The research of the power/knowledge relations and mechanisms that 
constitute the Terrorism Complex in the political field has used the uncovered 
subjugated knowledge on the conflict to set the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in a wider 
historical and socio-political context. This context represents a challenge to the 
dominant narratives and to their deployment of the term ‘terrorism’. The individual 
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segments of the alternative narrative on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict presented in 
Chapter 4 have been supported by a multitude of sources and illuminated from 
various perspectives in order to signal the amount of marginalized, silenced, omitted 
and obscured knowledge behind the dominant narratives. The conflict has been recast 
in the context of the Israeli neo-colonial project which depends on the securitizing 
narrative of Palestinian ‘terrorism’ for the justification of the continued occupation of 
Palestinian land.  
The analysis of the relations of power and knowledge that factor into 
sustaining this conflict situation has disclosed the pervasive mechanisms of power 
operating under the auspices of the Terrorism Complex. In section 4.2.3 The 
‘Terrorism’ Context – Status Quo and the Terrorising Effects of the Mechanisms of Power these 
mechanisms have been identified as the extensive Israeli control over most aspects of 
Palestinians’ lives; as the active prevention of recourse to official, legal, and political 
means of addressing the wrongs that Palestinians experience due to the occupation 
and the Israeli settlement project; and the silencing of discourses and knowledge 
critical of Israeli actions. The use of the ‘terrorism’ label has been found to be 
instrumental in the operation of the mechanisms of power as it is used to justify a 
range of Israeli actions against the Palestinians, including extrajudicial executions 
(e.g., IDF Blog, 2014b) and military operations with high civilian death toll (e.g., 
Kasher, 2010). The research in this chapter has provided insight into how Israel uses 
its dominant position in the asymmetry of power to apply the ‘terrorism’ label to the 
Palestinians in order to divert attention from the operations of Israeli state terrorism. 
These dynamics of power and knowledge can be seen as the underlying causes of 
‘terrorism’ and they represent the Terrorism Complex in action. The understanding 
of ‘state terrorism’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘counterterrorism’ as the cycle of violence has 
important implications for conflict resolution since it distributes the responsibility for 
creating and sustaining extreme conflict situations more accurately. It underscores the 
importance of including state terrorism on the agenda of the counterterrorism policies 
if they are to be successful in the sustainable long-term prevention of ‘terrorism’. 
 
The tracking of the Terrorism Complex operations has continued in Chapter 
5, where the focus of research has shifted to the media field. The scope of analysis has 
been narrowed down to examine the operation of the Terrorism Complex 
surrounding a singular event to which the ‘terrorism’ label had been applied – the 
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June 2014 kidnapping and murder of three Israelis in the West Bank. The study of the 
media field and the contextualization of the events under analysis have confirmed the 
operation of the mechanisms of power identified in previous chapters.  
The incursion of influences and exertion of pressures from outside of the field 
(Herman & Chomsky, 1994, p. 26; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2008, pp. 168-169; Corera, 
2003, p. 256; Philo, et al., 2003, p. 136; 2012, pp. 157-158) lead to biased reporting 
(Entman, 2007), censorship (Nossek & Limor, 2001), and self-censorship (Sherman & 
Shavit, 2006; Näslund & Pemer, 2012), which factor into the construction of media 
products (e.g., Hass, 2013; Weiss, 2014d). In the quest for objectivity reporters often 
resort to official sources (Philo, et al., 2003, pp. 143-144), which leads to the 
reproduction of the official securitizing narratives and to the uncritical adoption of the 
predefined ‘terrorism’ label (e.g., zidyboby, 2014). These factors contribute to the 
silencing of narratives that could challenge the dominant representations of reality. 
Other attempts to keep alternative perspectives from the public eye include physical 
attacks (PCHR, 2009; Reporters Without Borders, 2009), restraint of access (Kuttab, 
2013), and efforts to limit the freedom of expression on the basis of counterterrorism 
laws (Banisar, 2008), since the undefined term ‘terrorism’ allows for a broad 
interpretation of what constitutes ‘justifying terrorism’, ‘support for terrorism’, or 
‘incitement to terrorism’. The cumulative result of these mechanisms in the media 
field have been observed in the simplified, decontextualized, and misleading dominant 
media discourse on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Philo, et al., 2003; 2011) which 
caters to the interests of the dominant elites.  
The interconnectedness of the centres of power (Miller & Mills, 2009) aids in 
uncritical dissemination and unconditional reception of discursive representations 
constructed from the positions of power. The conclusion drawn from the analysis of 
the operations of power and knowledge in the media field suggests that the authority 
of official narratives and the narrow contexts framing the events of the non-discursive 
reality limit the ability of the alternative narratives to reach the publics. The 
asymmetry of power in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is thus replicated and sustained 
through the dominant media discourse. 
The awareness of the mechanisms of power operating in the media field has 
informed the analysis of the media representations of the events that have marked the 
reporting on the 2014 West Bank kidnapping, on the events leading up to it, and on 
the particularly acute set of violent manifestations of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 
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that unfolded in its wake. The effects of the Terrorism Complex have been observed 
in the extent of the disparity between the verifiable information about the non-
discursive reality, and the dominant narratives, their reception and framing.  
The analysis of the Terrorism Complex operations in the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict between April and September 2014 has pointed out the following effects of 
the biased dominant media discourse on the Israeli domestic society that has been 
most directly and extensively exposed to the discursive constructs intended to 
maintain the status quo. The long-term progressive closure of discursive spaces to 
Palestinian perspectives, the silencing of narratives critical of Israeli policies towards 
the Palestinians, and incitement from the authoritative political positions have 
produced an incendiary social environment. The ensuing normalization of extremist 
positions in Israeli domestic society has led to the open and extensive radicalization of 
the public space, closely followed by outbursts of violence. The analysis has shown 
that the process has been facilitated by the consistent application of the ‘terrorist’ label 
to the Palestinians, the exaggeration of the threat, the extreme securitization and the 
resulting demonization of the ‘Other’. All of these discursive patterns have gradually 
changed the image of acceptable reality in Israel to the extent that has enabled 
extreme positions to be exposed openly as they have become the new normal.  
The extent of the radicalization of Israeli official positions was pointed out 
during Naftali Bennet’s 2014 visit to the United States. Bennett, in the capacity of the 
Israeli Minister of Economy and the leader of The Jewish Home, a right wing Israeli 
party on the rise, was confronted with the ever more pronounced departure of Israel’s 
positions from what even some of the most ardent supporters of Israel see as 
acceptable (Weiss, 2014f). In a discussion on Israel’s future, Haim Saban, a prominent 
supporter of Israel, said to Bennett, “You and I live in different bubbles and in 
different realities” (Weiss, 2014f), while the peace-process veteran Martin Indyk of the 
Brookings Institution think tank, former US ambassador to Israel and former pro-
Israel lobbyist (Brookings Institution, n.d.; The Forward, 2014) remarked, “you live in 
another reality” and went on to characterize it as a “distorted reality field” (Weiss, 
2014f). The dominant reality construct of Israel as a victim engaged in self-defensive 
counterterrorism has become more difficult to maintain in the face of excessive 
aggression displayed openly by some of the highest political representatives and by 
sections of society alike (e.g., Badawi, 2014; Ben Porat & Ronen, 2014; Lazaroff, 
2014). The longstanding discursive asymmetry has eventually resulted in a construct 
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of reality that is so far removed from the non-discursive reality that it has held up thus 
far only due to the structural complex of the mechanisms of power across the involved 
fields.  
It is too early to draw conclusions about the possible changes in the dominant 
discourse on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict but the question worthy of future research 
is whether the introduction of the new media into the power/knowledge relations of 
the media field can aid in the disruption of the status quo. A preliminary analysis of 
the counter-currents to the status quo in the media field has focused on the impact of 
the new ways in which information is transmitted in the digital age. The results 
suggest that even though locating the subjugated and silenced narratives still largely 
depends on the personal engagement of interested individuals, the spread of such 
information among larger audiences has become easier through the new media 
platforms (Rainie, 2010; Purcell, 2010; 2010; Naveh, 2007). The gaping discrepancy 
between discursive and non-discursive reality has, with the help of the new media, 
allowed for the incursion of subjugated knowledge into select public spaces and has 
presented dominant discourse with a challenge it has long been impervious to. The 
online media platforms and the social media in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict represent the hitherto unattainable public space for the dissemination of the 
Palestinian perspectives (al-Helou, 2014,Mason, 2014 #1480). The slow and steady 
spread of alternative narratives among the world publics has resulted in mass protests 
across the world during the Operation Protective Edge (Haaretz, 2014c), and in a 
wave of boycott, divestment and sanctions successes (BDS Movement, n.d.).  
The rise and spread of the unprecedented options for the instant organic 
interconnectedness of individuals, which appear to rival the traditional media 
structures, has triggered the mechanisms of the Terrorism Complex. In line with the 
silencing observed in other fields, the securitizing ‘terrorism’ narrative has been used 
in an attempt to criminalize the dissemination of narratives that might present a 
challenge to the status quo (e.g., Weimann, 2014). The efforts to control, limit and 
regulate the Internet have been initiated as well (Banisar, 2008, pp. 22-24). The 
operations of the Terrorism Complex in the media field erode the core journalistic 
values by shaping the construction of the media products according to external 
pressures. Active awareness of the mechanisms of power identified in this thesis as 
affecting the field can be useful in the critical evaluation of the seemingly objective 
media products.  
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The purpose of this thesis has been to contribute to the expanding of the 
ontological space of Terrorism Studies beyond the foundational assumptions about 
‘terrorism’ that determine the ways in which ‘terrorism’ can be approached as an 
academic subject, as a political phenomenon, and as a media subject. The 
examination of the processes and relations of power behind the construction, 
subjugation, and marginalization of knowledge on ‘terrorism’ has revealed the various 
forms of domination embodied in the mechanisms of power such as silencing, control, 
delegitimization, and the use of force, that are used across the fields in order to secure 
the status quo of the asymmetric power distribution. The introduction of the 
Terrorism Complex as a new theoretical concept has proven useful in rendering this 
complexity easier to follow when it was referred to as a research subject during 
analysis. 
The research scope has been overly ambitious but necessarily so. It has 
represented a move towards reclaiming the space for broad theorizing in the 
academic study of complex social phenomena since “[t]he failure to acknowledge the 
complexity of a certain situation is not merely a technical error, it is also an ethical 
one” (Cilliers, 2005, p. 256). This thesis has succeeded in outlining a framework for 
future research which can facilitate a comprehensive untangling of the Terrorism 
Complex. This task is not in the purview of any one individual but rather offers itself 
as a venue of critical exploration that incorporates many academic subjects and many 
critical lines of research that have already been opened, and those yet to be identified.  
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